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Complaint Filed by Blake S Atkin, Attorney for 
Plaintiff 
Judge 
David C Nye 
David C Nye 
Filing: A - Civil Complaint for more than $1,000.00 David C Nye 
Paid by: Atkin Law Office PC Receipt number: 
0021684 Dated: 6/8/2009 Amount: $88.00 
(Check) For: 
Plaintiff: Clayson, Gaylen Attorney Retained Blake David C Nye 
S Atkin 
Summons Issued - Don Zebe, 465 Berrett Ave, David C Nye 
Pocatello, 1083201 
Summons Issued - Rick Lawson, 431 David C Nye 
Chesapeake Ave, Pocatello, 1083202 
Summons Issued - LAZE LLC % Rick Lawson, David C Nye 
431 Chesapeake Ave, Chubbuck, 1083202 
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other David C Nye 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: bowers 
law firm Receipt number: 0028119 Dated: 
7/27/2009 Amount: $58.00 (Check) For: Lawson, 
Rick (defendant), LAZE, LLC (defendant) and 
Zebe, Donald I (defendant) 
Answer, counterclaim and Demand for Jury; aty David C Nye 
John Bowers for def 
Defendant: Zebe, Donald I Attorney Retained David C Nye 
John D. Bowers 
Defendant: Lawson, Rick Attorney Retained John David C Nye 
D. Bowers 
Defendant: LAZE, LLC Attorney Retained John D. David C Nye 
Bowers 
Answer to Counterclaim; aty Blake Atkin for 
plntf/counterclaim def 
David C Nye 
Returns of Service of Summons and Complaint to David C Nye 
Don Zebe, Rick Lawson, and Laze, LLC; lsi Blake 
Atkin, atty for plantiff/counterclaim def 
Order of Disqualification and Reference; lsi J Nye David C Nye 
Administrative Order of Reference; matter David C Nye 
reassigned to Judge Dunn; lsi J Nye 
Order for Submission of Information for 
Scheduling Order; Is J Dunn 09/18/09 
Stipulated Statement (Atkin forPlaintiff) 
Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint; aty 
Blake Atkin for plntf/counterclaim Def. 
Memorandum in support of Motin for Leave to 
Amend Complaint; aty Blake Atkin for plntf 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Certificate of service of Plntfs First set of Interrog Stephen S Dunn 
to Defs; aty Blake Atkin for defs 
Date: 4/1/2011 
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Certificate of service of Plaintiffs first set of 
Document requests to Defendants: aty Blake 
Atkin for plntf/counterclaim def. 
Notice of Hearing; Motion for Leave to Amend; 
(Atkin for Def) 
Judge 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/23/200902:00 Stephen S Dunn 
PM) 
Defendants Motion to Continue Hearing on Stephen S Dunn 
Motion to Amend; aty John Bowers for defs 
Defendants Response to Plntfs Motion to Amend Stephen S Dunn 
Complaint; aty JohnBowers for def 
Certificate of service on Discovery Responses; Stephen S Dunn 
aty JohnBowers for def 
First Amended Complaint; Blake S: Atkin, Stephen S Dunn 
Attorney for Plntf. Adding Don Zebe. Rick Lawson 
and Laze, LLC as Counterclaim Plaintiffs, and 
Gaylen Clayson as Counterclaim Defendant 
Answer to First Amended Complaint; aty John Stephen S Dunn 
Bowers for Defslcounterclaim plntfs 
Hearing result for Motion held on 11/23/2009 Stephen S Dunn 
02:00 PM: Hearing Held 
Order; Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint is Stephen S Dunn 
Granted; J Dunn 12-14-09 
Stipulated Statement; atyBlake Atkin for Stephen S Dunn 
plntflcounterclaim def 
Notice of Depo of Bill Hudson; set for 1-8-2010 Stephen S Dunn 
@9am: 
Order Setting Jury Trial; Is J Dunn 12/23/09 Stephen S Dunn 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 03/23/201009:00 Stephen S Dunn 
AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 11/02/201009:00 Stephen S Dunn 
AM) 
Certificate of service - aty John Bowers for defs 
Amended notice of Depo of Bill Hudson on 
1-12-2010: aty Blake Atkin 
Amended Notice of Depo of Bill Hudson on 
1-12-2010 @ 9am: aty Blake Atkin for plntf 
Subpoena Duces Tecum; aty Blake Atkin 
Notice of service of Subpoena Duces Tecum; 
aty Blake Atkin for plnt/conterclaim def 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Return of service - srvd on (copy of Subpoena to Stephen S Dunn 
Becky Holzemer 12-29-09) 
Certificate of Service - aty John Bowers for defs Stephen S Dunn 
Date: 4/1/2011 
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Amended Notice of Depo of Gaylen clayson and Stephen S Dunn 
Subpoena; aty John Bowers for Def and 
Counterclaim plntfs 
Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice (Bowers for Stephen S Dunn 
Def) 
Defendant's Motion to Modify Scheduling Order Stephen S Dunn 
(Bowers for Def) 
Notice of Deposition of Jeff Randall; on Stephen S Dunn 
1-26-2010 @ 9am: aty John Bowers for def 
Order modifying deadlines in order setting Jury Stephen S Dunn 
Trial; J Dunn 1-20-2010 
Order of Admission Pro Hac Vice; J Dunn 
1-20-2010 
Stephen S Dunn 
Second Amended Notice of Depo of Gaylen Stephen S Dunn 
Clayson on 2-2-2010 @ 9am: aty John Bowers 
for def and counterclaim plntf 
Amended Notice Depo of Jeff Randall on Stephen S Dunn 
2-3-2010 @ 9am: aty John Bowers for defs and 
counterclaim plntf 
Motion and Memorandum to Hold Citizen Stephen S Dunn 
Community Bank in contempt for nonobedience 
of subpoena; aty Blake Atkin for 
plntf/counterclaim def 
Defs Motin to Dismiss and or Motion for summary Stephen S Dunn 
Judgment; aty John Bowers 
Defs Memorandum in support of motion to 
dismiss and or motion for sumary Judgment; 
John Bowers for defs 
Stephen S Dunn 
aty 
Certificate of service of plntfs Response to Defs Stephen S Dunn 
First request for Production of Documents; aty 
Blake Atkin for plntf 
Third Amended Notice of Depo of T Gaylen Stephen S Dunn 
Clayson on 2-17-2010 @ 9am: aty John Bowers 
for defs 
Amended Notice Depo of Jeff Randall on Stephen S Dunn 
2-15-2010 @ 10am: aty John Bowers for defs 
Subpoena Duces Tecum; (Glanbia Foods) 
Third Amended Notice of Depo of Jeff Randall; 
set for 2-15-2010: aty John Bowers for def 
Fourth Amended Notice of Depo of Gaylen 
Clayson on 2-17-2010 @ 9am: aty John Bowers 
for defs 
Subpoena Returned; left wI Jerry Femnger 
Fifth Amended Notice of Deposition of Gaylen 
Clayson on 2-25-2010 @ 9am: aty John Bowers 
for def and counterclaim plntf 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Date: 4/1/2011 
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Defendants Designation of Fact Witnesses; aty Stephen S Dunn 
John Bowers for the Def and Counterclaim Plntts 
Certificate of service of plntts response to 
Defendants Second request for production of 
documents; aty Blaker Atkin for 
plntt/counterclaim def 
Notice of Deposition of Rick Lawson (Atkin for 
Plaintiff) 
Notice of Deposition of Don Zebe (Atkin for 
Plaintiff) 
Plaintiffs Designation of Fact Witnesses: aty 
Blake Atkin for plntt 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Motion and Memorandum to be allowed to file late Stephen S Dunn 
dSignation of Fact Witnesses: aty Blake Atkin for 
plntf 
Defendants Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Witness Stephen S Dunn 
List;; aty John Bowers for defs 
Defendants Motion to Compel Discovery; aty Stephen S Dunn 
John Bowers for def 
Notice of Hearing; set for Defs Motoin to Stephen S Dunn 
Dismiss/or Motion for Summary Judgment; aty 
John Bowers for Def 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/15/2010 02:00 Stephen S Dunn 
PM) 
Amended Notice of Deposition of Rick Lawson Stephen S Dunn 
3-4-2010 @ gam: aty Blake Atkin for plntt 
Amended Notice of Deposition of Don Zebe on Stephen S Dunn 
3-3-2010 @ 9am: aty Blake Atkin for plntt 
Motion to Continue Hearing Date from March 15, Stephen S Dunn 
2010 to March 23, 2010 (Bowers for Def) 
Order Vacating Hearing on March 15, 2010 and Stephen S Dunn 
rescheduling for March 23, 2010 /s J Dunn 
03/12/10 
Continued (Motion 03/23/2010 10:00 AM) 
Stipulation and understanding of parties 
concerning Trial date Rescheduling; sl Don 
Zebe and Rick Lawson 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stipulation and Understanding of Parties Stephen S Dunn 
Concerning Trial Date Rescheduling (Don Zebe; 
Rick Lawson) 
Certificate of service of Plaintiffs Third set of 
Requests for Production of Documents to 
Defendants: aty Blake Atkin for pint 
Stephen S Dunn 
Certificate of Service of Plaintiffs Second set of Stephen S Dunn 
Interrog. to Defendants: aty Blake Atkin for 
plntt/counterclaim Def. 
Date: 4/1/2011 
Time: 03:26 PM 
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Date Code User 
3/22/2010 CAMILLE Certificate of Service of Plaintiffs First set of 
Requests for Admissions to Defendants: aty 
Blake Atkin for plntf/counterclaim def. 
3/23/2010 CAMILLE Memorandum in Opposition to Defs Motion to 
Dismiss and or Motin for Summary Judgment; 
Memorandum in support of Motion to Amend 
Plntfs First Amended Complaint to Assert a Claim 
for PUnitive Damages; and Motion to countinue 
pursuant to IR 
CP 56f: aty Blake Atkin for p Intflcounterclaim 
defendant 
CAMILLE Affidavit of Blake S Atkin in Support of Plaintiffs 
Rule 56f Motion; aty Blake Atkin for plntf 
counterclaim def 
HRHD KARLA Hearing result for Motion held on 03/23/2010 
10:00 AM: Hearing Held 
MEOR KARLA Minute Entry and Order-hrg hid 03/23/10 on 
Motion to dismiss; Court DENY Motion to 
Dismiss; Plaintiff Rule 56f GRANTED; Def Motion 
to Compel taken under advisement; set hrg for 
Def Motion for Summ Judgment; 
3/2912010 CAMILLE Certificate of service of Plaintiff Supplemental 
Response to Defs First Request for Production of 
documents; aty Blake Atkin for 
plnttlcounterclaim def 
3/31/2010 HRVC KARLA Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 03/23/2010 
09:00AM: Hearing Vacated 
4/1/2010 DEOP KARLA Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motion to 
Compel Discovery; DENIED except as to Bank of 
Star Valley records; Plaintiff ordered to produce 
Bank of Star Valley records within 14 days of this 
order; No costs or fees awarded to either party; /s 
J Dunn 04/01/10 
412/2010 HRSC KARLA Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary 
Judgment 07/07/201002:00 PM) 
4/19/2010 CAMILLE Notice of Deposition of Don lebe on 4-29-2010 
@ 9am: atyBlake Atkin for plntt 
CAMILLE Notice of DepOSition of Rick Lawson on 
4-30-2010 @ 9am: aty Blake Atkin for plntt 
CAMILLE Certificate of Service of Defs Replies to Plaintiffs 
First set of Req for Admissions to Defendants; 
aty John Bowers for def/counterclaimants 
4/22/2010 CAMILLE Motion for Protective ORder concerning 
Deposition Scheduled for 4-29-2010 and April 
30,2010: aty John Bowers for defs and 
counterclaim plntts 
CAMILLE Defendants Response to Plaintfs Motion to 
Extend Deadline to produce Bank of Star Valley 
Records; aty John Bowers for defs 
User: DCANO 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
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;/29/2010 HRSC CAMILLE 
;/30/2010 MEOR KARLA 
HRSC KARLA 
'/13/2010 CAMILLE 
Affidavit of Rod Jensen; aty John Bowers for Stephen S Dunn 
defs 
Defendants Motion for Contempt; aty John Stephen S Dunn 
Bowerss for Def. and counterclaim Plntfs 
Affidavit of John Bowers; aty John Bowers for Stephen S Dunn 
defs and counterclaim plntfs 
Defendants Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Stephen S Dunn 
Extend Deadline to Produce Bank of Star Valley 
Records; aty John Bowers for Defs. 
counterclaim plntf 
Affidavit of Rod Jensen; aty John Bowers for Stephen S Dunn 
def and counterclaim pltfs 
Certificate of Service - Counterclaim Plntfs served Stephen S Dunn 
upon the plntf, their Responses to Plntfs Interrog 
and req for production: aty John Bowers for 
Defs and Counterclaim plntfs 
Notice of Association of counsel; aty Gary 
Cooper for def 
Stephen S Dunn 
Memorandum Decision and Order re; Various Stephen S Dunn 
Motions; Motion for Protective Order and Motion 
for Extension of Time to Produce are moot; Court 
DENIES Motion for Contempt; Is J Dunn 05/19/10 
Motion to continue Trial; aty Gary Cooper for 
Def. 
Stephen S Dunn 
Notice of Hearing; on motion to continue set for Stephen S Dunn 
6-21-2010 @2pm: aty Gary Cooper for def 
Notice of Deposition of Gay/en Clayson and Stephen S Dunn 
Subpoena ; aty Gary Cooper 
Amended Notice of Deposition of Gaylen Clayson Stephen S Dunn 
and Subpoena; aty Gary Cooper for Def 
Notice of Cancellation of the Depo of Don Zebe Stephen S Dunn 
and Rick Lawson; aty Blake Atkin for 
plntf/counterclaim def 
Amended Notice of Heaering; set for Defs Stephen S Dunn 
Motion for Summary Judgment on 8-9-2010 @ 
2pm: aty Gary Cooper 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary 
Judgment 08/09/2010 02:00 PM) 
Stephen S Dunn 
Minute Entry and Order; hrg 06/21/10; Def Motion Stephen S Dunn 
to Continue Trial; Court retained trial date; set 
backup date; reset Motion for Summary 
Judgment; /s J Dunn 06/24/10 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 01/11/2011 09:00 Stephen S Dunn 
AM) 
Notice of service - Response to Plntfs Second set Stephen S Dunn 
of requests for Admissions to Def: aty Gary 
Cooper 
Date: 4/1/2011 
Time: 03:26 PM 
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Notice of Service - Discovery to Plaintiff and this Stephen S Dunn 
Notice: aty Gary Cooper for Defs 
Notice of service - Response to Plntfs Thrid set of Stephen S Dunn 
Document requests to defendants: aty Gary 
Cooper for def 
Affidavit of Gary Cooper; aty Gary Cooper Stephen S Dunn 
Defendants Lawson and Zebe Reply 
Memorandum in support of Motion at 
DismisslMotion for Summary Judgment: aty 
Gary Cooper for Def. 
Stephen S Dunn 
Notice of Mediation; sl Judge Brown 8-3-2010 Stephen S Dunn 
Affidavit of Blake S Atkin in Opposition to Defs Stephen S Dunn 
Motin to Dismiss or for summary Judgment; aty 
Blake Atkin for plntf 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Stephen S Dunn 
held on 08/09/2010 02:00 PM: Motion Held 
Certificate of Service of Plntfs RElsponse to Defs Stephen S Dunn 
Discovery to plntf: aty Blake Atkin for plntf 
Memorandum Decision and Orderan Defendants Stephen S Dunn 
Motion for Summary Judgment; (Court GRANTS 
Defs Summary Judgment) Defs Motion for 
Summary Judgment is DENIED; Plntfs Motion to 
Amend Plntf First Amended Complaint to Assert a 
Claim of Punitive Damages is DENIED) sl Judge 
Dunn 9-14-2010 
Second Amended Notice of Deposition of Gaylen Stephen S Dunn 
Clayson and Subpoena; set for 9-30-2010: aty 
Gary Cooper 
Defendants Expert and Fact witness Disclosure; Stephen S Dunn 
aty Gary Cooper 
Motion to reconsider damage aspects of decision Stephen S Dunn 
dated september 15, 2010: aty Blake Atkin for 
plntf 
Memorandum in Support of Defense Motion in 
Limine; aty Gary Cooper 
Second Affidavit of Gary Cooper; aty Gary 
Cooper 
Defs Supplemental Expert and Fact Witness 
Disclosure; aty Gary Cooper for def 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Defense Motion in Limine; aty Gary Cooper Stephen S Dunn 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/25/2010 01 :30 Stephen S Dunn 
PM) 
Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim; aty Gary Stephen S Dunn 
Cooper for def. 
Notice of hearing; set for Motion to Dismiss on Stephen S Dunn 
10-25-2010 @ 1 :30 pm; 
Date: 4/1/2011 
Time: 03:26 PM 
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Notice of Deposition of Jeff Randall to Preserve Stephen S Dunn 
Trial Testimony; Gary L. Cooper, Atty for Dfdts. 
Motion and Memorandum for Protective Order Stephen S Dunn 
Re; Deposition of Jeff Randall to Preserve Trial 
Testimoney (Atkins for Plaintiff) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Stephen S Dunn 
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: 
Atkin Law Office Receipt number: 0035333 
Dated: 10/12/2010 Amount: $4.50 (Check) 
Joint Pre Trial Stipulation; aty Blake Atkin for Stephen S Dunn 
plntt 
Notice of hearing; set for 10-25-2010 @ 1 :30 Stephen S Dunn 
pm: aty Blake Atkin for def 
Motion to Reconsider damage aspects of decision Stephen S Dunn 
dated September 15, 2010 (Atkin for Plaintiff) 
Defs Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Stephen S Dunn 
Order 
Memorandum In Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion Stephen S Dunn 
for Reconsideration Re Damage Aspects of 
Decision Dated September 15, 2010 (Cooper for 
Defs) 
Notice of hearing; set for Motion on 10-25-2010 Stephen S Dunn 
@ 1 :30pm: aty Gary Cooper 
Motion Eliminating Jury; aty Gary Cooper Stephen S Dunn 
Defendants Supplemental Expert and Fact Stephen S Dunn 
Witness Disclosure; aty Gary Cooper for Def. 
Return of Service; subpoena of Jeff Randall Stephen S Dunn 
10105/10 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defense Motion in Stephen S Dunn 
Limine; aty Blake Atkin for plntt/counterclaim 
def 
Hearing result for Motion held on 10/25/2010 
01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Sheila Fish 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less 100 
Stephen S Dunn 
Order; Counterclaim Dismissed; jury demand Stephen S Dunn 
dismissed; Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider 
denied; Def Motion in Limine deferred until trial; Is 
J Dunn 10/28/10 
Continued (Jury Trial 11/04/201009:30 AM) Stephen S Dunn 
Trial Brief; aty Blake Atkin for Stephen S Dunn 
plnttlcounterclaim; 
Designation of Testimony from the Deposition of Stephen S Dunn 
Morris A Farinella; on 9-30-2010: aty Gary 
Cooper for Def. 
Date: 4/1/2011 
Time: 03:26 PM 
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Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 
11/08/201012:00 PM) 
Judge 
Stephen S Dunn 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 11/10/201001:30 Stephen S Dunn 
PM) 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 01/11/2011 Stephen S Dunn 
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 11/04/2010 Stephen S Dunn 
09:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Sheila Fish 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: more than 500 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 11/10/2010 Stephen S Dunn 
01 :30 PM: Hearing Held 
Hearing result for Status Conference held on Stephen S Dunn 
11/08/2010 12:00 PM: Hearing Held 
Minute Entry and Order; Court Trial held; Parties Stephen S Dunn 
to submit findings of facts and conclusions by 
11/24/10; matter will be taken under advisement 
and written decsion to be issued; Is J Dunn 
11/16/10 
Plaintiff's DeSignation of Portions of the Stephen S Dunn 
Deposition of Morris Ferinella (Atkin for Plaintiffs) 
DefenseObjection to plntts designation of Stephen S Dunn 
Deposition excerpts from the Deposition of Morris 
Farinella: aty Gary Cooper 
Defense Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions Stephen S Dunn 
of Law and Argument; aty Gary Cooper 
Plaintiff's Post Trial Brief (Atkin for Plaintiff) Stephen S Dunn 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Atkin Stephen S Dunn 
for Plaintiff)( 
Memorandum Decision, findings of Fact and Stephen S Dunn 
Conclusions of law; court finds in favor of Plntt 
and awards damages totaling $97,310.94: sl 
Judge Dunn 12-6-2010 
Judgment; ag Don Zebe Rick Lawson and Laze, Stephen S Dunn 
LLC in the total amount of $97,310.94; sl Judge 
Dunn 12-6-2010 
Case Status Changed: Closed 
Defense Memorandum on Damage Claim 
(Cooper for Defs) 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Palintiff's Trial Memorandum Regarding the Stephen S Dunn 
Admissibility of Evidence that Defendants 
Assumed or Ratified Clayson's Entire Bill to Dairy 
Systems Company (Atkin for Palintiff) 
Reply Memorandum in support of Motion to Stephen S Dunn 
Reconsider Damage As[ects of Decision Dated 
September 15, 2010 (Atkin for Plaintiff) 
Date: 4/1/2011 
Time: 03:26 PM 
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Memorandum of costs and Attorney Fees; aty Stephen S Dunn 
Gary Cooper for def 
Affidavit of Gary Cooper in support of 
Memorandum of costs and attorney fees; aty 
Gary Cooper for def 
Stephen S Dunn 
Affidavit of John D Bowers for Attorney Fees and Stephen S Dunn 
costs; aty John Bowers for defs 
Memorandum of costs including attorney fees; Stephen S Dunn 
aty Blake Atkin for plntf 
Memorandum in support of defs objection to Stephen S Dunn 
costs and attorney fees claimed by plntfs: aty 
Gary Cooper 
Objection to Plaintiffs Memorandum of Costs and Stephen S Dunn 
Attorney fees: aty Gary Cooper for def 
Objection to Defendants Memorandum of Costs Stephen S Dunn 
including attorney fees; aty Blake Atkin 
Affidavit of Blake Atkin in support of Stephen S Dunn 
Memorandum of costs including attorney fees; 
aty Blake Atkin for plntf 
Memorandum Decision on motion for attorney Stephen S Dunn 
fees and costs; (Based on the foregoing, the 
court denies both motions for attorney fees and 
costs: the judgment will not be amended: sl 
Judge Dunn 1-4-2011 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Stephen S Dunn 
Supreme Court Paid by: Gary L.-Cooper 
Receipt number: 0001682 Dated: 1114/2011 
Amount: $101.00 (Check) For: Clayson, Gaylen 
(plaintiff) 
Appealed To The Supreme Court Stephen S Dunn 
NOTICE OF APPEAL; Gary L. Cooper, Atty for Stephen S Dunn 
Dfdts. 
Paid $101.00 check # 25113 for Filing Fee and Stephen S Dunn 
Supreme court Fee. Paid $100.00 check # 25114 
for deposit of Clerk's Record. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL; Signed Stephen S Dunn 
and Mailed to Counsel and SC on 1-21-11. 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Notice of Appeal Stephen S Dunn 
received in SC on 1-24-11. Docket Number 
38471-2011. Clerk's Record and Reporter's 
Transcript due in SC by 5-5-11. (3-31-11 5 weeks 
prior to Counsel. The following transcript shall be 
lodged: Court Trial 11-4-10, 11-5-10 and 
11-10-10. 
CORRECTED CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF Stephen S Dunn 
APPEAL. Signed and Mailed to SC and Counsel 
on 2-4-11. 
Date: 4/1/2011 
Time: 03:26 PM 
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Date Code User Judge 
2/8/2011 MISC DCANO IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Clerk's Corrected Stephen S Dunn 
Certificated received in SC on 2-7-11. All parties 
are to review title and if any corrections please 
contact the Dist. Clerk. If not the title on the 
certificate must appear on all documents filed in 
SC. 
3/30/2011 MISC DCANO NOTICE OF LODGING FOR TRANSCRIPTS: Stephen S Dunn 
Sheila Fish on 3-30-11. 
MISC DCANO REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPTS RECEIVED IN Stephen S Dunn 
COURT RECORDS FROM SHEILA FISH ON 
3-30-11 for the following: Court Trial held 11~4-10, 
11-5-10, and 11-10-10. 




Gaylen Clayson vs. Donald I Zebe, etal. 
Hearing type: Court Trial 
Hearing date: 11/04/2010 
Time: 9:33 am 
Judge: Stephen S Dunn 
Courtroom: Room #301, Third Floor 
Court reporter: Sheila Fish 
Minutes Clerk: Karla Holm 
Tape Number: 
Party: Donald Zebe, Attorney: Gary Cooper 
Party: Gaylen Clayson, Attorney: Blake Atkin 
933 Begin; Blake Atkin associate sitting at table; Cooper no objection 
934 Cooper Motion to Exclude Witnesses; Granted; witnesses excused 
935 Plaintiff called sworn and testified; Gaylen W. Clayson 
1046 Cooper-objection on record regarding issues requested during discovery that 
was not provided 
1047 Court-overruled objection 
1050 Recess 
1104 Reconvene; continue with Palintiff 
1109 Plaintiff Exhibit F-document prepared by Plaintiff-summary of work completed 
by Plaintiff; offered; 
1110 Cooper objection 
630 
1111 Atkin argument 
1113 Court; 
1114 Atkin 
1119 Court-deny Plaintiff Exhibit F 
1126 Cooper objection 
1127 Court-allow testimony regarding items marked by arrows on Exhibits F la-u, 
those supporting documents maybe admitted 
1129 Cooper advise Court of items not provided or identified during deposition 
1130 Atkin 
1131 Cooper continue with identifying documents not provided or identified at 
deposition 
1139 Court will take under advisement this documents and will make decision at later 
time; 
1140 Atkin 
1146 Cooper-Motion to strike; argument; Atkin 
1147 Court objection overruled 
1207 Cooper Motion to Strike; Sustained 
1210 Cooper Motion to Strike; Court grant motion to Strike 
1215 Cooper Motion to Strike; Court Grant Motion to Strike 
1223 Cooper question in aid of objection; Motion to Strike; Court overruled 
1225 Cooper Motion to Strike; Overruled 
1227 Cooper-Motion to Strike; Overruled 
1228 Exhibit L 
1230 Motion to Strike; sustained 
1230 Exhibit M 
631 
1231 Motion to Strike; Sustained 
1231 Exhibit P 
1234 Exhibit T 
1237 Motion to Strike; sustained 
1238 Cooper question in aid of objection; Objection; Overruled 
1239 Exhibit U 
1240 Atkin-move to remove striking of check to High Sierra for $9100; Court granted 
1245 Motion to Strike-Sustained 
1246 Cooper-question in aid of objection; Motion to Strike 
1247 Court-motion granted 
1251 Motion to Strike; Overruled 
1255 Cooper-question; Objection-Grant to all charges except at Thayne True Valley 
Hardware 
1257 Motion to Strike-granted 
1258 Atkin; Court Exhibit F la-u admitted except as striken by Court and subject to 
further ruling by Court on issue of timelyness 
1259 Lunch recess until 2 pm 
159 Reconvene 
159 Cooper-correction of earlier statement regarding supplemental discovery 
response; Exhibit F If, Flu, Fit; not withdrawing objection 
203 Motion to Publish Deposition Vol 1 and Vol 2 with attached exhibits; Court 
GRANTED; 
204 Continue testimony of Plaintiff 
210 Cooper-Objection 
211 Court-objection overruled 
217 Exhibit G 
632 
223 Offered 1st 4 pages of Exhibit G; objection; Admitted as foundational 
301 Exhibit F offered; Cooper objection; 
301 Court-objection overruled; admitted for limited purpose only, not for proof of 
what actual out of pocket expenses were -
324 Plaintiff Exhibit D; offered; admitted as stipulated 
325 Plaintiff Exhibit N-offered as stipulated; no objection; admitted 
326 Recess 
340 Reconvene 
340 Cooper cross examination 
341 Court Publishing deposition Vol 1 and 2 ofMr Clayson with no objection 
356 Def Exhibit 5A offered; Atkin objection; Admitted 
419 Atkin-redirect examination 
430 Witness excused 
430 Plaintiff witness , Don Zebe, called sworn and testified 
436 Plaintiff Exhibit J offered and admitted 
440 Plaintiff Exhibit K, Annual Report from, Milk Market Management; offered 
441 Cooper objection; Court admitted 
445 Deposition of Don Zebe published without objection (photocopy in lieu of 
original submitted to Court) 
456 Plaintiff Exhibit I, Star Valley Cheese Business Plan, offered; Cooper objected 
456 Atkin argument; Court admitted for limited purpose as Atkin stated on record 
509 Plaintiff Exhibit Q, SVC Financials from Dec 31, 2008-June 30, 2009 





Gaylen Clayson vs. Donald I Zebe, etal. 
Hearing type: Court Trial 
Hearing date: 11/05/2010 
Time: 8:26 am 
Judge: Stephen S Dunn 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Sheila Fish 
Minutes Clerk: Karla Holm 
Tape Number: 
Party: Donald Zebe, Attorney: Gary Cooper 
Party: Gaylen Clayson, Attorney: Blake Atkin 
826 Ruling on timelyness of Plaintiffs Exhibits; (see log notes) 
845 Continued testimony of Don Zebe 
850 Plaintiff Exhibit S; Email Don Zebe to Val Pendleton, 1/14/09; offered and 
admitted 
857 Plaintiff Exhibit U, Email Don Zebe to Klark Gailey 1/31/09; offered; objection 
858 Cooper argument; Court admitted for portion dealing with Dairy Systems in the 
past 
908 Ruling on testimony regarding Dairy Systems bill; case limited to $50,000 paid 
by Clayson; Objection to last question sustained 




























Plaintiff Exhibit X, email from Don Zebe to Klark Gailey 03/07/09; offered 
Cooper-objection; argument 
Court-objection overruled; Exhibit X admitted 
Recess 
Reconvene; Court addresses party regarding additional research to be done; 
Atkin comments 
Cooper comments 
Cooper direct examination of Don Zebe 
Def Exhibit l1-A, Offered 
Atkin-objection argument 
Cooper 
Atkin withdraw objection; Court admitted Def Exhibit ll-A 
Exhibit N, admitted by stipulation 
Atkin-re-cross examination 
Plaintiff Exhibit V, email Don Zebe to Klark Gailey, offered 
Cooper-objection 
Atkin 
Court-Admitted for purpose of challenging credibility 
Witness excused 
Atkin-identify witness and offer of testimony to be presented 
Cooper-objection to offer of testimony 
Court-testimony not admissible; ruling; Objection sustained 
Atkin 
636 
1102 Plaintiff rests subject to Court reconsideration of prior issue 
1103 Recess 
100 Reconvene; update of witnesses; tel conf 12 pm Monday; Court to instigate call; 
no Court on Tuesday; Wednesday 1:30 pm; any submissions by Saturday at 12 
pm by email; 
104 Cooper-highlighted deposition of Morris Ferineli submitted to Court 
106 Atkin 
106 Defwitness-Ricky Layne Lawson called sworn and testified 
125 Atkin-question in aid of objection; objection 
126 Court-overruled 
129 Def Exhibit 11, IRE 1006, summary of Clayson Invoices paid by SVC, offered; no 
objection; admitted 
139 Court questions witness 
141 Atkin cross examination 
143 Plaintiff Exhibit Q, SVC Financials from 12/31/08-06/30/09 
145 Offered-pages 7 & 8-only; Cooper objections 
146 Atkin; Court overruled objection; Admitted 
204 Cooper-re-direct examination 
205 Exhibit Q, last 2 pages, offered; Atkin objected 
206 Court -admitted 
209 Witness excused; 






Gaylen Clayson vs. Donald I Zebe, etal. 
Hearing type: Status Conference 
Hearing date: 11/08/2010 
Time: 11:59 am 
Judge: Stephen S Dunn 
Courtroom: Room #301, Third Floor 
Court reporter: Sheila Fish 
Minutes Clerk: Karla Holm 
Tape Number: 
Party: Donald Zebe, Attorney: Gary Cooper 
Party: Gaylen Clayson, Attorney: Blake Atkin 
1200 Court's decision on pending issue 
1201 Decision 
1206 Resume trial 1:30 pm Wednesday; 
1206 Atkin-rebuttal witnesses 
639 
COURT MINUTES 
CV -2 009-000 2 212 -OC 
Gay ten Clayson VS. Donald I Zebe, eta!. 
Hearing type: Jury Trial 
Hearing date: 11/10/2010 
Time: 1:54 pm 
Judge: Stephen S Dunn 
Courtroom: Room #301, Third Floor 
Court reporter: Sheila Fish 
Minutes Clerk: Karla Holm 
Tape Number: 
Party: Donald Zebe, Attorney: Gary Cooper 
Party: Gaylen Clayson, Attorney: Blake Atkin 
154 Court Trial Continued 
155 Atkin regarding exclusion of witnesses 
156 Defwitness Jeff Randall called sworn and testified 
222 Court questions witness 
223 Atkin cross examination 
228 Plaintiff Exhibit CC, declaration of Jeff Randall, marked, 
233 Exhibit CC, offered; Cooper objection; Court admitted 
242 Cooper redirect 
246 Witness excused; Defense rests 
246 Plaintiff Rebuttal witness, Don Zebe, called and testified 
640 
251 Witness excused 
251 Plaintiff Rebuttal witness, Gaylen Clayson 
253 Cooper cross examination 
253 Witness excused; Plaintiff rests; 5 minute recess 
306 Reconvene; Cooper-no sur rebuttal 
306 Court-Atkin; 
307 Cooper; 
308 Court-require proposed findings and conclusions from both parties; due 




IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
Register No.CV-2009-02212-0C 















MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER 
" :', 'I 
. , .. _ ~ L ,~.' 
On November 4,2010, the above entitled matter came before the Court for the purpose of a 
Court Trial. Blake Atkin, appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff and Gary Cooper, appeared for the 
Defendants. 
Sheila Fish performed as Court Reporter for this proceeding. 
At the outset, counsel for the Defendants made an oral motion for the exclusion of 
witnesses. Counsel for the Plaintiff had no objection. Court granted motion and witnesses were 
excused. 
The Plaintiff was called, sworn and testified. 
Register CV -2009-01954-PI 
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Plaintiffs Exhibit F, and supplemental Exhibits F/a-u, were offered, objected to and 
admitted into evidence, except as stricken by the Court, or admitted for a limited purpose as 
outlined by the Court. 
Plaintiff s Exhibits G, pages 1-4 Invoices and Statements of Dairy Systems, August 2008-
June 2009, D, Contract to buy real estate, and N, Addendum Al Assignment, were offered and 
admitted. 
Defendant's Exhibit 5A, Ferinella deposition, offered and admitted. 
Plaintiff s witness, Don Zebe, called, sworn and testified. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit J, Article of Organization DVC, LLC, Exhibit K, Annual Report from, 
Milk Market Management, Exhibit I, Star Valley Cheese business plan, were offered and 
admitted. Exhibit I being admitted for a limited purpose as stated by the Court. 
Recess for night at 5: 21 p.m. Court instructed parties to reconvene Friday, November 5, 
2010, at 8:30 a.m. 
The Court reconvened at 8:26 a.m. on November 5,2010. 
At the outset, the Court advised the parties of its ruling regarding the Defendant's objection 
to the timeliness of Plaintiff s Exhibits. 
Testimony of Plaintiffs witness, Don Zebe, continued. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit S, email from Don Zebe to Val Pendleton dated January 14, 2009, 
Plaintiff Exhibit W, email from Don Zebe to Klark Gailey, dated February 25, 2009, Plaintiff 
Exhibit X, email from Don Zebe to Klark Gailey, dated march 7,2009, Plaintiff Exhibit V, email 
from Don Zebe to Klark Gailey dated February 19,2009, were offered and admitted into evidence. 
Register CV -2009-01954-PI 
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Plaintiff Exhibit U, email from Don Zebe to Klark Gailey, January 31, 2009, offered and 
objected to. The Court admitted Exhibit U limited to the portion regarding Dairy Systems dealings 
in the past. 
Defendant Exhibit II-A, bills paid through November 25, 2008, was offered and admitted 
into evidence. 
Plaintiff Exhibit N, Addendum Al Assignment Gaylen Clayson, November 4, 2008, was 
admitted by stipulation of parties. 
The witness was excused. 
Plaintiffs counsel made an offer of proof of the proposed testimony of Klark Gailey. 
Defendant objected. The Court sustained the objection. 
The Plaintiff rests. 
The Court recessed for lunch at 11 :03 a.m. 
The Court reconvened at 1 p.m. 
The Court reviewed the pending trial schedule with the parties. 
Counsel for the Defendant submitted a highlighted copy of the deposition of Morris 
Ferinella to the Court for review. 
Defendant Ricky L. Lawson was called sworn and testified. 
Defendant Exhibit 11, IRE 1006, Summary of Clayson Invoices paid by SVC, LLC, was 
offered and admitted into evidence. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit Q, SVC Financials from December 31, 2008 to June 30, 2009, pages 7 
and 8, and last two pages, were offered and admitted into evidence. 
Register CV-2009-0I954-PI 
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The Court recessed for the night at 2: 13 p.m. The Court instructed counsel for the parties as 
to the submission of briefings to the Court regarding pending issues. The Court also instructed the 
parties as to the pending trial schedule. 
The Court held a telephonic hearing on Monday, November 8, 2010 at 12 p.m. At that time 
the Court issued its ruling on the record on the pending issues. 
The Court reconvened on Tuesday, November 10,2010 at the hour of 1:54 p.m. 
Defendant's witness, Jeff Randall, was called sworn and testified. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit CC, Affidavit of Jeff Randall, was marked, offered and admitted into 
evidence as limited by the Court. 
Defense rests. 
Plaintiff's Rebuttal Witnesses, Don Zebe and Gaylen Clayson, were recalled and testified. 
The Court required that proposed findings of facts and conclusions be submitted by both 
parties no later than November 24,2010. At that time, this issue will be deemed under advisement 
and a written decision shall be issued by the Court. 
DATED November 16,2010. 
Register CV-2009-01954-PI 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the It !' day of U('\',,/ ,2010, I 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals 
in the manner indicated. 
Blake S. Atkin 
7579 North Westside Highway 
Clifton, ID 83228 
Blake S. Atkin 
Atkin Law Office 
837 South 500 West, Ste 200 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Gary L. Cooper 
Cooper & Larsen 
PO Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Register CV-2009-01954-PI 
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(,lu.s. Mail 
( ) Email 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
( A' U.S. Mail 
( ) Email 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
( '" U.S. Mail 
( ) Email 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
Deputy Clerk . . 
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Blake S. Atkin (lSB# 6903) 
7579 North Westside Highway 
Clifton, Idaho 83228 
Telephone: (208) 747-3414 
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.e. 
837 South 500 West, Suite 200 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (80l) 533-0300 
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380 
Attorney for Defendants 
---------
; i... _' ~ ,., 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
BANNOCK COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
GA YLEN CLAYSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, and LAZE, 
LLC, 
Defendants. 




GA YLEN CLAYSON, 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
647 
PLAINTIFF'S DESIGNATION OF 
PORTIONS OF THE DEPOSITION OF 
MORRIS FARINELLA 
Case No: CV-2009-02212-0C 
Judge: Dpnn 
I 
The Plaintiff, Gaylen Clayson designates the following portions of the deposition 
of Morris Farinella attached hereto as exhibit A 
P. 14 lines 7 through 17. 
P. 14 line 18 through P. 15 line 4. 
P. 18 line 16 through P. 19 line 6. 
P. 35 lines 13 through 20. 
P. 40 lines 14 through 25. 
P. 42 lines 4 through 15. 
P. 43 lines 4 through 17. 
P. 46 line 3 through P. 50 line17. 
• iinE' 
P. 561~ne 2 throughf. 21. 
P. 58 line 5 through line 13. 
P. 61 line 19 through P. 62 line 13. 
P. 63 line 7 through 14. 
P. 65 line 9 through line 20. 
Dated this;~ay of November, 2010 
Atkin Law Offices, P.e. 




MORRIS A~ FARINELLA 
LAZE, LLC v" DAIRY SYSTEMS COMP~1\fY; INC, 
Taken On 
September 30,2010 
Transcript provided by: 
HUTCHINGSS~ 
COURT REPORTERS, LLC 
C1Ul &49 
GI.OBAL LEGAL SERVICES 
800.697.3210 
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uE. LLC V. DAIRY SYSTEMS " INC. September 30, 2010 MORRIS A. F~~INELLA 
CERTIFIED COpy 
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1 MORRIS A. FARINELLA, 









Q. Mr. Farinella. My name is Jolm Bowers. 1 






Would you please stale your fuil name for the 
record. 
A Moms A. Farinella, F·a-T-i-n-e·!-l-il_ 
Q. Great. 
15 And your curroot address? 
1 6 MR- MARIN: 9323-
17 THE WITNESS: 9323 Tweedy lane, Downey, California 
16 "90240," 
19 MR- BOWERS: Thank )'011_ 
20 Q. Mr. Farinella, have you ever bad your 
21 deposition iak-en before? 
22 A. Yes, 
23 Q. SO you unde!St.and the procedure? l get to ask 
2 4 the questions and you get to answer them; correct? 
2:' A. To the best of my ability, yes. 
2 (Paqes 2 to 5) 
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9: 13 Q. And just II <OQuple things. 
2 On the telephone, this will make it easier, because 
3 we'll be more likely to answer questions verbally, but 
4 sometimes in hu.ma."1 nature, we have a habit of shrugging 
9: 13 5 and shaking our heads, and our court reporter Lori won't 
6 be .. ble to take thaI down. Sv we'll verbalize our 
7 ans\.vers. 
8 The other things is we r...<Jve !J;J slow down. I have 11 
9 habit of talking over people. So jf you have !hat same 
9 : 1 3 10 babit, jllst wait until I finish my question before you 
11 answer. 
12 Okay? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Are you on any type of medication today, sir? 
9:13 15 A No. 
16 Q. How old are you? 
17 A. 87. 
18 Q. Any reason medically, or there's no medicatioo 
1 9 that would prevent you from understanding and answering 
9 : 13 20 my questions today truthfully? 
21 A. No. 
22 The only thing I take is aspirin. 
23 Q. Great 
2 q Okay. Can you tell me what you did in preparation 
9 : 14 25 for this depositiou? 
Page 7 
1 A. Nothing. 
2 Q. Did you talk to anybody? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. Okay. 
5 Did you talk to Gaylen Clayson? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. When is the last time )'QU spoke with 
8 wiT. Cla)ll!on? 
9 A. A year, I guess, ago. Maybe a year, year and a 
10 half. I don't know. 
11 Q. Did you review any documents? 
12 A. No. 
1 3 Q. Have you ever spoken to Clark Gayley? 
1 4 A. I don't know him. 
9 : 14 15 Q. Jolm Gayley? 
1 6 A. I don't know him. 
17 Q. That would mean you haven't spoken to them? 
18 A. If I don't know them, I don't think I talked to 
19 lhem. 
9: 14 20 Q. That's right. Okay. 
21 Mr. Farinella, you, through a company that I 
2 2 understand lIlat you own, were the owners for a long 
2 3 period of time of a business located in Thayne, Wyoming 
2 4 that we refer to as Star Valley Cheese Plant; is that 
9: 15 25 true'! 
9:15 
9: 15 
1 A. Yes. Since i975. 
Q. Thank you. '75. 
Page 8 
3 And in 2008, thai plant was in bankruptcy; is that 
5 
6 
A. I believe so. 
Q. Or under the directiQn of bankruptcy? 
7 A. Wen, under a Chapter II and Chapter 7, [ 
8 think 
9 Q. Okay. 
9 : 15 1 0 -- And did there come a time when you sold the plant? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. WIle!! I refer to plant, rn whet.her it's 
13 plant or Star Belly Cheese Factory or Star Belly Plant, 
14 it's all the same thing. 
9; 15 15 A. Yes. 
16 No, we haven't sold it 
17 Q. Okay. 
1 B So can you tell me about -- Apparently there was a 
19 time when you were allowed to sell the plant even though 
9: 15 20 it was in bankruptcy. 
21 Can you tell me how that transpired? 
22 A. You don't understand the procedure of a 
23 bankruptcy. 
24 Q. Yes, I do. 
9 : 1 6 25 A. You say "bankruptcy" - a bankruptcy lawyer was 
Page 9 
1 there, and he mils the show. The Court runs the show; 
2 noime. 
3 So when it went in bankruptcy, we took bids to get 
4 the money to pay the people. And the bids had to be 
5 okayed by the court. I was appointed as president to 
6 take the bids with the broker Dum Wyoming, the real 
7 estate broker, who had the authority to seU the plant 
8 for the bankruptcy court. 
9 Q. Okay. 
9 ; 1 6 10 So just to make sure 1 understand this. 
11 A. Okay. 
12 Q. You would receive blds or offers to purchase 
1 3 it. Then you would forward that information to the 
14 bankruptcy trustee for his approval? 
9 : 16 15 A. That's correct. 
1 6 Q. And so, hypothetically, let's say, you wanted 
17 to sell the plant to a friend or somebody else for a 
18 lower price. Yau couldn't do that because you bad to 
19 send the offer to the bankruptey trustee; correct? 
9: 17 20 A. T think that would be fraud. 
2 1 Q. Fair enough. 
22 A. I couldn't sell it to a friend ofmim::. I'm 
2 3 sure it has to go to the bankruptcy court. TIley had to 
2 4 approve everything. 
9 : 17 25 Q. Fair enough. 
3 (Pages 6 to 9) 
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So in 2008 -- just kind of shan circuit this -- my 
understanding is you were receiving offers. 
109: 19 
Page 12 
1 A. Nothing. Until he bought it. 
9: 18 
: 18 
Val D. Pendleton of Caldwell BankerS was working 
with you a little bit or, I guess, soliciting offers; is 
mat correct? 
A. We worked togemer, yes. 




8 And during that time period of time, did you 
9 havc a - did you run into or did you know a Gaylen 
10 Clayson? 
11 A. I don't know what year that was, but he did 
1 2 approach the broker, which was Pendleton, and said "l'd 
13 jike to put a bid in to buy the plant." 
14 Q. Okay, 
1 S And when you say "a bid," if he puts a bid in, it's 
1 6 got to go through the same process you've already 
17 explained to me. 
18 A. Yes. 
19 And we had meetings at the pJant with op:m bids 




Q. Am! what about - Let me back up just a little 
bit 
In 2008, did you ever allow him to operate the 
24 re:,iaurant on the premises? 
2.s A. I don't know what yea. it was., but at the time 
Page 11 
1 the restaurant - during the bankruptcy, tbe lawyer says 
2 let the restaurant operate in front of the plant so we 
3 can have some revenue come in. 
4 So we hired two little Mexican girls there to run 
: 18 5 the planl for the bankruptcy court. Okay? 
6 But they were a little mixed up. And Gaylen was 
7 there everyday. And I asked him to help to take care of 
8 the restaurant while I'm living in L A., and - [ 
9 couldn't do it You know, bere, Wyoming, hear, back and 
10 fortlL I couldn't go. So I says, "Take care of tbat 
11 restaurant with those two girls." 
12 And he says, "I will look after it," and that was 
13 all. 
14 Q. And when you said your agreement with GayJen -
9 : 19 15 and I separate the two. I separate in my mind the 
16 restaurant out in front and then the cheese plant, the 
17 manufacturing plant in the back. 
18 A. Yes. They were separated. 
1 9 In other words, the plant W!lS dosed, but tlJe 
9 ; 1 9 20 restaurant was open. And they kept it open to get 
21 revenue to - for the banlr.xuptcy court to put it in 
22 there. 
23 Q. Okay. 
24 And what \\.'as - What was Gaylen to do, ifanything, 











Nobody had nothing to do with the plant. It's in 
bankruptcy. 
Q. So it was just sit there, and then he could run 
the restaurant oUI front and -- What was your 
understanding of the terms of the agreement to allow him 
to run the restaurant? 
A. Just to watch over it so those two little girls 
9 knew what they were doing there. That's all. 
10 Q. Okay. 
11 How was he to be paid tbr that'? 
12 A. He wasn't going to get paid anything. He was 
13 doing me a favor. 
14 Q. He was doing you -
15 A. Not me. .He was doing the bank.-uptcy people a 
16 fuvor. 
17 Q. The bankruptcy court? 
18 A. Yeah. 
19 Q. Whennvas the money to go? You know, each day 





A. It was supposed to go into a 'barLl.: ac(.'.(>urn that 
we had for the restaurant. 
Q. Okay. 
9:20 ?5 
A. I think it was Wells Fargo Bank. 
THE WITNE!:;S: Wa-m't it? 
Page 13 
9:20 1 MR..MARlN:Yeah. 
2 THE WITNESS: Wells Fargo Bank in Star Valley. 
3 MR. BOWERS: 
4 Q. Was Mr. Clayson allowed to spend any of that 
9; 20 5 money on his personal needs? 
6 A. He bad ttl pay the bills with the providers, the 
7 people who brought the food there for tbe restaurant to 
8 operate. That's all he had to do. Make sure tile people 
9 got paid. 
9 ; 21 10 Q_ For Jack of a better word, was he allowed to 
11 convert any of that money to pay his own personal bills 
12 not reiated to the restaurant? 
13 A. Not as •• that I know of, no. 
14 Q. Was - did he have authority to lake any of 
9 : 2 1 15 that money and put into his own personal account? 
16 A. He had no authority to do that, 00. 
1 ( Q. Do )'OU remember where the "- rm going 10 call 
18 it the trustee receivership account for the restaurant 
19 Do you know where that account, which bank it was held 
9:21 20 at:? 
21 A. Receivership or the -- I think it was Wells 
22 Fargo. 
23 MR. MARIN: Wells Fargo. 
2 4 THE WD'NESS: Wells Fargo. 
9 : 21 25 MR. BOWERS: 
4 (Pages 10 to 13) 
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1 Q. J know, Mr. Farinella, this is a dumb question, 
2 but I'll ask it anyway. 
3 Y Oli don't by chance have any documents with you 
4 that would give us the account numbers for that, would 
5 you? 
6 A. I don't have them anymore. 
7 Gaylen offered 10 run the restaurant after he made 
8 the offer to -- was accepted. 
9 After he bought the - he made the offer to buy the 
10 plant at the time. So with that in mind, 1 figured he 
11 can be trusted to run the restaurant. That's the way 
12 that happened. Just to run it so .. to keep it open. 
13 Q. Because you assumed that at some point he would 
14 be able to buy the whole thing? 
15 A. It was already in process of him buying it 9:24 
16 lhrough tbe bankruptcy court. 
17 Q~ Oka-j. 
18 A. He made an initial bid for it 
1 9 A fter the - ·we had three different bids there when 
2 Q it first started.. 9:25 
21 And one was from somebody out ofL A., !!!lother one 
22 was from another place. And me and the broker decided 
23 that let's go -- we had the same two bids from two 
21] different people. So me and the lawyer, myself and the 
Page 16 
1 lower until it came down to 800,000. 
2 Then with thai in mind, I proceeded to go 10 the 
3 bankruptcy lawyer and give him the information that the 
4 most we could have got with the broker, real estate 
5 -broker, was 800,000. And he okayed it. 
6 Q. Okay. 
7 So it was the bankruptcy trustee or attorney as you 
8 call it-




Q. - that approved the sale? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. Okay. 
j 3 Let's see. During Ine time that tile plan!: was 
14 under .- under the direction of the bankruptcy court, 
15 did you have authority 10 sell equipment QUt of there? 
J 6 MR. ATKIN: Objection. Calls for a legal 
17 conclusion. 
18 THE WITNESS: Would you repeat that, please. 
19 M"R. A TK1N: Calls for a legal conciusil:lll. 





(The ,ecom is read by the reporter.) 
THE WITNESS: No. 
THE REPORTER: He answered "No." 
MR.BOWERS; 
25 lawyer - 1 mean the lawyer - the real estate for the 9:25 25 Q. Did the bankruptcy trustee or the banknrptcy 
Page 15 
1 bankruptcy court, decided to go with Gaylen because he 
2 was a local, he bad the milk, and it was good for the 
3 environment there, and hire some people in that area to 
4 run the plant. 
S TIle other people that were going to bid on it, they 
6 were just guing to tear it apart and pull it out. 
7 ~. Did they - Do you remember what the numbers 
B were they bid? 
9 A. The numbers what'! What was bid'i 
10 Q. Yes. 
11 A. Yeah. 
12 800,000. 
13 Q. That was Gayler> Clayson',;; hid? 
14 A. That was his bid and somebody else's too. I 
15 forgetthe other guy. 
16 Q. OlL So the other two bids weren't higher, but 
17 they were --
18 A No. 
1 9 Q. -- at ! east tile. smne? 
20 A One was lower. One was less. 500,000. 
21 Q. Okay. 
22 
23 
So Mr. Clayson's was one of the highest bids? 
A. Well, no. 






2 5 bid. And you know how the bid.., go. And we go lower and 09 : 26 
Page 17 
1 court give Gaylen Clayson authority to sell equipment 
2 out of the plant? 
3 A. No. 
4 Nothing was to be touched tmtil escrow closed. 
5 Q. "Escrow closed. " You mean tIle actual sale? 
6 A. Sale of the plant when escrow closed. 
7 Q. I just want 10 make sure my defJIlition is the 
8 same as yours. 
9 That's the day the money transfers and there's a 
1 0 deed issued? 
11 A_ Absolutely. 
12 Q. Fairem:rugh. 
13 If .bere was any equipment that was sold, shoulrl 
14 tbat money have been returned back - if there was any 
15 equipment said by Gaylen Clayson, should that money o;!'Je 
16 been returned back to lhe bankruptcy eourt? 
17 A. I don't know how \0 lIt1Swer that because 1 don't 
18 know if he sold anything. 
19 Q. Okay. 
20 So - We've got some documents here that I think 
21 may help us as we walk through this. 
22 TIle first one is - Well, dQ you remember, 
23 ultimately who the plant was sold to? 
24 
25 
A. At the velY end when il W-dS sold? 
Q. Yes. 
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1 A. Well, you know, really -- where is that - this 
2 guy - wait a minute. 
3 1 think you're jumping in -- you're going ahead. 
4 You're talking about Gaylen, and now you're going who 
5 bought the plant 
6 Q. r know, and 1 apologize. 
7 The reason for that is when I e-mailcd the 
8 documents to you, two of them are out of order. So 
9 we're going to have to jump ahead so it's going to mess 
1 0 up the documents. 
11 A Do yoo wanl me to sit here and teU it the way 
12 it was? 
13 Q. Yeah. Let's do that. 
14 A Okay. 
1 5 Q. Perfect. 
16 A. As far as I know, Gaylen made ine bid. 
17 Everything was okay, and Ihe bankrUptcy la\>."ier agreed 
1 8 and the real estate brokcr agreed and we backed off, and 
19 that was it. It was gone into escrow. They had to come 
20 up with tlle money. 
2 1 At that lime, the second visit to WYOll'.mg, Gaylen 
22 introduced me to these two ]:leOple that I do not know 
23 '1ery we!!. One of \hem is Don Zebe. Don Zebe and Rick. 
24 Rick "Larson." 
2 5 I really don't know them at all - at all except 
Page 19 
1 from Gaylen telling me they got the money; they're going 
2 10 buy it. 
3 So I told Gaylen. "I don't care who comes up wilh 
4 the money, but just buy it. to The bid was okay, and 
5 everything's - "'buy it. n 
6 And that's where it ended up with me. 
7 Q. Okay. Fair enough. 
8 So let's jump ahead then and then it wiU get back 
9 in order here in a second, Mr. Farinella. 
10 A. Okay. 
11 MR. BOWERS: in can have tile court reporter mark 
12 Bates stamped 1 througb 2, wbich is a Wammty Deed, two 
13 pages, as Exhibit 1. [EXH-l] 
14 Q. I'll have you look at that Mr. Farinella when 
15 she'sready. 
1 6 (Whereupon the document referred to is marked by 
17 the reporter as E.-dlibit I for identification.) 
18 MR. BOWERS: 
19 Q. As you pointed out, Mr. Farinella, tbese are a 
2 0 little bit out of order. 
:;> 1 This -- l'll represent to you what my undersllmmng 
22 is -- is the warranty deed that was executed as -- you 
23 call it the escrow, I call i1 the closing -- when the 
24 cheese plant WIIS sold. 
25 Is that what your understanding of Exhibit 1 is? 
Page 20 
9 : 28 1 A. Look, I'm not a lawyer and rm not an 
2 accountant., and I don't know where this come from. 
3 Because once it was out., I was out of it. 
4 It was taken - taken by the --
9 : 29 5 THE WITNESS: Who is the one that did the closing 
6 up there? The escrow company? 
7 MR. MARIN: Alliance. 
8 TIIE WITNESS: Alliance. Yeah. Alliance. 
9 So where this came from, I have no idea. 
9: 2 9 10 MR. BOWERS: 
11 Q. Why don'1 you look at page one on the bottom. 
12 Is that your signature there? 
13 MR. iVlARIN: This one (indicating). 
14 THE WITNESS: Y cah, that's my signature. 
9: 29 15 'Warranty--
). 6 MR. BOWERS: 
). 7 Q. Do you remember signing this WlllTIluty deed? 
18 A. Not really, but I guess I did. 
1 9 What does it say there? 
9 : 2 9 20 Yeah. 1 signed it.! guess. 
2 1 THE wm.JESS: But who did I sign lhis for? 
22 MR. MARIN: It was far the escrow company. 
2 3 THE WITNESS: For the escrow compally, yeah. 
24 MR. BOWERS: 
9;29 25 Q. Right 
Page 21 
9:29 1 And this is what's been represented to me as !he 
warranty deed that you signed to sell the cheese plant 2 
3 
4 
at the close of escrow when the property was transferred 
to my client. 
9: 30 5 A. After he put up the money I guess, yeah. 




And that's an I'm asking you. I just need you to 
validate, first of all, that that's your signature. 
A. Yeab. 





A. You know what? W'ny did I sign a W'dITantf deed? 
I held !he mortgage on that property. 
MR . .t>.'IARIN: You were representing Star Valley. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
9 ; 3 D 15 I represent Star Valley Cheese Corporation. I 
1 6 guess that's why 1 signed it. 
17 Go ahead. 
18 MR. BOWERS: 
19 Q. Okay. 
S ; 30 ? 0 Mr. Farinella is this - is this a warranty deed 
21 that YOIl signed? 
22 A. ] guess I did, yes. 
2.3 Q. All right. Thank you. 
24 I know it's hard to go back and look at documents. 
9:30 25 A. Yeah. We're talking eight years. 
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9:30 1 Q. Whatever time you need, just take it. 9:33 1 Q.Okay-
:1 )')ow i'lj have you look at what I'U have the com't 2 A. I didn't get a letter. I just got a "voice" 
3 repOrter -- Bates stamp 3, the 8iU of Sale, and ask 3 from my anomey telling me. 
11 that Lori !l1 .. ark that as deposition Exhihit 2. [EXH-2} 4 Q. Okay. 
9:31 5 When she gets done., I'll have you take a look at :33 S Well sometime if your attorney and you wani to talk 
6 that, Mr. Farinella. 6 to me about it, we'll be glad to talk to you about it 
7 (\Nbereupon the document referred to is marked by 7 outside of this setting. 
8 the reporter as Exhibit 2 for identification.) S A. No, I don't want to talk to nobody. 
9 THE REPORTER: Okay. 9 MR. SO\VERS: Now I'll ask the court reporter if 
9:31 1 0 MR. BOWERS: 10 she'll mark as deposition Exlnbit 3 for identification 
11 Q. Mr. Farinella, I'll have you look at deposition 11 purposes, what's Bates stamped 4 through 7. [EXH-3] 
12 Exhibit 2 and it's Bates stamp 3. 12 (Whereupon the document referred to is marked by 
13 First of all, is that your signature on the bottom 13 the reporter as Exhibit 3 tOr identification.) 
1 4 towards the bottom of the page? 14 MR. BOWERS: 
:31 15 A. Yes. 9 : 3 'I 1 5 Q. I'm going to have you look at what's been 
16 Q. And I understand that this was executed at the 1 6 marked for identification purposes deposition Exhibit 3. 
1 7 same time as the warranty deed as part of the close of 17 On top of it is "Bill of Sale." 
1 8 the escrow or the sale. Is that your understanding? 1 B A."1<l my understanding is this was in referent.'e to 
1 9 A. My understanding says this is from the escrow 19 t.'1e closing of the escrow, bul does that - is that your 








21 Q. Okay" 




A. From the bankruptcy cour!, I guess, yes. 
Can I talk to you one minute? 
Q. Sm·e. Go ahead. 
Page 23 
A. Why - 1 say why am I being sued? I'm nnt - I 
2 want to know why I'm being sued. 
3 Q. That's something I can probably lalk to you 
4 about with you and your attorney when we're not in a 
5 deposition. 
6 How does that sound? 
7 A. No, it doesn't sound right. 
S I'm .here to get a question from you. Why am \ 
9 getting sued? 
10 Q. Mr. Farinella, unfortunately this is a 
11 situation where 1 don't bave to answer your questions_ 
12 A.. \'n rettaetthat. 
13 Q. That's a legitimate question., and I'll answer 
14 it when we're done with the - when we can talk 
15 sometime. 
16 tn fac~ while I'm thinking of it, Mr. farinella, I 
17 sent a letter - I don't know - asking ifl can talk to 
1 a you or talk to your persol1al attorney about this matter. 
19 Have you received a copy oftlla.? 
20 A_ Idon'tkoow. 
21 MR.. MARIN: YOllrattomeycal\ed-
22 THE WITNESS: My attorney - my attorney in Wyoming 
23 told me aboll!t it And I told him "No, I don't want to 
24 talk to Don Zebe or anybody up there_" 
25 MR. BOWERS: 
2 1 first page? 
22 A_ Yes. 1 signed this. 
23 Q. And was that part of the c[i)sing i'lD the plant 
24 too? 
2 5 A_ I guess, 'cause rm not familiar with -
Page 25 
1 THE Wfl'Nr:SS: I got this from the escrow company; 
2 didn't!? 
3 MR. MARIN: Yes. 
4 THE WITNESS: Yeah. I guess it is a biU ohale. 
5 MR. BOWERS: 
6 Q. And then would you mind looking at the second 
7 page -- the second., third, fourth page on there. The I 
a list of equipment. 
9 A. Where is the list of equipment? 
:34 10 MR. MARIN; That one. 
11 TIfE WITNESS: Yes. 
12 MR. BOWERS: 
13 Q. Does that look like equipment that would have 
14 been at Star Valley Cheese Plant that was sold pursuant 
15 to the sale'? 
1 6 A. I guess.. 
17 THE WITNESS: Who took this here? This i«vent<.r.y, 
18 who took it? 
19 MR. MARIN: That was the list from-
20 THE WITNESS: That was the list from who'! 
21 MR.. MAroN: That was from the list of Frank Dana. 
22 THE WITNESS: Oh. 1 guess it is, yes. 
23 It is a list from the plant manager. 
2.4 MR. BOWERS: 
:35 25 Q. It sounded like Frank Dana? 
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MR. MA1UN: Before he died. 
THE WITNESS: Before he died. 
1'.1R. BOWERS: 
Page 






Q. Is this a fair and accurate representation of 9 : 3 8 
the bill of sale that was signed at the time of closing 
with my client? 
A. Yes, I guess. Y cs. 
Q. Okay. Perfect 
MR. BOWERS: Now let's go - I'll have the court 9: 38 
reporter - this is a little longer. If you wouldn't 
mind marking as deposition Exhibit 4 what's been marked 
as Bates stamp 8 through 190 [EXH-4] 
(Whereupon the doclIDlerU referred to is marked by 
the reporter as Exhibit 4 for identification.) 
MR.BOWERS: 
Q. If you would lOOk, Wlr. Farinella, at deposition 
Exhibit 4. Now we're maybe a little back on order 
9: 38 
1 9 pursuant to our previous conversation. 
Page 28 
1 Q. You know, I understand it's hard when you look 
2 at these documents and -
3 A. TIlat's why I wanted to know why I'm being sued. 
4 Q. Inere you go. There you go. 
5 A. I've gone through this, which you should have 
6 the broker here who handled the sale, not me. I'm not a 
7 real estale broker. 
S All I was there for is to take the bids for the 
9 bankruptcy lawyer and submit them to him. That's all. 
10 Q. Okay. 
1 1 A. And as president, J signed all - and the 
12 escrow company. That's aliI know. 
13 So I don't know why you don't have -- Go ahead. 
1 4 "Excuse me. I'm sony. 
15 Q. I (old you 1 have it hahit of talking over. 
16 apologize. 
17 A. I apologize too. 
18 Q. SO to clarlfY. Your job was just to submit, 
19 receive the bids, but it was the banlmlptcy trustee that 
9 : 3 6 20 1 believe this is the offer to purchase that you 9 : 3 9 2 a approved them; correct? 
2 1 made reference to initially - in fact it's dated 
22 October 17th, 2008 ~ that you were talking about Gaylen 
23 Clayton. 
2 4 Would you mind taking a look at tbe front page and 
9 : 3 7 2 5 see if that refi'esr,.es your memory that this looks like 


























the document that you were talking about that -
A. rve never seen this document. This is 
Caldwell Banker's, the broker. 
Q. You've never seen this document? 
A. No, I've neVer seen this. Jt went to the 
broker, Coldwell Banker. 
MR. MARIN: I know, hut this refers to you. 
THE WITNESS: He made me sign it 
MR. BOWERS: 
Q. Yeah, I think your signature .- or at least 
somebody signed it. 
if you look at Bates stamped 13. 
THE WITNESS: r guess I've seen it, but 1 don't 
remember it. 
MR. BOWERS: 
Q. Is that your signature on Bates stamp 14 of 
Exhibit 4? 
A. That's not my signature. That's not my 
signature. 
MR. MARIN: That was a stamp. 
THE WITNESS: Oh, that's a stamp. I signed it. 
10/4/08 it says. 
MR.BOWERS: 
Q. Right 
A. Is that correGt? 
21 A. Absolutely. 
22 Q. Do you know if -- and you rnay not because of 
23 whatyoujust told m~, but on page one of deposition 
24 Exhibit 4, Bates stamped 8, it says it was to be an 
9 ; 39 25 "Eamesl Money" paid at $lO,OOO, on paragraph ten there. 
Page 29 
1 Do you see that? 
2 A. J see it, yealL 
3 Q. Do you know jf that was ever paid by 
4 Mr. Clayson or Mr. Randall? 
5 MR. MARIN: Whatever money -
6 THE WITNESS: r don't know if it was paid. 
7 MR. MARIN: -- it went to the broker. 
8 THE WITNESS: It went to the broker. 
9 If it did, it went to the broker. I never seen it; 
9:39 1 0 1 never heard it. 
11 This must bave been with the broker, the real 
12 estate broker. 
13 Is it the deposit or what? Is that what it is? 
14 MR. BOWERS: 
9:39 15 Q. It speaks for itself; but that's what 1 would 
1 6 understand it would he, a deposit 
1 7 A. Why would I know about it? 
1 8 Q. Well you were soliciting the bids. That's my 
1 9 question. I didn't know jf you did or not. 
9:40 20 A. No. 
21 But the money, everything, transaction goes to the 
2 2 real estate broker. 
2 3 Like I said, I was not a real estate broker. I was 
2 4 taking the bids and it went to the real estate broker 
9: 40 25 who in tum referred to I.he bankruptcy court to approve. 
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As far as that gres, that's all I know. 
2 I didn't know he put up $10,000. 
3 I don't know. 
4 MR MA..'UN: It went to escrow. 
5 THE WITNESS: It went to the Pendleton, I guess. 
6 MR MARIN: It was escrow. Escrow company. 
7 THE WITNESS: Escrow company. 
B Maybe it went to the escrow company. I have no 
9 idea. 
10 But I don't know. The answer is I don't know. 
11 MR. BO\VERS: 
12 Q. You know, there's nothing wrong wim an "I 
13 don't know.r. 
14 
15 
A. You know, I really don't know. 
Q. Okay. 
1 6 Would you mind looking on deposition Exhibit 4. 
17 Would you :mind looking Gn the Bates stamp Number 13 at 
18 the lop of the page. 
19 A. Just a minute. 
20 Here! got it in front of me. 
21 Q. And right down there,. there's a Roman XVI. Off 
22 to the side there's a line -- is it 228 -- "Consents And 
23 Acknowledgments." 
2 4 It's about the middle - top of the middle of the 
25 page. 
Page 31 
1 Do you see that? 
2 A. Yeah. 
3 Q. Okay. 
4 It says nAil prior representations made in the 
5 negotiations of this sale have been incorporated herein, 
6 and there are no oral agreements or representations 
7 between Buyer, Seller or Brokers to modify the terms and 
B conditions of this Contract. n 
9 Did yoo read that before you signed this document'? 





Q. You didn't read that? 
A. No. 
Q. When you signed this agreement--
THE WITNESS: ~'here did this paper come from? 
9 ; 4 1 15 ~ifR l'vtARIN: It's--
I 6 THE WITNESS: It's what? 
1 7 MR. MARIN: -- part of the offer with !he -
1 8 THE WITNESS: Of the offer from? 
19 MR MARIN: From-
'} : 4 2 20 THE WfINESS: To the real estate broker? 
.7.1 MR. MARIN: Yes. 
22 THE WITNESS: No, I didn't even see this. 
23 MR BOWERS: 
24 Q. If you look to the next page. J just want to 
9: 4 2 25 clarify on Bates stamp 14, !he next page, that that's 
Page 32 
~ 9 : 4 2 1 your signalure on tins documerlt; correct? 
:2 A. There's a lot of si gnatures on here. 
3 MR. MARIN: This one (indicating). 
4 MR. BO\VERS: 
9 : .:I 2 5 Q. RighL 
6 A. 1 see my signature there. 
7 Q. J know you - Do you normally sign legal 
6 documents without reading tbem? 
9 A. Like 1 toid you, I'm not a broker and f'm not a 
9 ; 4 2 1 0 lawyer. I trust the peopie who are giving me the 
11 documents from either the broker or the escrow company. 
12 Q. Okay. 
13 Well, Mr. Farinella, let me just --
14 A. You know what? You're going around and around 
'}:42 1 5 il' circles. \\Thy don't you get 10 the bottom of this 
1 6 what you really want to know? 
1 7 This is all builshit you pay time over here. Gel 
18 to the point you really want to know. I know what 
19 you're going around and around about because alJ Qf this 
9: 43 20 is 
21 Q. Unfortunately, what ! want to ask, [ can't 
22 A. Get to the point what you really want to know. 
2 3 Q. rm an attorney. 1 have to do the round and 
24 round. 
9: 43 2S A. I know you do. 
Page 33 
9 : Ii 3 1 Q. 1 don't like it allY more than you do. 
2 A. I bope not 
3 Q. SO on page - on the front page ofExbibit 4, 
4 if I understand when I read this - just there may be -
9; Ii 3 5 To move this along. Star Valley - your company is the 
6 seller, even though we know that it has to be approved 
7 by the bankruptcy trustee; Caldwell .B3ni<er is the 
8 broker, and then at least on this document it lists 
9 Gaylen Clayson and Jeff Randall. 






Q. Have you eVeJ met him before? 
A. Henllo. No. 
Q. Okay. 
9 ; -'I 3 3. 5 \Alben you signed this document, were there any other 
1 6 agreements. oral or written. between yourself as the 
I? seller of the property and Gaylen Clayson and Jeff 
1 8 Randall about the sale of the property? 
19 A. No, there was no oral agreement at aU, 
9: 44 20 Q. Okay. 
21 So whatever - Basically the agreement was what was 
22 in this offer which you signed, which is Exhibit 4; 
23 correct? 
24 A. Yes. 
9: 44 25 You have to put it in - I live in Los Angeles and 
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9: q 4 1 this all took place in Wyoming. 
2 And what was going on there is between the broker 
3 and the bankruptcy court had to go between me. So when 
4 they sent me papers up here and papers down there, it 
9 : 44 5 was kind of confusing what they're doing because I was 
6 completely out of it. I was out of it 
7 I know I'm signing here, but Once a conlpany goes 
8 into bankruptcy, it's handled by the bankruptcy court, 
9 the realtor who is trying to sell it and the bankruptcy 
9 : 4 4 1 0 lawyer. 
11 All! was there was helping them out. Or I could 
12 have walked away from it all But I helped them out 
13 trying to get the bids. 
14 You do understand that? 
9 : 45 15 Q. I do. 
16 A. So if they send me a paper down here and say 
1 ? "Si gil this because you've got to do it," I signed it. 
1 a I didn't go get a lawyer to look it over and see 
1 9 iL I signed it because that's what I had to do. 
g: '15 20 Q. Well. Mr. Farinella, you asked me to kind of 
2 1 cut to the chase. 
22 A. Yeah, I did. 
2 3 Q. Herels what I'm trying to get at. 
24 A. I know. Let's get to it. 
9 ; 4:) 25 Q. I have a whole bunch of documents that I want 
Page 35 
9 : q 5 1 to go through with you, and I'll move along pretty 
? quick, but all the documents say there was no other oral 
3 representations or agreement. 
4 A. No. 
S Q. But your attorney has alJeged in SOJ1le pleadings 
6 that there was some other agreements, full agreements. 
7 And I don't understand them. 
8 And so I want·- I'm just trying to find out - 1'm 
9 confused because the documents say there are no other 
9 : 4 5 10 agreements, and I just need to go througb these--
II A. I understand. 
12 Q. - and find out if there was another agreement 
13 A. I understand what you're going througb, but 
14 there was no oral agreement other than what I told you 
9 : 4 6 1 5 what he did. An.d once he bid for it, it was out. of my 
1 6 hands. They agTeed to the bid, and 1 backed off after. 
17 that. 
18 Untill found out Ga}'len had a partner, and then I 
19 said, "00 what you want to do, both of you," So J ca.'le 
9:4620 backtoL.A. 
21 Q. And it was out of your hands? 
22 A. Naturally it's out of my hands. They already 
2 3 bid it, it went into cscro1i'/, and what tiley did between 
24 tbe two of thcrn over there God only knows. 
9: <l to 25 Q. Okay. That's a nice summary_ 
Page 36 
9 : 4 6 1 Mr. Farinella, here's what JIm going to do. I've 
2 got some more dOCllml:nts I'm going to go through, and 
3 J'Il tell you what rm going to do. 
4 A All rigbt. 
9 : 4: 6 5 Q. It looks like a whole bunch of these documeots 
6 are extensions. It looks likes there was a closing date 
7 and it keeps getting extended, extended. 
8 The only reason Pm going through with these is I'm 
9 going to have them show you the document. 
9: 4 6 10 A. All right. 
11 Q. I'm going to probably ask you two questions. 
12 One is "Is your signature on the docwnent, " have you 
13 look at thaL 
14 A. Okay. 
9 : 4 6 15 Q. There's some more -- I already alluded to this. 
1 6 There's some more wording on the documents that says 
1 7 there was 110 oral agreement. 
18 So my second question will be to have you thin\( 
19 back see if there were any other agreements other than 
9 : 4 7 2 a what's on the paper; okay? And we'll try to move 
21 through as quick as pOSSIble. 
22 How's that? 
2 3 A. Thatls fme. Thanl< y()l.l. 
24 Q. Youhet 
9 : 47 2 5 lA's - the court repoctei' can look at -- or pull 
Page 37 
9 : 47 1 up the next two pages, which is Bates stamped 20 and 21, 
2 and mark that as deposition Exhibit 5. [EXH-5] 
3 (Whereupon dte document referred to is marked by 
4 the reporter as Exhibit 5 for identification.) 
9 : 47 5 MR. BOWERS: 
6 Q. Mr. Farinella? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Exhibit 5 appears to me to be a -- a change of 
9 deadline on this real estate contract that we talked 
9 : lj 8 1 0 about, 1 thinlc it was Exhibit <I. 
11 But would you look at deposition Exlubit 5. Is 
12 that your signature on the bottom? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Okay. 
9 : .; 8 15 And then would you look at "OW in the rr.iddie of thl! 
16 page. 
17 A. Dis-
1 B Q. "All prior representations" -. Let me say, 
19 quote, "All prior representations made in the 
9 : 4 8 2 0 negotiations of this sale have been incorporated herein, 
21 and there are no ora! agreements or representations 
2 2 between Buyer, Seller or their agents to modify the 
2 3 terms and conditions of this Contract." 
2 4 Are you aware of any otber oral agreements other 
25 than this real {".state - this extension and the real 
10 (Pages 34 to 37) 
HUTCHINGS COURT REPORTERS, LLC - GLOBAL LEGAL SERVICES 
800.697.3210 
659 
. ~Ef LLC V. DAIRY SYSTEHS , INC. September 30, 2010 MORRIS A. FARINELLP . 
9: 49 
Page 38 
1 estate contract? 
2 A. No. 
3 There was no oral .. No, none of that None at 
4 all. 
5 Q. Allright. 
6 MR. BOWERS: Lori, if you wouldn't mind taking 
7 Bates stamped number 22 and mark it as 
8 Exhibit 6. (EXH-6J 
9 (Whereupon the document referred to is marked by 
1 0 the reporter as Exhibit 6 for identification.) 
11 MR. BOWERS: 
12 Q. On deposition Exhibit "8," Mr. Farinella I 
1 3 don'! sec your signature on there anywhere. 
14 Do you? 
15 THE REPORTER: You said "8." 
16 
17 
THE WITNESS: You said "8." 
MR.. BOWERS: 
18 Q. Deposition Exhibit 6. 
19 A. J don't see any signatw·c on hem. 




21 'i\.'ho is this? Oil. JeffP..andaii and Gaylen. That's 
22 on this page. 





ever seeing this document before? 
A. Never. 
Q. Okay. Then we'11 just move on. 
Let me - and then I want to clari..fy. 
Page 39 
3 When you talk. about, on my notes here - when you 
4 talk about the escrow again, you're talking about the 
5 closing when money is paid, deed's transferred and the 
6 property is completed and sol~ correct? 
7 A. Right. 
8 Q. SO up to tbat point, I want to clarify that no 
9 one had the authority to do anything on the property as 
10 far as, I guess, unusual expenses witbout the authority 
11 of the bankruptcy trustee; correct? 
12 MR. ATKIN: Objection. Calls for a legal 
1 3 conclusion. 
1 4 Blake Atkins. 
9 ; 51 15 THE WITNESS: You want me to allSwer that? 
1 6 MR. BOWERS: 
17 Q. Yes, please. 
18 A. That nobody had authority to do anything or to 
19 spend any money at the plant while it was in prQCess of 
9: 51 20 eserow to close. Is t1'!at what you're trying to sa:y? 
21 Q. Yes. Without the bankruptcy trustee's 
22 permission; correct? 
23 A. That's normal. Yes. That's righl 
24 Q. Okay. 







1 stamp number 23 through 26 and mark that as deposition 
:2 Exhibit 7. (EXH.7j 
3 A. John? 
4 Q. Yes. 
5 A. Gaylen submitted his offer and was accepted at 
6 the time. 
7 Then Gaylen suggested to run the plant and 
8 restaurant -
9 MR. MARIN: (Indicating.) 
10 THE \VITNESS; What the hell is this? 
1 .1 MR. lVlARlN: Familiarize. 
12 THE WITNESS: Towhat? 
13 MR. MARIN: To familiarize on the ope<atiolL 
14 THE WITNESS: -- to familiarize on the operation. 
15 Gaylen then suggested --
16 
17 
What the hell is this? 
MR. MARIN: To cle;;n. 
18 THE WITNESS: - to clean the plant. Yeah. I 
19 remember toot. 
20 He says, urI! clean the plant and get it ready. 
21 As soon as escrow doses, we {;'!Itl start opening and make 
22 cheese at the time." 
2 J- And I told him "Go ahead lllId do what you want as 
24 long as it doesn't cost the bankruptcy or me or anybody 
25 any mt)Uey to spend.' 
Page 41 
1 TI18t's where we -- that's the thing that I - I 
2 think that's where we're going in the first place, 
3 aren't we? 
4 MR. BOWERS: It sounds reasonable. 
: 53 5 (Whereupon the document referred to is marked by 
6 the reporter as ExIlibit 7 for identification.) 
7 MR. BOWERS: I 
B Q. Deposition Exhibit 7, when you look on the 
9 second page - no, it's not the second .- yours isn't on 
: 53 .1 0 the second. There's so many pages to this. 
11 Would you look ou the fourth page and see if lhat's 
12 your signature. 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Okay. 
15 And then up above there, two paragraphs up, number 
1 6 two Slates, • All representations made in the 
1 7 negotiations of this sale have been inco1pQrated herein, 
18 there are no verbal agreemerns between Buyer, Seiler 
19 andlor any cr..her Brokers to modify terms and 
2 0 conditions. n 
21 Was that a fair statement at the time? 
22 A. I think so, yes. 
23 Q. Were you aware of any other oral or agreements 
24 other than what was spelled out in these documents we've 
25 discussed? 
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A. No. P9:56 1 Lees go to Bates stamp •• Lo~ if you1] pull 
Except what I read to you. 2 Bates stamp 32 through 39. Mark that as deposition 
Q. Okay. 3 Exhibit Number 10. [EXH·lOj 
Basically that Gaylen could fumiliarize himself and 4 (Whereupon the document referred to is marked by 
run tbe piant as long as it didn't cost anybody any 9:56 5 the reporter as Exhibit 10 for identification.) 
money? 6 MR.BOWERS: 
A. Right 7 Q. And would you mind looking at Exhibit J 0 Bates 
And it was agreed by him and his partners. 8 stamp 39. That would be the very last page. 
Q. Okay. 9 MR. MARIN: Last page. 
A. That he was going to get the plant ready to 9;57 10 MRBOWERS: 
operate as soon as escrow closed. 11 Q. And see if that's your signature, 
Q. Okay. 12 Mr. Farinella? 
A. But GayJen slept there I think. He slept 13 A. Yes. 
there. He never went home. 14 Q. See up above there, two paragraphs up, it 
Q. Okay. 9:57 15 states "All representalions made in the negotiations of 
MR. BOWERS: Lori, if you would look at 16 this sale have been incorporated herein, there are no 
deposition - or Bates stamp 27 throng]) 30. 17 verbal agl'c-ements betwcen BU"jer, Seller and/or Brokers 
That is deposition Exhibit 8. [EXH·8J 18 to modifY the tenns and conditions." 
(Whereupon the document referred 1.0 is marked hy 19 Other than what you explained to us, ',vhich really 
the reporter as Exhibit 8 fur identification.) 9:57 20 doesn't have to do with the tenus of the sale, bUl 
MR. BOWERS: 22- taking that into account, was there ::my other agreement 
Q. Okay. 22 referenced in the sale that is not .. was not contained 
Deposjtion Exhibit 8. W ou Id you Jook at the very 23 in these real estate documents we've discussed? 
last page. 24 MR. ATKIN: Object to the question as 
MR. A TKlN: Would you say the pages again, ?C ,," argumentative. 
Page 43 Page 45 
MR. BOWERS: It's Bates stamp 30. 1 You call go ahead and answer. 
TIlE WITNESS: That's my signature. 2 This is Blake Atkin. 
MR. BOWERS: 3 THE WITNESS: I don't know bow to answer that 
Q. Again, on paragraph two, it states there's no 4 Can you repeat it again. 
other representations or oral agreemmt. :58 5 MR BOWERS: Lori, can you read tbat back to mm, 
Do you agree with that- 6 please. 
A. Yes. 7 (The record is read by tbe reporter.) 
Q. - that when you signed this there was no other 8 THE WITNESS: No, there was no other agreement. 
oral agreement? 9 MRBOWERS: 
A. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. la- Q. All right. Thank you. 
That's the same as the other ones; right? 11 A. Tms is all real estate stuff from the broker. 
Q. Same as the other ones. 12 MR BOWERS: You know, if we could take a .. about 
A. Okay. 13 a two-minute break. If everybody can stay on the line, 
Q. And 1'Il say except for what you explained to 14 we've covered a lot of tile materials J have, and jf we 
me. How's that? 9:58 15 c,m take two to five minutes, we'll be able to move this 
A. That's fine. nlat's exactly fine. 16 along. 
Q. Okay. 17 (A recess is taken.) 
MR. BOWERS: Lori, if you wouldn't mind taking 18 MR.-BOWERS: 
Bates stamp 31. If you eouid mark that deposition 19 Q. Mr. Farinella, do you have documents in front 
Exhibit 9. (EXH.9} 10:10 20 of you today that you brought or Manny brought? 
(Whereupon the doctlluent ref<,:ITed to·is marked by 21 A What kind of documents? 
the reporter as Exhibit 9 for identification.) 22 Q. Did you bring documents, any documents? 
THE WITNESS: J got it. 23 A. I got one ilere. 
MR. BOWERS: Actually, we've covered that. So 24 THE WITNESS: Is that what we -
we'll skip that Qne. 0:10 2S MR. MARIN: (Nods head in the affirmative.) 
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Q. Tell me what it is. 
MR. MARIN: Jt's an e-mail. 
THE WITh!£SS: What the hell is it? 
It's an e-mail 
MR. BOWERS: 
Q. Can you read it to me. 
A. Well. it's a long one. 
Page 46 
9 V\'hat do you want? You're supposed to ask me 
10 questions. 
11 Q. I am asking you questions. Does it have 
12 refi:rence to this case? 
13 A. Only ifhe asks me a question. 
1 4 Q. Have you been referring to it during this 
1 5 deposition? 
1 6 A. Okay. f'Jl read 1t to you. 
1 7 Tilis is iiil e-mail sent by Ze-tc. 
18 MR. MARIN: Don Zebe. 
19 THE WITNESS: Don Zebe. 
20 1 can't read too much, Manny. You want to l\-"ad it 
21 to them? 
2 2 The writing is so little, r told you before about 
23 my-
2 4 Read it for theflt It's an e-mail. 
25 MR- BOWERS: 
Page 47 
o : 11 1 Q. Is it - WeU, let me ask yoo this. 
2 Is it an e-mail from - is it an e-mail from Manny 
3 reference the accounts? 
4 A. No. From Donald Zebe. 
o : 11 5 Q. Who gave you that e-mail today? 
6 MR. MARIN: We have that 
7 THE WITNESS: We bad it. 
S MR. MARIN: We have this on file. 
9 MR. BOWERS: 
o ; 11 1 0 Q. SO you just decided to bring that today? 
11 A Yeah. 
12 MR. MARIN: No. Because we - we have this file. 
1 3 This was sent to YOll. 
14 THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
0: 1 J 15 MR. MARIN: To my e-maii address. 
1 6 THE WITNESS: It was sent to your e-mail? 
17 MR .. MARlN: Yeah. 
18 MR. BOWERS: 
19 Q. SO somebody sent you this ck'.cument-
o : 11 20 A. I don't understand why you're asking me this. 
2 1 What dOCllffief1ts did 1 bring? What relevance --
22 Q. Let me finish, Mr. Farinella 
23 You're a business man? 
2 -1 A. I'm not a lawyer. 








1 you or somebody -- what you did to prepare forthls. 
2 It sounds to me, correct me jf I'm wrong, somebody 
3 sent you an e-mail with a copy of an old e-mail from my 
4 client to prep you and influence you for this 
5 deposition. 
5 A. No. No. 
7 They sent me an e-mail to answer any questions that 

















Q. Oh, they sent you an e-mail to answer -
A. No. Nobod}1 sent -- I have an e-mail that was 
sent to the the real estate -
MR.MAR1N: Yeah. 
THE WITNESS: Was it sent to Pendleton? 
MR. MARIN: Yeah, be sent i1 to Pendleton. 
THE WITNESS; - to Pendleton that we had on file 
here. 
MR.BOWERS: 
Q. But it was just sent to you in the last day or 
so to prepare you for this deposition? 
A. No. No. 
llis w .. .s sent - Do you Wlmt to read the date on 
there? January 14th --
MR. MARIN: 2009. 
THE VvTINESS: - 2009. 
MR..BOWERS: 
Page 49 
o : 13 1 Q. So my question is why didn't you bring other 
2 things from the file other than this? 
3 A. You must think rm a stupid jerl< over here. I 
4 know what you're getting at over here. J have to answer 
o : 13 5 your question. 
6 MR. MARIN: We brought the listing agreement 
7 THE WITNESS: We brought all tile listings from tile 
B C.aldweU "Banks" we've got here, and all the listings -
9 but I have an e-mail. 
o : 13 1 0 1 don't know why you're asking me about an e-mail. 
11 Would you please expJain ibat. 
12 MR. BOWERS: 
13 Q. It sounded to me tike somebody had sent you an 
14 e.mail-
o : 1 3 15 A. It rounds like. It sounds like. 
1 6 Is tbat the way a lawyer talks? It sounds like. 
17 Q. Yes. 
18 It sounds like they sent you --
I 9 A. U don't sound like that 
o : 13 20 Q. In the last five days, did anybody e-mail you 
2 1 material, either you or Manny, in reference to this 
22 upcoming deposition? 
23 A. No. 
24 !I.1R. MARIN: I prepared it. 
0: 13 25 THE WITNESS: Manny prepared it 
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0: 1 3 1 He prepared it for this deposition, He prepared it 
2 for this deposition. 
3 MR. BOWERS: 
4 Q. Good, 
o : 14 5 Do you have - you can ask him. Does he have or do 
6 you have in front of you the August 28, 2008 
7 authorization which you signed in which you gave 
8 Mr. Clayson permission to run the operations of the Star 
9 Valley restaurant? 




TIIE WlTh"ESS: It was in that e-mail? 
MR. MARIN: Yes. 
THE WITNESS: You got it with you'! 
14 MR. MARIN: So I don't have it, but I know it was 
0: 1 4 15 in the file. That's the reason you signed this. 
16 THE WITNESS: Yeah, this is why I signed this. 
17 Yeah. 
18 MR. BOWERS: 
19 Q. Okay. 
o : 1 4 20 Do you have that? Call you review thaI, the 
21 August 28,2008 leiter authorization? 
22 MR. MARIN: This is exactly what was in there. We 
2 3 didn't bring that. 
24 TIfE WITNESS: We didn't bring it with us, that part 
0: 14 25 of it. 
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10 : 14 MR. BOWERS: 
2 Q. Okay. 
3 A. October 8, the owner of Star Valley Cheese --
4 You know, these words are _. 
o : 15 5 Listeil, rUl lIot a lawyer, but when you go bankrupt, 
6 how do you OWll it mymore? 
7 Do you own anything after you're b~t? Do you 
f.l still own it? As a lawyer, answer me. Do you stiU own 
9 it after a place goes bankrupt? 
o : 15 1 0 Q. Let me ask you this: Did you believe you owned 
11 it or you didn't when it went bankrupt? 
12 A. No, tile coun owns it. The court takes it 
13 over. 
14 You might be a principal there, but you don't own 
0:15 15 it. 
16 Q. So--
17 A. So here it says -- it says lllat ~As I was tbe 
1 8 owner of Star Valley Oleese Plant in Thayne, Wyoming to 
1 9 the company of Star Valley Cheese Corporation. R 
0: 15 20 I was always working for the cOurts, not as 3D 
21 individual owner. So I want YOll tQ straighten that one 
22 out. 
23 J'm not going to get any deeper with this thing 
2 " because I have nothing (0 do with any of you guys. I'm 
0: 15 25 getting a little-· 
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: 16 1 Q. Since you weren't the owner, then you didn't 
:2 have authorization to have GayJen Clayton --
3 A. Only - only for the restaurant. Don't put 
4 words in my mouth. Only for the restaurant 
5 I had the right to keep it open as much as I could, 
6 but the people there weren't running it right, and 
7 Gaylen was staying there and living there. I told him 
8 to look after it, to take care of it, to keep it open. 
9 Otherwise, T would have had In close the 
o : 16 10 restaurant, and it WOUldn't look good for the courts. 
11 Q. But you didn't have the authorization or power 
12 to allow Gayien Clayson to sell equipment out of the 
13 plan!? 
14 A. Hell no. No. Excuse me. No. 
o : 16 15 !vIR. ATKIN: This is Blake Atkin. 
16 Object to the question. Calls fur a Jegal 
17 condusioll. 
18 MR. BOWERS: Okay. 
19 Q. lfMr. Clayton sold -- during the time prior to 
o : 16 20 the closing of the escrow, if Mr. Clayton sold equipment 
21 out of the plant, then he did so without you. approval; 
22 correct? 
23 A.. If anything came Ollt of that plant it was 
2 4 absolutely without roy approval. 
0:17 2 5 As I said, again - I wtll read it again to YOIL 
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0: 17 1 After Gaylen ~'llbtnilted and the offer was accepted, he 
2 suggested to run the plant and restaurant and keep it 
3 familiarized and to operations - keep it in operation. 
4 That I didn't mind as long as it didn't cost any 
0:17 5 money to the courts. 
6 Q. Let me claritY .. While were on that subject, 
7 let me clarify tbeil. 
S II wasn't sold -- when there was money coming into 
9 the restaurant, because you bave customers paying, did 
0:17 10 Gaylen Clayton have any authority to withdraw or use any 
11 of that money for his personal use? 
12 A. No. Nobody. 
13 Neither did Don Zsbe. 
14 Q. Neither did Don Zebe? 
15 A. As far as I know, hotb of them were over there. 
16 Q. SO the money was to go back into either paying 
1 7 for the suppliers -. 
18 A. Right" exactly. 
1 9 And the help. Wbich we had I got sued by the 
20 stale of Wyoming. 
21 THE WITNESS: What was that? The - the labor 
22 department. 
23 What was the name of this? 
2" 1\1&. MARIN: For state tax. 
25 THE WITNESS: For state tax. 
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a : 18 1 MR. MARIN: Sales tax. o : 20 1 him until he paid it 
2 THE WITNESS: Sales tax. 2 Q. And, again, he didn't have any - it was 
3 They weren't paying. l got sued. 3 basically - the only authorization you gave him in 
4 And I called up Gaylen and the girls that worked 4 August 28th on the plant was to just mairuain the 
o : 18 5 there and said, "You have to pay this." Between Don o : 20 5 cleanlinesS; correct? 
6 Zebe and Gaylen, whoever, they paid it. 6 A. Yeah. That's what be wanted to do. 
7 MR. BOWERS: 7 He wanted - be suggested that himself after -
8 Q. And did there come a time before the sale of B Here, I'll read it to you again. 
9 the property that the bankruptcy was discharged and you 9 Gaylen then suggested ro clean the plant and fix 
o : 1 8 1 0 were what is referred to as a debtor in possession? o : 20 10 the electrical and plmnbin~ And it was confirmed -- it 
11 A. Did - Can you clarify thaI? 11 was confumed by John - Don Zebe. He authorized it 
12 You mean in simple words was the -- was the 12 also that he should do that 
1 3 bankrupt taken out? 13 Q. Who told you that? 
14 Q. Wasit- 14 A. Don Zelle. 
o : 18 15 A. No. Never. : 20 15 He - he became his partner. 'When he became his 
16 Q. Ever? 16 partner he had it noted too that he was going 10 do the 
17 A. Never. 1 -; cleani.i1g and fix tile plan!: so it could be running when 
18 Q. Let me tell you - You know, I have it in front 18 escrow closed. 
19 of you, and l'U just read it to you what 1 have in 19 Q. Who told you that Don Zebe was his partner? 
0:19 20 front of you. 0: 21 20 MR. MARIN: Don Zebe. 
21 It's an August 28, 2008. I t.l-tink you told me that 21 THE WITNESS: Don Zelle himself told me. 
22 you reviewed this_ 22 MR. BOWERS: Manny, I can hear you in the 
23 It says, ~To whom it nmy concern. Tlris will 23 background telling him the a!lSWe-l'S. 
24 authorize Mr. Gaylen Clayton to run the operations of 24 THE WITNESS; Wel~ tbars why] brought him here. 
o ; 19 25 the Star Valley restaurant" -- o : 21 25 MR. BOWERS: Yeab, well, Pm not deposing him. 
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0: 19 1 A. Right. 0:21 1 And I don't mind you giving documents and helping.. 
2 Q. - "and he will also be responsible f()r 2 but I've gut to ask that you refrain from giving the 
3 providing workers' compensation IDb-urance" - 3 answers. 
4 A. Yeah. 4 Will you do tbat for me? 
o : 19 5 Q. - "for the restaurant employees ... 0:21 5 THE WITNESS: Okay. 
6 A. Correct 6 MR. MARIN: Okay. 
7 Q. And the next line, "In addition, Mr. Clayson ? MR. BOWERS: Otherjwise, we'U set up another 
8 will also take care of the cleanliness of the plant. 8 deposition. . 
9 Sincerely, Morris A. Farinella." 9 THE WITNESS: No. No. Just get to the point here. 
o : 1 9 10 Is that the autilorization you reviaved you were 0:21 10 MR. BOWERS: Okay. 
11 making reference to earlier? 11 Q. SO he told -- you have an independent 
12 MR. MARIN: Yeo. 12 recollection outside of what Manny just mId you -
13 THE WITNESS: Yes. 1 J A. 1 didn't even hearwliat Manny said, to teU you 
14 MR. BOWERS: 14 the truth. I didn't bear wh!!t he said, O!<..ay? 
0:19 15 Q_ SO he was to pay for workers' compensation 15 Q. Okay. 
1 6 insurance for employees of the restaurant? 1 6 When did Don Zebe teU you that he was partners 
1 7 A. Correct 17 with Gaylen? 
18 Q. Did be do that? 1 B A. The last time I was at Wyoming when he made the 
1 9 A. After we told him that it was being S\!ed by the 1. 9 bid and it was accepted. 
0:19 2 0 state, then he paid. I think. I believe he paid it. 20 And I told Man- - told Gaylan, "You're going to 
21 Yes, he paid it. 21 have to come up with the money. It 
22 Q. You thought he paid it after you got sued; 22 He said, "No, Don Zebe has got the money. Both of 
23 correct? 23 us are going to. He's my panner. II 
24 A. No. You know, the state sent him letters and 24 P..nd I came back to L A., and that was the end of 
0;20 25 they're going to sue you this and that, and I kept on 25 that. 
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o : 22 1 Q. SO he said he was - did Gay\en tell yOll he was 
2 going tn be his partner? 
3 A. Yeah. 
4 Q. He was going to be partners with Don Zebe? 
; 22 5 A. Yeab. He introduced him to me at the time. I 
6 didn't know Don Zebe. 
I Q. Did he introduce him as his partner? 
8 A. He said he was going to be his partner, 
9 Q. Okay. Okay. 








A. Don Zebe said it too. 
Q. Okay. 
So did you ever enter inio any agreement witb Don 
15 Zebe? 
16 A. Never. 
17 Q. Okay. 
18 A. He wanted to borrow money lTom me. After he 




what it was. And] told him "No. I couldn't do it." 
Q. All right. 
So lei me just get back. We got off track.. 
So I just want to clarity because here's "- and I'm 
just pardphrasing. My understanding now is that at 
leas! 1"l some document Gaylen Clayson bas alleged that 
Page .!:i9 
10: 2 3 1 he had the right to withdraw money out afthe restaurant 
2 and use it for his personal use. 
3 1bat's not true; com:ct? 
4 A. No. 
0: 23 5 Q. You never gave him authority to do that? 
6 A No. 
t Q. 1 also understand that Gayle!! Oayton sold SOIDe 
8 equipment 
9 One, 1 think somebody's aIlegt:d that he sold a 
o : 2 3 10 dryer for over - was it $10,000 or j 2,000, some -
11 A. Where did you gel that inrormaUQD from? 
12 Q. 'That's what we--
13 A Don Zebe. 
14 Q. I'm trying to --
o : 23 15 THE REPORTER: Wail. You guys are talking at the 
16 same time. I couldn't hear. 
17 THE WITNESS: Where clid you gct information thllt he 
18 sold equipment? 
1 9 'Thall don't know about. 
0:24 20 MR. BOWERS: 
21 Q. Actually, Mr. Clayson admitted that he sold the 
22 equipment, but be claims you gave bim pennission. 
23 A. Nobody gave him permission. I haven't got the 
2 4 right to give him pennission. 








1 remember giving him permission to sell any equipment; 
2 correct? 
3 A. I don't have the right in the bankruptcy court 
4 they give permission to sell equipment out of a bankrupt 
5 plant. I didn't do it. It's ilI1jlOssible. 
6 Q. Do you remember ever -- ever remember in the 
7 history of your relationship with Gayien Clayson giving 
8 him permission to sell equipment out of that planf! 
9 A. Never. 
10 Q. All right 
11 A. To cleanup -- he could have cleaned up - You 
12 know, iftbcrcwasjunk in the- You know what I mean 
13 by cleanup'? 
14 Are you familiar with the cleanup ". what it means 
1 5 cle-anup tbe plant o\!iside and in? So it will look 
16 decem. 
1 7 III fact, YOIl want me to tell you the truth. I told 
18 him don't clean it too good because other bidders 2TC 







But he cleaned the outside, wbich was ajob, the 
garbage around the plant. That's what 1 thought he was 
cleaning. And he cleaned inside. 
And I said, ·Okay. As long as it don't cost tne 
bankruptcy lawyer." 
Q. SO at one point you assumed there was going to 
Page 61 
o : 25 1 be higher bidders than Gaylen Claytol1; correct? 
2 A. fU back off.. 
3 Before he wanled tl) clean the plant, 1 said, ''No. n 
4 When he WlUlted to fl.lC the plant I said, "No.· 
o : 25 5 The bids were not in at that time_ So I'll read it 
6 back to you what 1 did. 
7 After he - after he submitted the offer and was 
8 accepted is when I told him you can go and clean it and 
9 get ready fur it, as long as it dml't cost no moneY. 
o : 2 5 1 0 until this escrow closes, to the bankruptcy oourt. 
11 Q. Okay. 
12 A. And Gaylen - he suggested he clean the plant 
13 and fix the electrical, p.lumbing. 
14 Why would 1 tell him that without - Yeah, they're 
15 not going pay for all of this. The bankruptcy court is 
1 6 not going to pay fot that. It's in bankruptcy. 
17 So be was doing it for his purpose and Don Zebe's 
1 8 purpose. And John, whatever his name is, knew it too. 
1 9 Q_ Did you ever give Gaylen permission to have a 
: 26 20 couple hundred thousand dollars worth of electrical work 
21 done on the plant? 
22 A. No, I didn't know anything about it. That 
23 was - that was the two partnet's idea, both Don and 
24 GayJen. 
o ; 2 6 25 Q. And who told you that? 
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1 A. Gaylen and Don. Don Zebe too. 
:2 Q. He told you that he was - that he wanted to 
3 spend a couple hundred thousand dollars to get 
4 electrical work -
5 A. Yeah. That's what he told me. 




When was that? 
A. That was on January 14th. 2009 at 2:36 p.m. 
Q. Okay. 
o : 27 10 And what are you loolcing at? 
11 A. At an e-mail thal he sent to the real 
12 "estater," and he sent one here -- he sent me one too. 
13 Q. Okay. 
14 Other than that, do you have any - did you have 
o : 27 15 any independent TccolIection of that without loot-Jog at 
1 6 that document? 
1 7 A. Recollection about what'! That Don Zebc was a 
18 partner? 
19 Q. Here's how it's supposed to work, and it's hard 
o : 27 20 from tbe telephone. 




Q. I'm supposed to ask you a question. 
A. Go ahead. 
Q. If you don't know, you don't know. 
0:27 25 If you need to look at a document, you're supposed 
Page 63 
0,27 1 to say "1 need to look at a document." 
2 A. Okay. fm sorry. 
3 Q. That's okay. 
4 Let's see here. 
o : 27 5 A. I got to get new glasses. J can hardly read 
6 the little writing. 
7 You didn't ask me if you wanted to hear what the 
8 e-mail says. 
9 Q. I've seen the e-mail. 
o : 28 lOA. Did you see the paragraph where Zebe says he's 
11 going to do it for $200,000. And be's going to take 
1 2 full responsibility and prepared to pay for it himself? 
13 Did you read that part of it? 
14 Q. ! did. 
o : 2 8 15 A. Actually were on the same page. 
16 Q. No. No, we're no(. 
17 A. WJ1Y not? You've got this e-mail. 
18 Q. No, we';e not on because-
19 A. Doesn't it say that he's prepared to pay? 
0: 28 20 Q. No, it doesn't 
21 A. No? 
22 Q. SO Mr. Farinella, Jet me ask you this-
23 A. Yeah. 
24 Q. - the offer was accepted on October 17th; 
o : 2 8 25 correct? The date that -
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0:28 1 A. J don't remember. 
2 Q. Well, let's look. 
3 A. You are going to get me to the point where I'm 
4 going to say I don't remember anything and forget ahout 
0:28 5 it because you haven't answered me. 
6 Q. No, no, 00. 
7 You got to understand the rules. I get to ask you 
8 the questions. 
9 A. I know the rules. 
0: 28 10 You're asking the questions, but I'm asking them of 
11 }'ffiInow. 
12 This is the point that we came here for in the 
13 frrst place. 
14 Q. That's right. We call go all day and I won't 
o : 29 15 answer your questions. We call get through a lot quicker 
1 6 if yoo just answer the questions. 
17 A. Go ahead. 
1 B Q. Would you look at deposition Exhibit 4. That's 
1 9 the 1'e31 estate contract. 
o : 29 20 A. Why don't you tell it to the real estate guy? 





Q. Well you signed it; correct? 
A. Well he sent it to me.. 
That's not my signature. 
Q. That's not your signature? 
0: 2 9 1 A. It's a thousand miles away. 
2 THE REPORTER: Let us get the exhibit 
3 MR. BOWERS: 
4 Q. After-
5 'IHE REPORTER: Wait. Wait. Wait. 
6 Let us get the exhibit. 
7 Okay. Ready. 
8 MR. BOWERS: 
Page 65 
9 Q. When you talked about once the offer was 
: 30 10 accepted from Gaylen and you allowed Irim to go in and 
11 take care of the restaurant; correct? 
12 A. Well, I allowed him. J asked him to. 
13 As long as he's going buy tbe place and I'm having 
1 I} . ~ pl'Oblem.s with the help over there in the restaurant, 
o : 30 15 rather than closing it, to keep it open ""bile escrow 
1 6 closed to run it and take care of it. 
17 Q. I'm trying to figure these dates out. 
18 So then that would be sometime after October 17th, 
19 20081 
'0: 30 20 A. I don't remember. 
21 Q. Wen you said that once the offer was 
22 accepted - Your exact testimony was something aloog 
23 that line --
24 A. Yeah. 
o ; 30 25 Q. - after the offer was accepted, I told him he 
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0: 30 1 could do this and this. 
2 A. Yeah. 
3 Q. Okay. 
4 So then prior to October 17th, 2008, he didn't have 
0: 31 5 permission; correct? 
6 A. No. 
7 Neither did Don Zebe either. Because he was in 
8 that restaurant too, you know, taking money out too. 
9 Q. So Don Zelle was taking money out too'? 
0:31 10 A. Yea1L Absolutely. 
11 As far as I know, they were both fighting over 
12 there and you guys got me involved up there. 
13 That's a circus going on up there. You know that. 
14 Excuse me, off the record. That is II circus going em 
0: 31 15 between the two of them. 
16 Q. Well, we're ilOt off Ihe record. Everythi.,g is 
17 on the record. 
lS A. Okay. 
1 9 Q. Did you -- Did you ever tell Gaylen Clayson or 
0:31 20 authorize him as your agent to do whatever he needed to 
21 get the plant running? 
22 A. No. He's not my agent. 
2 3 Q. Did you - would Y<l1-l ever authorize him to do 
2 4 anything to get the plant running? 
0:32 2 5 A. ~ wouldn't authorize him or Don Zebe without 
Page 
o : 32 1 signing a piece of paper in front of a lawyer. I don't 
2 trust either one of them. 
3 Q. Fair enough. Fair enough. 
4 A. They're a bunch of crooks up tbere. 
a; 32 5 MR. MARJN: (Indicating). 
6 THE Wl1NESS: I know. 
7 MR. BOWERS: Okay.! Let's take another 30 seconds 
B to 2-minute break and we may be wrapping up. 
9 (A recess is taken.) 
o ; :3 5 10 MR. BOWERS: Mr. Farinella, 1 don't have anymore 
11 questions. 
12 Mr. Atkins will have the right 
13 I just wanted to throw this (lut one more time. 
14 THE WITNESS: ClO ahead. 
o : 35 15 MR. BOVIERS: And Manny, I'm sorry, 1 don't know 
16 your last name. I don't mean any disrespect for calling 
17 you that 
18 MR. MARIN: Marin, M-a-r-i-n. 
1 9 MR. BOWERS: The only thing is - apparently you 
o : 35 /. a got it, but T wt)uld still throw out there that I would 
21 like to talk to Mr. Farinella and Manny and their 
22 personal attorney about settling this case between us 
23 When there's the lime convenient for you. 
2 4 THE WTINESS: Settle the case. 








~ THE WITNESS: You want to settle? How do \ve settle 
2 tills case? 
:3 MR MARiN: You CI.lll arrange it with Blak-e as fur as 
~ that schedule. 
S Morris he wanted to talk to you and me so that's 
o fine. 
THE WITNESS: Who wanted La talk to me? 7 
8 MR. ATKlN: I do have a couple questions iflhat's 
9 okay, Morris. 




1 e _..I 
BY MR. A TKJN: 
Q. Do you recall, yOll know, you-
16 MR. BOWERS: Wait II minute. Wait a minute. Are we 
17 dcp!lsing Morris? rm SOlT'j. 1 tllougiI! you said Manny. 
18 MR. ATKlN: I said "Moms." 
19 THEWITNESS: Moms. 
20 MR. BOWER.'): You did. 
21 MR.ATtaN: 
22 Q. You were asked some questions by Mr. Bowers 
23 about tllis document that we've marked, the offer that 
24 was accepted in October of2008. 
25 Do yOU recall that Gaylen bad made an offer earlier 
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o : 36 1 in the year ill 2008, sometime back in February 20081 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And so some of those conversations that you 
4 talked about with GayJen about running the restaurant 
o : 37 5 and doing whatever was necessary to make the plant 
6 operational, those conversations, didn't tbey occur 
7 before October of 2008 as to that first offer in 
B February? 
9 A. Well, he made an offer and it was not accepted. 
o : 37 10 Gaylen made lhe first offer. i don't know. I think it 
11 was February •• J think it was -
12 THE WITNESS: Was it February 7th that he made his 
1 3 offer? February 7. That's 2008. 
1 4 MR. MARIN: Yes. 
o : 37 15 THE 'WITNESS: 2008, Februmy 7, and he offered 
16 500,000. And it was not accepted. It was turned down. 
17 MR. ATK1N: 
1 a Q. In any event, he started running the restaurant 
1 9 at about that time, didn't he, February 200S? 
20 A. It was much later than 'February though. It was 
21 after -- after the 500,000 was rejected, he offered 
22 $800,000 with another offer of 800-, and we accepted 
23 his. Al1d that's when I found out Don Zebe was a 
24 partner. He made·- he acr,eptOO the offer of 800,000 --
25 we accepted that 
18 (Pages 66 to 69) 
HUTCHINGS COURT REPORTERS, LLC - GLOBAL LEGAL SERVICES 
800.697.3210 
667 


















































0: 40 25 
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So when we accepted that. that means that the thing 
was dosed. Like I said, I read it to you again. 
After the accepting of the offer, Gaylen asked me 
ifhe can clean it up and get it ready to run. 
Which I said go ahead, as long as it don't cost the 
court any money. 
Q. All right. 
A. And they said, "Okay." 
Because I got an e-mail from Don Zebe that says 
they're willing to pay anything -- that they -- you 
know, that the'j -- Gaylen -- Gaylen and Don Zebe will 
accept up to 200 something thousand - $245,000 to 
cleanup the plant They will pay for it and nnt charge 
us or the courts or anybody. 
I got an c-mail to that it effect. 
Q. And tbat's the e-mail that you talked aboD! 




A. The plant was closed for a couple of years. 
T1mt's why it got so dirty and crumby and every!hing. 
That's ,I\fby it wasn't cleaned. It was closed for two 
years. 
Any piece of property that has been closed -
Page 71 
Q. Wasn't there junk on the property that had been 
used that was no longer usable? Xt was considered junk 
on the property? 
A. Yes. 
And in fact, we had what we calla junkyard. We 
used to throw the equipment that was not good or didn't 
work no more out in the back. 
Q. And wasn't that weigh dryer part of that junk? 
A. I believe so. I believe we had and old weigh 
dryer - Well, it was a pan. They call it a pan. It 
W'dS tlu-own in the back. It couldn't be used at all. It 
wasn't worth anything. It was scrap. 
Q. And you authorized Gaylen to get rid of that? 
A. I didn't authorize him to get rid of that or 
any particular itenl. Only to clean it up. 
If that meant to get rid of that, 1 guess he did 
it. But not to cost any money to court - not to cost 
me or the bankruptcy coll11. Because they would have 
come - I had no authority to tell him anything anyway. 
He might as well ask a monkey on a tree what he 
could do. I had no lutthority, 
MR. A TKfN: That's all I have. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
MR. BOWERS: 'l1lat's all. I have nothing else. 


















































MR. BOWERS: We're off the record. 
(The proceedings concluded at 10:40 a.m.) 
*** 
T declare under penalty of ptlljury under the laws 
of ihe Slate of California tha1 the foregoing js true 
and correct. 
Executed at _______ _ ,California, 
MORRIS A. FARINELLA 
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STATE OF CALIFORNIA) ss 
1, Lori S. Turner, CSR 9102, Cr>, RPR, do hereby 
declare: 
That, prior to being examined, the witness named in 
the foregoin~ deposition was by me duly sworn pUJSUant 
to Section 2093(b) and 2094 of the Code of CiVIl 
Procedure; 
11tat said deposition was taken down by me in 
shorthand at the time and place therein named and 
thereafter reduced to text under my direction. 
1 further declare that I bave no interest in the 
event of the action. 
1 declare under penalty of peJju.ry under the laws 
of the State of California iliat the foregoing is true 
and correct. 
W1TNESS my hand this _____ day of 
Lori S. Turner, CSR 9102, CP, RPR 
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Gary L. Cooper - Idaho State Bar # 1814 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 t 
".,' t,,,,-i.J 
?"iD u'-;' 2~i~ "-.-'f Vi: r,t.' 
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Counsel for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
GA YLEN CLAYSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 














CASE NO. CV-2009-0002212-0C 
DEFENSE 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
DESIGNATION OF DEPOSITION 
EXCERPTS FROM THE DEPOSITION 
OF MORRIS FARINELLA 
COME NOW the Defendants and object to the Plaintiff's designation of excerpts from the 
deposition of Morris Farinella as follows: 
DESIGNATION OBJECTION 
Page 14, lines 7 - 17 No objection 
Page 14, line 18 - Page 15, line 4 No objection 
Page 18, line 16 - Page 19, line 6 No objection (pmi of the Defense designation) 
Page 35, lines 13 - 20 No question designated. Answer was non-responsive 
and the answer to the-extent it seeks to raise the issue of 
"partnership" is not relevant to the claims and defenses 
at issue in this trial 
ORIG 
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Page 40, lines 14 - 25 No objection 
Page 42, lines 4 - 15 To the extent the answer raises the issue of 
"partnership" it was not responsive and is not relevant 
to the claims and defenses at issue in this trial 
Page 43, lines 4 - 17 Answer makes no sense because the exhibit is not 
identified 
Page 46 line 3 - Page 50, line 17 relevance 
Page 56, lines 2 - 21 To the extent the answer raises the issue of 
"partnership" it was not responsive and is not relevant 
to the claims and defenses at issue in this trial 
Page 58, lines 5 - 13 To the extent the answer raises the issue of 
"partnership" it was not responsive and is not relevant 
to the claims and defenses at issue in this trial 
Page 61, line 19 - Page 62, line 13 To the extent the answer raises the issue of 
"partnership" it was not responsive and is not relevant 
to the claims and defenses at issue in this trial 
Page 63, lines 7 - 14 No question designated. Answer was non-responsive 
and the answer to the extent it seeks to raise the issue of 
"partnership" is not relevant to the claims and defenses 
at issue in this trial 
Page 65, lines 9 - 20 relevance 
DATED this 24th day of November, 2010. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that on the 24th day of November, 2010, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to: 
Blake S. Atkin 
7579 North Westside Hwy 
Clifton, ID 83228 
Atkins Law Offices 
837 South 500 West, Ste 200 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
John D. Bowers 
Bowers Law Firm 
PO Box 1550 
Afton, WY 83110 
Honorable Stephen S. Dunn 
District Judge 
624 E Center, Room 220 





[V"f Email: bJake(a\atkinlawoffices.net 
c 
[] Hand delivery 
[] Fax: 801-533-0380 
[~~.s.mail 
[~ Email: blake{(Qatkinlawoftices.net 
[] Hand delivery 
[] Fax: 801-533-0380 
[] ,U.S. mail 
[~ Email: john@thebowersfinn.com 
[] Hand delivery 
[] Fax: 307-885-1002 
[] U.S. mail 
[ ] ymail: karlav@bannockcountv.us 
[~ Hand delivery 
[] Fax: 236-7012 
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Gary L. Cooper - Idaho State Bar # 1814 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
Counsel for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRleT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
GA YLEN CLAYSON, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 














CASE NO. CV -2009-0002212-0C 
DEFENSE 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ARGUMENT 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Gaylen Clayson is a dairy farmer with approximately 38 years experience as a dairy 
fanner. 
2. Don Zebe is a real estate agent with a 25 year business background and 6 year 
commercial real estate sales and development background. 
3. Rick Lawson is an accountant with 25 years experience as a CPA who is now 
managing the Star Valley restaurant located on the property at issue in this litigation. 
4. Jeff Randall is a milk hauler who has a long-standing business relationship with 
Gaylen Clayson hauling his milk and commodities. About 25% to 40% of his revenue 
is attributable to hauling milk and commodities for Gaylen Clayson. 
5. Gaylen Clayson used Dairy Systems to service his dairy equipment and to update and 
install new milking equipment in his dairies prior to 2008. 
Rl 1. 
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6. Gaylen Clayson had a close working relationship with Dairy Systems before 2008 
during which times he had engaged it on time and materials contracts and worked out 
billing disputes directly with the owners of Dairy Systems. 
7. Gaylen Clayson had experience prior to 2008 operating and renovating cheese plants. 
8. Gaylen Clayson had a relationship with Star Valley Cheese and its owner, Morris 
Farinella, prior to 2008, which included both selling his milk to Star Valley Cheese 
in the 1970's and again in the 1990's as well as operating the cheese plant as a part of 
a receivership in the 1980's. 
9. In June of2008, Gaylen Clayson met with Morris Farinella who was then about 85. 
The cheese plant had been shut down for about 2 Y2 years and was in bankruptcy. The 
restaurant was open. Morris Farinella was trying to sell the cheese plant and restaurant 
with the help of a Wyoming real estate agent through the bankruptcy court. Clayson 
had expressed an interest in purchasing the cheese plant and restaurant. Morris 
Farinella asked Clayson to help operate the restaurant. Clayson was not to be paid 
because he was doing it as a favor to Farinella. On July 1, 2008, Gaylen Clayson 
took over operation of the restaurant. The money from operating the restaurant was 
supposed to go into an account which had been established for the restaurant and was 
supposed to be used to pay the bills to the food vendors and help. 
10. Gaylen Clayson had no ownership interest in the restaurant or the cheese plant on July 
1, 2008 and never thereafter had an ownership interest in the restaurant or cheese 
plant. Gaylen Clayson believed he would be able to put something together to buy the 
restaurant and cheese plant so that he would have a place to sell his milk. 
11. It was not until August 28, 2008, that Gaylen Clayson had anything in writing 
authorizing him to operate the restaurant and it only authorized him to run the 
restaurant, take care of the worker's compensation insurance for the restaurant 
employees and take care of the cleanliness ofthe plant. (Exhibit 5A to deposition of 
Gaylen Clayson) 
12. Gaylen Clayson told Morris Farinella that if the cheese plant was not up and running 
by October 2008 he could not be a part of it. 
13. Gaylen Clayson spent time from July 1, 2008 to October 8, 2008, at the restaurant and 
cheese plant. He managed the restaurant, opened and closed the restaurant, worked 
around the plant and supervised others in working around the plant. Gaylen Clayson 
did not keep track of the time he spent. He testified his time was worth $lS/hour but 
provided no evidence to corroborate his opinion .. 
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14. After July l~ 2008, paint and floor work was accomplished on the inside and outside 
of the cheese plant. 
15. Gaylen Clayson opened a bank account at the Bank of Star Valley on approximately 
July 1, 2008~ which was funded primarily with receipts from the restaurant. By 
October of 2008 it was depleted and closed. 
16. Gaylen Clayson stipulated that all the expenses documented in Exhibit F were not 
approved in advance by Defendants and further that his claim is entirely based on 
implied agreement by Defendants after the fact to reimburse him. This stipulation 
does not include the debt to Dairy Systems. 
17. In July of2008~ Gaylen Clayson paid Johnson Plumbing $1,872 from the Bank of Star 
Valley account for plumbing work in the restrooms of the restaurants. The 
Defendants did not request or encourage him to incur this indebtedness. (Exhibit 
F(A» 
18. .T eff Randall introduced Gaylen Clayson to Don Zebe. Randall was acquainted with 
and had a personal relationship with both Gaylen Clayson and Don Zebe. This 
introduction took place in late July or early August, 2008. This is consistent with the 
recollection of Don Zebe. Rick Lawson, however, was not introduced until the last 
week in August, 2008. Gaylen Clayson, Don Zebe and Rick Lawson all agree that the 
initial introduction was for the purpose of having Don Zebe write a business plan for 
Gaylen Clayson, not finance the acquisition of the plant and restaurant. Gaylen 
Clayson testified that almost immediately the relationship changed and by mid-
August, 2008, Don Zebe and Rick Lawson became interested in acquiring the plant 
and restaurant. Don Zebe and Rick Lawson disagree and testified that they did not 
become interested in acquiring the plant and restaurant until the end of September 
2008. On October 2,2008, Rick Lawson prepared paperwork to form SVC, LLC 
which included Clayson, Lawson and Zebe as members. (Exhibit J) On the same 
date Rick Lawson made some changes to the annual report fonn for an existing 
company called Milk Market Management, LLC, which included the names of 
Clayson, Lawson and Zebe as well as Jeff Randall. (Exhibit K) The disputed 
evidence is most consistent with Zebe and Lawson not becoming interested in 
acquiring the plant and restaurant until the end of September, 2008, just before the 
paperwork on the two LLC's was generated. 
19. In the latter part of July, Gaylen Clayson contacted Dairy Systems regarding some 
work at the cheese plant. Sometime near the first of August, 2008, Clayson initially 
hired Dairy Systems to get power on in the cheese plant. After Dairy Systems started 
Gaylen Clayson was advised that it was more involved and could cost as much as 
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$200,000 to get the cheese plant operational. Gaylen Clayson felt this was cheap 
because it would cost as much as $2 Million to build a new plant so he instructed 
Dairy Systems to proceed. Dairy Systems agreed to bill monthly for time and 
materials and they did. Defendants Don Zebe and Rick Lawson did not request 
Gaylen Clayson to hire Dairy Systems. According to Clayson, it was Morris Farinella, 
the owner of the cheese plant and restaurant, who authorized Gaylen Clayson to get 
this work done. Morris Farinella testified that he did not authorize Gaylen Clayson 
or anybody else to "get the plant running." Don Zebe and Rick Lawson deny they 
requested Dairy Systems to perform any work at the cheese plant. Don Zebe 
specifically told Dairy Systems to stop work at the plant shortly after October 8,2008, 
when SVC, LLC took over operation of the restaurant from Clayson. This disputed 
evidence does not support the formation of an express or implied agreement on the 
part of the Defendants to reimburse Clayson for the payment he made to Dairy 
Systems. 
20. On September 30,2008, Gaylen Clayson paid plumber, Casey Monson, $10,772.41 
for work in the cheese plant. This was paid from the Bank of Star Valley account. 
The Defendants did not request or encourage him to incur this indebtedness. (Exhibit 
F(B)) 
21. On August 14, 2008, Gaylen Clayson attended an Idaho Milk Producers Association 
meeting in Sun Valley and charged $644.01 as expenses for attending that meeting 
to his personal Bank of America credit card. (Exhibit F(D)) Although Clayson 
testified that he talked this over with Zebe and Lawson before attending, Clayson 
stipulated that this expense was not approved in advance by the Defendants. Clayson 
had not even met Lawson at the time of this meeting. There is no evidence that this 
expenditure improved the plant or restaurant. 
22. On August 13,2008, Gaylen Clayson paid Golden Ram Painting $2,000 for a down 
payment on painting from the Bank of Star Valley account. On August 25, 2008, 
Gaylen Clayson paid Golden Ram Painting $8,621 from his personal checking 
account for payment in full on painting. (Exhibit F(F)) The Defendants did not 
request Clayson to incur this indebtedness. 
23. On August 21, 2008, Gaylen Clayson charged $379.14 at Columbia Paint on his 
personal Bank of America credit card. (Exhibit F(G)) The Defendants did not 
request Clayson to incur this indebtedness. 
24. Between September 3,2008 and October 3,2008, Gaylen Clayson paid Joshua Flud 
$3,917.02 from the Bank of Star Valley account for working on refurbishing the 
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cheese plant. (Exhibit F(l» The Defendants did not request Clayson to incur this 
indebtedness. 
25. Between August 15, 2008 and September 26, 2008, Gaylen Clayson paid April 
McMurdo $5,100.06 from the Bank of Star Valley account for secretarial work and 
answering phones. (Exhibit F(J» There is no evidence that this work improved the 
plant or restaurant. The Defendants did not request Clayson to incur this 
indebtedness. 
26. Between August 1, 2008 and September 10,2008 Gaylen Clayson paid Mark Pittman 
$3,532 from the Bank of Star Valley account for clean up work and work in the 
restaurant cooked and waited tables. (Exhibit F (K» There was no evidence 
regarding how much of Pitttman 's time was spent cleaning up or what he cleaned. 
The Defendants did not request Clayson to incur this indebtedness. 
27. On August 13, 2008, Gaylen Clayson charged $1,778 in travel expenses on his 
personal Bank of America credit card for two repairmen from Viking to travel to 
Thayne Wyoming to get some equipment running. (Exhibit F(P» The Defendants 
did not request Clayson to incur this indebtedness. 
28. On September 25, 2008, Gaylen Clayson paid $9,100 to High Sierra for work 
expanding the restaurant. (Exhibit F(T» Defendants did not request him to incur this 
indebtedness and, in fact counseled him against incurring the expense. 
29. Gaylen Clayson charged $308.61 for some unidentified items at Thayne True Value 
Hardware on his personal Bank of America charge card in August of2008. (Exhibit 
F(U» The Defendants did not request Clayson to incur this indebtedness. 
30. Dairy Systems sent four invoices/statements before Clayson turned over operation of 
the restaurant to SVC, LLC on October 8, 2008. The last statement was dated 
September 30,2008 and shows a $50,000 payment. (Exhibit G (first 4 pages» The 
statements and invoices were all directed to Star Valley Cheese. Gaylen Clayson paid 
the $50,000 payment by a check drawn on his personal account at US Bank dated 
September 16, 2008. (Exhibit F(U» At the time the payment was made Morris 
Farinella (or his company) owned the cheese factory and restaurant. 
31. Gaylen Clayson also gave Dairy Systems two other checks drawn on the Bank of Star 
Valley account, each for $50,000, which were never funded and never cashed by 
Dairy Systems. The account was closed shortly after October 8, 2008, by Clayson. 
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32. Gaylen Clayson testified that he asked Defendants Zebe and Lawson to fund the 
checks. According to him, both indicated they would work on getting the money to 
fund the checks, but they never did fund the checks. Defendants Zebe and Lawson 
deny they ever discussed the checks with Clayson or Dairy Systems and deny they 
were even aware of the two unfunded checks until litigation was commenced in 
Wyoming and Idaho. This disputed evidence does not support an agreement that 
Defendants agreed to reimburse Clayson for the $50,000 check he used to pay Dairy 
Systems. 
33. Gaylen Clayson stipulated that Dairy Systems is not presently making a legal claim 
against him to recover its bills for time and materials at the Star Valley Cheese Plant. 
34. Gaylen Clayson did not have the money to make the October payroll at the restaurant 
and called Rick Lawson on October 8, 2008, to inform him of that fact. Rick Lawson 
advised him that if they were going to take over the restaurant they wanted him out 
of there. Gaylen Clayson quit the restaurant at that time and turned it over to 
Defendants Zebe and Lawson. The Defendant's version of this event is relatively 
consistent with that of Clayson, except that Defendants testified that Clayson told 
them he was "done" and if they were "interested they could take it over." Jeff 
Randall testified that Gaylen Clayson told him he was out of money and if "those 
guys" (i.e. Don Zebe and Rick Lawson) wanted to take over they could. Even if one 
accepts Clayson's version of events, the evidence does not support an express or 
implied agreement on the part of the Defendants to reimburse Clayson for expenses 
he had paid prior to October 8, 2008. 
35. Although Gaylen Clayson was briefly a member ofSVC, LLC his name was removed 
from the LLC shortly after he turned the restaurant over to Don Zebe and Rick 
Lawson on October 8, 2008. 
36. Gaylen Clayson testified that there was a meeting inRick Lawson's office which was 
attended by Clayson, Zebe, Lawson and Jeff Randall when he asked and Zebe and 
Lawson agreed to reimburse him the expenses he had incurred of about $130,000, but 
Gaylen Clayson has not provided proof that such an amount was actually paid by him. 
He was unsure of the date except that he recalled it occurred before November 4, 
2008. All of these expenses were incurred by Gaylen Clayson before he quit the 
restaurant and turned it over to Defendants Zebe and Lawson on October 8, 2008. 
Both Zebe and Lawson deny that such a meeting took place before November 4,2008, 
and deny that they agreed to pay his expenses. Jeff Randall does not recall such a 
meeting prior to November 4, 2008. The disputed evidence does not support 
Clayson's testimony. 
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37. Gaylen Clayson has paid no debts since he turned over operation of the restaurant to 
SVC, LLC on October 8, 2008. He did, however, receive a $20,000 refund from the 
power company according to Rick Lawson. Clayson claims he did not receive the 
$20,000 refund .. 
38. Gaylen Clayson testified that Rick Lawson and Don Zebe agreed to pay the bills that 
came in October. Zebe and Lawson deny they agreed to pay any of Clayson's bills 
except the payroll which was upcoming after October 8, 2008. However, Zebe and 
Lawson did pay $25,986.01 in bills Clayson incurred prior to October 8, 2008 in the 
first month after SVC, LLC started operating the restaurant. (Exhibit l1A) These 
bills included payroll, payroll taxes, food vendors, utilities and back sales tax. Zebe 
and Lawson testified that if they had not paid these bills they would not have been 
able to operate the restaurant because the utilities would have been turned off and the 
vendors would not have supplied food for the restaurant. Additional bills were paid 
thereafter, primarily after SVC, LLC closed the transaction to purchase the plant and 
restaurant. Bills paid by SVC, LLC which were incurred prior to October 8, 2008, 
while Clayson was operating the restaurant totaled $78,237.79. (Exhibit 11) The 
disputed evidence does not support an implied or express agreement by the 
Defendants to reimburse expenses paid by Clayson before October 8, 2008. 
39. Gaylen Clayson and Jeff Randall signed a Purchase and Sale Agreement on October 
17, 2008 in which they agreed to buy the Star Valley Cheese Plant from its owner, 
Morris Farinella, in its "present condition" for $800,000 (Exhibit D). The testimony 
about the circumstances surrounding the execution of that agreement are disputed. 
Clayson testified that he signed the agreement because he had the relationship with 
Farinella and because Don Zebe and Rick Lawson said they were not going to spend 
any money until they got ownership and they were making no effort to purchase the 
cheese plant and restaurant. Don Zebe testified that he decided to make an offer at 
the prompting of Jeff Randall in a phone conversation on October 16, 2008. Jeff 
Randall testified that he made the decision on October 16, 2008 to make an offer of 
$800,000 to "get the ball rolling" because ifthe cheese plant opened he felt he would 
benefit from revenue earned from trucking milk to the plant. The following day, 
October 17, 2008, Jeff Randall drove with Gaylen Clayson to the Star Valley 
restaurant and met with Don Zebe. Both Jeff Randall and Don Zebe recalled that 
Zebe called the realtor to tell him he was going to make and offer, but the realtor and 
Zebe got into an argument and Zebe told Randall he had changed his mind and was 
not going to make the offer. Randall persisted and Zebe agreed to have Randall make 
the offer of $800,000 for him but instructed him to have the words "and/or assigns" 
included so that Randall could assign the PSA to Zebe. Randall stated that he did not 
know where the realtor lived and Clayson offered to show him. Randall testified that 
neither he nor Clayson had the money to perfonn and Randall's intent was to make 
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the offer on behalf of Zebe and assign it to Zebe. The disputed evidence is most 
consistent with Clayson and Randall executing the PSA on behalf of Zebe with the 
anticipation that Clayson and Randall would then assign it to Zebe. 
40. Later that day Randall and Clayson returned to the Star Valley restaurant and 
presented Zebe with the PSA which had been executed. Zebe was upset because he 
did not see the "and/or assigns" language in the document and because Clayson's 
name was on the document. The PSA did, in fact, have the "and/or assigns" language, 
but it was on the third page at line 117. (Exhibit D) Randall agreed that Zebe was 
upset when he saw Clayson's name on the document and when he could not see the 
"and/or assigns" language. Randall called the realtor who told him the "and/or 
assigns" language was in the PSA. Randall told Zebe that it did not make any 
difference whether Clayson's name was on the PSA because they were going to 
assign it to Zebe anyway. Randall's and Zebe's version is most consistent with 
Clayson and Randall executing the PSA on behalf of Zebe with the anticipation that 
Clayson and Randall would then assign it to Zebe. 
41. The PSA provided that the buyer was purchasing the "cheese plant, equipment, 
restaurant with all improvements thereon, easements and other 
appurtenances and all fixtures of a pennanent nature currently on the premises except 
as hereinafter provided, in their present condition, ordinary wear and tear excepted 
. . ." (Exhibit D) 
42. Gaylen Clayson admits he did not have the $800,000 to close the transaction when he 
signed the PSA on October 17, 2008. Gaylen Clayson testified that he was not 
worried because he had talked to the Department of Agriculture and Morris Farinella. 
Randall testified that Clayson told him he did not have the money to perform. 
43. SVC, LLC paid the $10,000 earnest money called for in the PSA which was executed 
by Randall and Clayson on October 17, 2008. 
44. Don Zebe and Rick Lawson testified that on November 4, 2008, they attended a 
meeting at Rick Lawson's accounting office with Gaylen Clayson and Jeff Randall 
to obtain Clayson's and Randall's signature on a written assignment of the PSA 
which Don Zebe prepared. Gaylen Clayson presented them with a handwritten list of 
bills he wanted them to pay. Zebe and Lawson refused to pay any bills and presented 
Clayson with a list of bills they had already paid and told him that because of the mess 
he had left them with they wanted him to pay these bills. Zebe and Lawson testified 
that the list they showed Clayson was the general ledger for SVC, LLC which 
included the bills they had paid through November 4,2008. (See Exhibit llA) Jeff 
Randall testified that the meeting got heated and he backed out to let them resolve it. 
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He only recalls Zebe and Lawson agreeing to pay some bills associated with operating 
the restaurant, specifically the payroll and payroll taxes. Zebe testified that Clayson 
claimed he had paid some ofthe bills Zebe and Lawson paid and Zebe responded that 
if he could prove it with invoices and checks they would reimburse him. Zebe and 
Lawson testified that Clayson grumbled but backed down and agreed to sign the 
assignment. The disputed evidence does not support an implied or express agreement 
by the Defendants to reimburse expenses paid by Clayson before October 8, 2008. 
45. Both Jeff Randall and Gaylen Clayson admit that on November 4, 2008, they 
assigned all their right title and interest in the October 17,2008 PSA to SVC, LLC 
whose members were Don Zebe and Rick Lawson. (Exhibit N) Gaylen Clayson 
knew he was not a member of SVC, LLC when he signed the assignment. 
46. After the Assignment was signed by Clayson and Randall, Don Zebe and Rick 
Lawson sought financing to close the transaction. In the course of doing so they 
presented a business plan they prepared. The business plan contained representations 
that the plant had been undergoing cosmetic and physical renovations, including 
electrical, resurfacing of the floors, plastering of walls, cleaning, removal of old 
equipment, maintenance, repairs and painting. They also represented that the 
principals of SVC, LLC had paid for the electrical retrofit at a cost of $225,000, 
which Don Zebe admitted was a misrepresentation. The business plan also 
represented the restaurant was profitable. Both Zebe and Lawson admitted that it was 
questionable whether the restaurant was profitaBle, but stated that it had been 
represented to them that it was. Zebe and Lawson were eventually able to secure $2 
Million in loans. 
47. On January 14, 2009, Don Zebe wrote an email to the realtor and two of Morris 
Farinella's representatives seeking $3,000 to pay some ofthe expenses SVC, LLC had 
incurred in operating the restaurant before closing. The email was not directed to or 
copied to Clayson or Dairy Systems. In that email Don Zebe stated that "we are 
prepared to absorb what we have paid in and most of what was done while Gaylen 
was in charge, i.e. electrical, plumbing, to the tune of$245k." There is no evidence 
to indicate that Gaylen Clayson received this email. 
48. The transaction to purchase the restaurant and plant from Morris Farinella (or his 
company) closed on February 24, 2009 for $800,000. Laze, LLC owns the real 
property and bUildings. SVC, LLC operates the restaurant. 
49. After closing, Gaylen Clayson approached Rick Lawson in March of 2009 again 
requesting that Zebe and Lawson pay some of his bills. Lawson refused. Clayson 
claimed SVC, LLC was using meat he had supplied at the restaurant and had not paid 
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for it. The following week Lawson and Clayson met at the restaurant and Clayson 
retrieved what was left of the meat he supplied. Lawson paid him $3,700 for the meat 
which Clayson claimed had been used by the restaurant. Clayson agrees that Rick 
Lawson paid him for the meat which had been used in the restaurant. 
50. Don Zebe used the $50,000 payment Clayson made on September 16, 2008, in 
negotiations with Dairy Systems over its bill. (Exhibit Wand Exhibit X) The 
negotiations were not successful. The Defendants have been sued by Dairy Systems 
in Wyoming where Dairy Systems seeks to recover for the labor and materials it put 
into the cheese plant. 
51 . Rick Lawson testified that he feels no obligation to reimburse Gaylen Clayson for any 
of his expenses, including the $50,000, because SVC, LLC was required to pay over 
$78,000 of Clayson's bills after Clayson turned over operation of the restaurant to 
SVC, LLC on October 8, 2008. 
DISCUSSION OF LAW AND ARGUMENT 
The issues to be resolved are as follows: (1) Is there an implied-in-fact contract which 
would support the remedy of quantum meruit requiring the Defendants to reimburse any of 
the admitted Exhibit F debts claimed by Plaintiff?; and/or (2) Is there an implied-in-Iaw 
contract suppOliing an unjust enrichment or restitution recovery in favor of Plaintiff and 
against the Defendants? Defendants submit that the answer to both questions is "'No" for the 
following reasons. 
A. IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT/QUANTUM MERUIT 
Plaintiff s stipulation concerning the Exhibit F expenses is inconsistent with the 
concept of an implied-in-fact contract. Plaintiff stipulated that all the expenses documented 
in Exhibit F which the Court admitted for purposes of evaluating Clayson's claim were not 
approved in advance by Defendants and that his claim is entirely based on agreement by 
DEFENSE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ARGUMENT - PAGE 10 
681 
Defendants after the fact to reimburse him 1. Dairy Systems was engaged by Clayson before 
he even met Zebe and Lawson so there can be no claim that the Defendants approved 
incurring the indebtedness before Dairy Systems started its work. "The general rule is that 
where the conduct of the parties allows the dual inferences that one perfonned at the other's 
request and that the requesting party promised payment, then the court may find a contract 
implied in fact." Gray v. Tri-Way Constr. Servs., 147 Idaho 378, 387 (Idaho 2009)2 
Plaintiff's stipulation establishes that Clayson did not perfonn at the request of the 
Defendants. Therefore, no "implied-in-fact contract" was created based on the dual 
inferences that Clayson perfonned at the Defendant's request and that the Defendant's 
promised payment. Even Clayson's September 16,2008 $50,000 check to Dairy Systems 
fails this analysis. According to Clayson his payment was not conditioned upon an "in-
advance" implied promise by Zebe and Lawson to reimburse him for the check. He paid 
Dairy Systems and expected Zebe and Lawson to each fund two other $50,000 checks. 
Setting aside the fact that Zebe and Lawson deny Clayson's version of the events, even 
IThe stipulation did not cover the $50,000 payment to Dairy Systems. 
2While there are earlier Idaho cases which make reference to quantum meruit and/or 
implied contracts, the earliest Idaho case explaining the "implied-in-fact contract" theory of 
recovery used almost identical language in its explanation: "An implied contract is one, the 
existence and terms of which are manifested by the conduct of the parties, with the request of 
one party, and peiformance by the other party often being inferred from the circumstances 
attending the performance." Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 153 (Idaho 1965) All subsequent 
"implied-in-fact contract" decisions suggest that the factual basis requires performance at the 
request of the party to be held responsible as the necessary requirement. 
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assuming Clayson's version to be accurate, the fact that Zebe and Lawson did not fund the 
other two $50,000 checks does not transform these circumstances into an implied promise 
to reimburse Clayson. 
Before an "after the fact" agreement can provide a basis for Clayson to recover against 
the Defendants for an "implied-in-fact" contract, Clayson must carry the burden of proving 
that "the conduct of the parties implies an agreement from which an obligation in contract 
exists." Continental Forest Prods. v. Chandler Supply Co., 95 Idaho 739, 743 (Idaho 1974) 
See also Willnerdv. Sybase, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114544 (D. Idaho Oct. 26, 2010) 
(In order to assert breach of an implied-in-fact contract, a plaintiff must demonstrate that 
both parties to the contract are aware of the contract's existence) To prevail Clayson has the 
burden of proving all the elements of a contract. As explained in GEM Indus. v. Sun Trust 
Bank, 700 F. Supp. 2d 915, 922 (N.D. Ohio 20lO): 
The existence of an implied-in-fact contract, as with an express 
contract, "hinge[ s] upon proof of all the elements of a contract." Stepp v. 
Freeman, 119 Ohio App. 3d 68, 74, 694 N.E.2d 5lO (1992). The difference is 
that mutual assent to the essential elements of an implied-in-fact contract is 
shown not by an express offer and acceptance,_but by the "surrounding 
circumstances, including the conduct and declarations of the parties [ .]" Id. 
Those circumstances must "make it inferable that the contract exists as a 
matter of tacit understanding." Id. 
The basic elements of a contract are subject matter, consideration, mutual assent by 
all the parties to all the terms, and an agreement that is expressed plainly and explicitly 
enough to show what the parties have agreed. State v. Korn, 224 P.3d 480, 482 (Idaho 2009) 
Clayson's own testimony proves that there was no plain or explicit understanding about what 
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was agreed. Clayson claims Zebe and Lawson3 agreed to reimburse him approximately 
$130,000 for bills he paid. The bills listed on the first page of Exhibit "F" do not total 
anything close to $130,0004 • The bills Clayson could actually substantiate with a check or 
credit card is a different amount, i.e. $98,023.98 which includes the $50,000 check to Dairy 
Systems. What was the "after the fact" contract? Was it $130,000? Was it $98,023.98? 
Was it $48,023.98? Was it $69,600. Gaylen Clayson himself does not know what the 
agreement was. Zebe and Lawson deny the existence of any-such agreement. Zebe' s January 
14, 2009 email does not save this claim because it contains a different number, "24Sk", 
which Don Zebe testified was a reference to the Dairy Systems bill, not the bills which 
Clayson is now seeking to recover under a theory of implied-in-fact contract. While that e-
mail may be significant in Dairy System's lawsuit in Wyoming, it does not support an 
implied-in-fact agreement between any of the Defendants and Clayson. 
Gaylen Clayson has failed to carry his burden of proving an implied-in-fact contract. 
The conduct of the parties and the circumstances do not support an inference that a contract 
to reimburse Gaylen Clayson exists. Clayson did not prove that he incurred the debts because 
Zebe and Lawson encouraged him to or asked him to incur the debts such that an inference 
was created that the Defendants intended to reimburse Clayson. Clayson has not proven 
3There was a clear failure of proof against Laze, LLC on the implied-in-fact contract. 
There was simply no testimony that Zebe and Lawson were acting on behalf of Laze, LLC at any 
time when an alleged implied-in-fact contract came into existence. 
4The total is $69,600 
DEFENSE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ARGUMENT - PAGE 13 
684 
what the agreement was. Clayson has not proven that both parties were even aware of the 
existence of the implied-in-fact contract. The claim of an implied-in-fact contract is not 
supported by the facts and circumstances, is speculative and must fail because Clayson failed 
to cany his burden of proving it. 
B. IMPLIED-IN-LA W CONTRACTIUNJUST ENRICHMENT 
To prevail, Clayson must present evidence of the amount by which the Defendants 
were unjustly enriched, not just the value of the services rendered. Clayson made no attempt 
to present and presented no evidence of the amount he claims the Defendants were unjustly 
enriched. His implied-in-law/unjust enrichment claim must fail. 
In Blaser v. Cameron, the Court of Appeals indicated that a party 
seeking recovery under an unjust enrichment theory must present evidence not 
only ofthe value ofthe services it rendered, but also "the amount of the benefit 
which, if retained by the [defendant], would result in their unjust enrichment." 
121 Idaho 1012, 1017,829 P.2d 1361,1366 (Ct. App. 1991). The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court's finding that the plaintiff fai led to establish 
a claim for unjust enrichment because it did not present evidence of the 
amount by which the defendant was unjustly enriched. Id. 
Barry v. Pac. West Constr., Inc., 140 Idaho 827,834 (Idaho 2004) 
The proper measure of recovery on an unjust enrichment claim is not 
the actual amount of the enrichment, but the amount of enrichment which, as 
between the two parties, it would be unjust for one party to retain. Beco 
CansO'. Co., Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 463,466, 797 P.2d 
863,866 (1990)(citingHixon v. Allphin, 76 Idaho 327, 281 P.2d 1042 (1955)). 
Blaser had the burden of proving that the Camerons received a benefit and of 
proving the amount of the benefit which the Camerons unjustly retained. 
Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, 101 Idaho 663, 667, 619 P.2d 1116, 1120 
(1980); Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 107 Idaho 134, 139-40,686 P.2d 79,84-5 
(Ct.App.1984). Damages need not be proven with mathematical precision, but 
the value of any benefit unjustly received must be proven to a reasonable 
certainty. Gillette, 101 Idaho at 667, 619 P .2d at 1120. 
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B laser presented evidence as to the value ofthe services he performed 
for the Camerons. n4 The value of services rendered can be used as evidence 
of the value of the benefit bestowed under the theory of unjust enrichment, 
Hartwell Corp., 107 Idaho at 141,686 P.2d at 86, but Blaser also had to prove 
the amount of the benefit which, if retained by the Camerons, would result in 
their unjust enrichment. Mere proof of Blaser's costs was inadequate to 
establish the value of any benefit the Camerons may have unjustly retained. 
Gillette, 101 Idaho at 667,619 P.2d at 1120. 
Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho 1012, 1017 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991) 
The district court, however, instructed the jury on the theory of unjust 
enrichment. The measure of recovery under this theory is that part of the 
benefit bestowed by Smith upon the Corporation which, if retained by the 
Corporation, would result in its unjust enrichment. Gillette v. Storm Circle 
Ranch, supra. This is to be contrasted with the measure of damages under the 
theory of quantum meruit, which is the reasonable value of the services 
rendered. There seems to be a continuing confusion of these two theories of 
recovery. See e.g., Intel10rm Co. v. Mitchell, 575 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir.1978), 
and the dissents in Gillette, supra. Suffice it to say that Interform and the 
dissents in Gillette merely point out that the result under both theories is often 
the same. The method of measuring damages, on the other hand, is quite 
different, as indicated earlier. We see no need, however, to blur the distinction 
between the theories and use the terms interchangeably simply because in 
some cases it does not change the result. See Peavey v. Pellandini, 97 Idaho 
655, 551 P.2d 610 (1976). Such shortcuts cause more harm than good in 
leading to the confusion noted among the members of the bar and the jUdiciary. 
The fact ofthe matter is that the results are not always the same under the two 
methods of measuring damages, as we show later. 
This is not to say that there is no overlap between the two theories. 
While unjust enrichment is measured in terms of the value ofthe benefit to, in 
this case, the Corporation, the value of Smith's services can be used as 
evidence of the value of that benefit, as we have shown. D. DOBBS, 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.5 at 261 (1973). However, 
the jury needs to take this one step further and determine the amount of the 
benefit which, if retained by the Corporation, would result in its unjust 
enrichment. 
Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 107 Idaho 134, 141 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984) 
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Clayson seeks recovery of three different classes of benefit he claims enriched the 
property which is owned by Laze, LLC5• The three classes of benefits are: (1) Clayson's 
own efforts; (2) The Exhibit F(A) - (T) expenses including the True Value Hardware 
expenditures; and (3) the$50,OOO payment on the Dairy Systems account. 
1. Clayson's own efforts 
Clayson's testimony was that he was present at the cheese factory and restaurant six 
days a week from July 1, 2008 until approximately October 10, 2008. He further testified 
that his time was worth $15/hour. He made no effort to identifY the total number of hours 
he is claiming and has made no effort to break down his time between the restaurant and the 
cheese factory improvements. A review of the credit card charges he submitted in support 
of his claims for reimbursement show that in the month of August he was somewhere other 
than Thayne, Wyoming on August 9, 14, 15, 16, 18,20,21,22,23,25 and 266 • It would be 
pure speculation to try to determine the number of hours Gaylen Clayson spent perfonning 
services which benefitted the property. While damages need not be proven with 
mathematical precision, the value of any benefit unjustly received must be proven to a 
reasonable celiainty. Grayv. Tri-WayConstr. Servs., 147 Idaho 378,389 (Idaho 2009)(value 
5 There is a clear failure of proof against Don Zebe or Rick Lawson on the implied-in-Iaw 
contract/unjust enrichment claim because Zebe and Lawson do not personally own the property 
on which the improvements were made. 
6Clayson did not submit credit card charges for July or September so a similar 
comparison cannot be made in those months. 
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of any benefit unjustly received by the defendant in an action based upon unjust enrichment, 
must be proven to a reasonable certainty) 
Even ifone accepts the proposition that Clayson's services had a value of$15/hour, 
it would require pure speculation to determine the number of hours Clayson spent benefitting 
the property. Peavey v. Pellandini, 97 Idaho 655, 661 (Idaho 1976) provides some guidance 
about the type of proof which is required to support a claim for services: 
As noted in 66 AmJur.2d, Restitution and Implied Contracts, § 89 at 1031: 
"Generally, in order to be entitled to recover the value of his 
services, the plaintiff must prove such value. Thus, evidence of 
the value of work or materials is ordinarily essential to a 
recovery under the COImnon counts. In an action to recover the 
value of services rendered, any competent evidence which 
reasonably tends to establish such value is, of course, 
admissible. Evidence of what others received for like services 
may properly be considered. Proof of the value of services may 
also be shown by the opinion of witnesses who are familiar with 
the value of such services, including, it is generally held, the 
opinion of the person who performed the services." 
Clayson offered no evidence of what others received for like services. Clayson 
offered no opinion evidence about the value of his services. Although Clayson may have 
been able to offer an opinion of the value of his services, he did not and only offered an 
opinion about the hourly value of his services without offering testimony about the number 
of hours or the overall benefit he provided. In fact, Clayson never kept track of the number 
of hours he spent and offered no reasoned estimate. The claim for the value of Clayson's 
services and the value unjustly retained by Laze, LLC fails for lack of proof and speculation. 
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2. The Exhibit F(A) - (T) expenses including the True Value Hardware expenditures 
Most of the expenses in this category were paid from the checking account Gaylen 
Clayson opened at the Bank of Star Valley on approximately July 1,2008, which was funded 
primarily with receipts from the restaurant. (Exhibit F(A) Johnson Plumbing $1,872; 
Exhibit F(B) Casey Monson $10,772.41; Exhibit F(F) Golden Ram Painting $2,000; Exhibit 
F(I) Joshua Flud $3,917.02; Exhibit F(J) April McMurdo $5,100.06; Exhibit F(K) Mark 
Pittman $3,532) According to the owner, Morris Farinella, the money from the operation of 
the restaurant was supposed to go into the account to be used to pay the expenses associated 
with keeping the restaurant operating. (See Farinella deposition, p. 10, line 1 to page 13, line 
9) Instead Clayson used some of these funds to make improvements to the cheese plant and 
the restaurant despite having no authorization to do so from the owner, Morris Farinella. 
(See Farinella deposition, p. 66, line 19 to page 67, line 2) The consequence of using these 
funds for improvements instead of operations was that Clayson ran out of money and turned 
the restaurant over to Zebe and Lawson who had to pay operating expenses which Clayson 
failed to pay while he was operating the restaurant. (Exhibits 11 and IlA) 
Mere proof of payment of these expenses from the restaurant checking account is 
inadequate to establish the value of any benefit Laze, LLC may have unjustly retained. As 
between Clayson and Laze, LLC why is it unjust for Laze, LLC to retain whatever benefit 
these expenses created? SVC, LLC had to pay payroll, payroll taxes, utilities and suppliers 
which could have been paid from this account if Clayson had used the account for the 
purposes it was created. It was not Clayson's money, it was the restaurant's money. No 
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equity is created by allowing Clayson to benefit personally. Finally, SVC, LLC paid for all 
of these improvements when it paid the owner $800,000 to buy the property. The October 
17, 2008 PSA provided that the buyer was purchasing the "cheese plant, equipment, 
restaurant . . . with all improvements thereon, easements and other appurtenances and 
all fixtures of a pennanent nature currently on the premises except as hereinafter provided, 
in their present condition, ordinary wear and tear excepted . . ." Clayson made no attempt 
to present and presented no evidence of the amount he claims Laze, LLC was unjustly 
enriched. Clayson has failed to can)' his burden of proof. 
The expenses which were not paid from the Star Valley restaurant account include 
(Exhibit F(D) $644.01 for attending the Idaho Milk Producers Association meeting in Sun 
Valley charged to Clayson's Bank of America credit card; Exhibit F(F) $8,621 for Golden 
Ram Painting paid from Clayson's personal checking account; Exhibit F(G) - $379.14 for 
Columbia Paint charged on Clayson's personal Bank of America credit card; Exhibit F(P) 
- $1,778 in travel expenses for two repainnen from Viking to travel to Thayne Wyoming to 
get some equipment running charged on Clayson's personal Bank of America credit card; 
Exhibit F(T) $9,100 to High Sierra for work expanding the restaurant paid by Clayson's 
personal check; (Exhibit F(U) for $308.61 to Thayne True Value Hardware charged on 
Clayson's personal Bank of America charge card. Mere proof of payment of these expenses 
is inadequate to establish the value of any benefit Laze, LLC may have unjustly retained. 
SVC, LLC paid for all of these improvements when it paid the owner $800,000 to buy the 
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property. It was Morris F m'inella, not Laze, LLC that benefitted from whatever improvement 
these expenses caused because the October 17, 2008 PSA provided that the buyer was 
purchasing the "cheese plant, equipment, restaurant . . . with all improvements thereon, 
easements and other appurtenances and all fixtures of a pennanent nature currently on the 
premises except as hereinafter provided, in their present condition, ordinary wear and tear 
excepted . . ." Clayson made no attempt to present and presented no evidence of the 
amount he claims Laze, LLC was unjustly enriched by these expenditures. Clayson has 
failed to carry his burden of proof. 
3. TheS50,OOO payment on the Daily Systems account 
The same arguments presented above apply to this payment. Mere proof of payment 
to Dairy Systems is inadequate to establish the value of any benefit Laze, LLC may have 
unjustly retained. SVC, LLC paid for any improvements when it paid the owner $800,000 
to buy the property. It was Morris Farinella, not Laze, LLC, that benefitted from whatever 
improvement these expenses caused because the October 17, 2008 PSA provided that the 
buyer was purchasing the "cheese plant, equipment, restaurant with all 
improvements thereon, easements and other appurtenances and all fixtures of a pennanent 
nature currently on the premises except as hereinafter provided, in their present condition, 
ordinary wear and tear excepted . . ." Clayson made no attempt to present and presented 
no evidence of the amount he claims Laze, LLC was unjustly enriched by paying Dairy 
Systems $50,000 for the work it did at the request of Clayson. Great Plains Equip. v. 
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Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754, 767 (Idaho 1999) (Unjust enrichment, as a 
fictional promise or obligation implied by law, allows recovery where the defendant has 
received a benefit from the plaintiff that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain 
without compensating the plaintiff for the value of the benefit) Although Zebe attempted 
to use Clayson's $50,000 payment to negotiate the Dairy Systems' bill, no agreement was 
reached and Defendants realized no benefit from the negotiation. Clayson has failed to carry 
his burden of proving the value 0 fthe benefit which it would be inequitable for Laze, LLC 
to retain. 
PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The conduct of the parties does not permit the dual inference that Clayson performed 
at the request of the Defendants and that Defendants promised payment because 
Clayson admits that he did not perform at the request of the Defendants. 
2. The conduct of the parties does not imply an agreement from which an obligation in 
contract exists. Clayson has the burden of proving all the elements of a contract, 
because even in the case of an implied-in-fact contract its existence hinges upon proof 
of all the elements. While Clayson claims the Defendants agreed to reimburse him 
for $130,000 in expenses he incurred, he did not prove that he incurred $130,000 in 
expenses nor did he identifY what specific expenses he claims the Defendants agreed 
to reimburse him. The document he claimed identified the expenses the Defendants 
agreed to pay only totals $69,600, but the amount Clayson could substantiate was yet 
a different amount. The disparity between the amounts is too great to imply an 
agreement to pay a reasonably certain amount. Thus, the conduct of Clayson himself 
does not imply an agreement by the Defendants to pay a reasonably certain amount. 
Clayson failed to carry his burden of proving an implied-in-fact agreement on the part 
of the Defendants to reimburse him for expenses he incurred. 
3. Under an unjust enrichment theory Clayson has the burden of presenting evidence not 
only of the value of the services he rendered, but also "the amount of the benefit 
which, if retained by the [Defendants], would result in their unjust enrichment." In 
the case of his own services Clayson failed to prove the value of his services and 
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offered no evidence by which to detennine the amount of the benefit which~ if 
retained by the Defendants, would result in their unjust enrichment. 
4. Under an unjust enrichment theory Clayson has the burden of presenting evidence not 
only of the value of the services or property he paid for~ but also "the amount of the 
benefit which~ if retained by the [Defendants]~ would result in their unjust 
enrichment." In the case of the Exhibit F expenses which were paid from the Bank 
of Star Valley restaurant account the Defendants were not unjustly enriched at the 
expense of Clayson because the services and property were paid from the restaurant 
account and because the Defendants paid other restaurant expenses which would have 
been paid from the restaurant account if Clayson had not diverted the funds in the 
restaurant account to pay for cheese plant improvements. Clayson offered no 
evidence by which to detennine the amount of the benefit which, if retained by the 
Defendants, would result in their unjust enrichment. Clayson failed to carry his 
burden of proof. 
5. Under an unjust enrichment theory Clayson has the burden of presenting evidence not 
only of the value of the services or property he paid for, but also "the amount of the 
benefit which, if retained by the [Defendants], would result in their unjust 
enrichment." In the case of the Exhibit F expenses which were paid from Clayson's 
personal checking account or his personal credit card mere proof of payment is 
insufficient to establish the value of any benefit Defendants may have unjustly 
retained. Clayson offered no evidence by which to determine the amount of the 
benefit which, if retained by the Defendants, would result in their unjust enrichment. 
In any event Defendants paid for any improvements when SVC~ LLC purchased the 
property in its "then condition" after the improvements were made for $800,000. 
Clayson failed to prove Defendants were unjustly enriched by the Exhibit F expenses 
which were paid from Clayson's personal checking account or his personal credit 
card. 
6. Under an unjust enrichmenttheory Clayson has the burden of presenting evidence not 
only of the value of the services or property he paid for, but also "the amount of the 
benefit which, if retained by the [Defendants], would result in their unjust 
enrichment." In the case of Clayson's $50,000 payment to Dairy Systems, the Dairy 
Systems work was perfonned while Morris Farinella (or his company) owned the 
property, not Clayson and not the Defendants. Defendants paid for any improvements 
when SVC, LLC purchased the property in its "then condition" after the 
improvements were made for $800,000. Although Zebe attempted to negotiate the 
Dairy Systems bill using the $50,000 Clayson paid he was not successful and 
Defendants did not benefit from the negotiation. Clayson failed to prove Defendants 
were unjustly enriched by Clayson's $50,000 payment to Dairy Systems. 
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CONCLUSION 
Gaylen Clayson decided before he met Don Zebe and Rick Lawson that he wanted to 
purchase and operate the Star Valley Cheese plant and restaurant. He knew the cheese plant 
had to be operational by the fall of2008 or he could not participate and he testified that this 
is what he told rVlorris Farinella. As fall approached the plant was not operational and 
Clayson was running short on funds. He turned over the operation of the restaurant to Don 
Zebe and Rick Lawson. He assigned any interest he had in the PSA to SVC, LLC. His 
mistake was that he invested some of his own funds into fixing up the cheese plant before 
he had a clear understanding or agreement with the owner, Morris Farinella, or with the 
Defendants who eventually purchased the property from Farinella. 
Gaylen Clayson took a risk. Because of his prior relationship with Morris Farinella 
and the lack of any agreement with him, he did not pursue recovery of his unwise investment 
from Farinella. Because of his prior relationship with Dairy Systems he advanced money for 
work he had requested before he had any authority to do so. With no legal basis to recover 
this unwise investment, Clayson is left to seek some recov~ry through the equitable remedies 
of implied-in-fact contract and implied-in-law contract. Clayson's record keeping and his 
recollection of events is spotty and inconsistent. Clayson admits he never performed any 
work and never paid for any services or materials at the request of the Defendants. He is 
unable to verifY or quantifY the time he allegedly spent improving the cheese plant. His 
records of expenditures do not match his claim and his memory of events do not match that 
of the Defendants in many critical respects. More significantly, his memory does not match 
DEFENSE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ARGUMENT - PAGE 23 
694 
that of the non-part witness, leffRandall, in many critical respects. This inconsistent and 
contradictory evidentiary record makes it clear that no implied contract can be concocted 
because to do so would involve pure speculation. Clayson failed to prove an implied-in-fact 
contract. 
Gaylen Clayson has the burden of proving unjust enrichment. Clayson used restaurant 
money that should have been used to operate the restaurant to make improvements resulting 
in the Defendants paying many of Clayson 's restaurant expenses that went unpaid due to lack 
of funds. Most of his evidence was devoted to trying to establish how unfairly Clayson had 
been treated and little of his evidence was devoted to how much he paid for the 
improvements he claimed he made. Again what he paid for and what he received for what 
he paid is largely left to speculation. None of his evidence answered the critical question 
about the extent, if any, to which his efforts and expenditures actually enriched the 
Defendants who bought the property "as is" with all the improvements for $800,000 from the 
owner. If Clayson is to be believed, he is the one that negotiated the price of$800,000 so he 
can hardly complain now that $800,000 was not fair value. Because the Defendants bought 
the property after the improvements were made it is illogical to now claim the Defendants 
were unjustly enriched by Clayson's efforts. Clayson failed to prove the Defendants were 
unjustly enriched. 
Defendants request this Court to deny Clayson's claims for implied-in-fact and 
implied-in-Iaw contracts, enter judgment in favor of the Defendants dismissing Clayson's 
claims with prejudice and award costs and attorney fees in favor of the Defendants. 
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DATED this 24th day of November, 2010. 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
BANNOCK COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
GA YLEN CLA YSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, and LAZE, 
LLC, 
Defendants, 









Case No: CV-2009-02212-0C 
Judge: Stephen S. Dunn 
Plaintiff submits this Post-Trial Brief with the attached proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and a proposed Judgment pursuant to the direction of the Court at the end of 
trial. Plaintiff has not attempted to reproduce here the analysis set out in the proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law themselves, but only matters that may not be necessary to 
decision, but which may be helpful to the Court as he analyzes the evidence introduced at the 
trial. 
To the extent practicable, Plaintiff has attempted to organize the information by 
paragraph numbers corresponding to the paragraph numbers in the Findings of Fact. 
Paragraph 7. 
There is no dispute that Mr. Farinella told the Plaintiff to do whatever he wanted to get 
the Cheese Plant ready to open and make cheese as soon as the escrow closes, as long as it didn't 
cost Mr. Farinella or the bankruptcy court anything. Mr. Clayson testified that was his 
understanding. Mr. Farinella, although a bit confused as to the timing of events essentially 
agreed. Farinella deposition at 40,42. 1 Defendants may try to argue that there is an issue of fact 
about when that authorization came about. But logically there is not. Mr. Clayson testified that 
Mr. Farinella gave him that authorization when he moved into the Cheese Plant in July 2008. 
Mr. Farinella testified that it came in conjunction with Mr. Clayson's having made an offer to 
I Defendants may try to argue that Mr. Farinella admitted in his deposition that there were no oral agreements 
relating to the Cheese Plant. However, that is not how he testified. After Mr. Farinella had set out this agreement he 
had with Gaylen that he could do whatever he wanted so long as it did not cost Mr. Farinella any money, then Mr. 
Bowers, who was conducting the deposition, prefaced the "no oral agreements questions" with "except for what you 
explained to me, how's that?" Farinella deposition at 43. Mr. Farinella made it clear that there were no other 
agreements "other than what I told you what he did." Farinella deposition at 35. Referring to the fact that GayJen 
was living at the plant while he operated the restaurant to get the plant ready to reopen upon close of escrow. 
Farinella deposition at 42. 
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buy the Cheese Plant, Farinella deposition at 60-61, but he also connected the timing of that 
authorization with Mr. Clayson taking over the running of the restaurant. 
Gaylen offered to run the restaurant after he made the offer to-was accepted. 
After he bought the-he made the offer to buy the plant at the time. So with that 
in mind, I figured he can be trusted to run the restaurant. That's the way that 
happened. Just to run it to keep it open. 
Q. Because you assumed that at some point he would be able to buy the whole 
thing? 
A. It was already in process of him buying it through the bankruptcy court. 
Q. Okay. 
Farinella deposition at 14. 
We know that Gaylen began running the restaurant on July 1,2008, so the understanding 
to which Gaylen testified, that Morris Farinella told him "the Cheese Plant is yours," to go ahead 
and get the plant operational and he would work out the title problems and authorization to do 
whatever you want to get the Cheese Plant operational by the time of closing, must have been 
given in the July time frame as testified by Mr. Clayson. Moreover, it would not make any sense 
to argue that the authorization came after the October 17, 2008, formal offer because by that time 
Gaylen was no longer running the restaurant and Defendants had taken control of the Cheese 
Plant. Mr. Zebe testified that it would be illogical for a person to do all the work that Mr. 
Clayson was doing unless he had the assurance he would someday own the property. And 
indeed, it would be. Mr. Farinella must have assured Mr. Clayson that he would own the plant 
and given the authorization to "do what you want to get the Plant ready to operate upon the 




While there is some slight dispute in the record over the facts set out in paragraph 8, 
paragraph 8 is the most logical interpretation of the disputed facts. While Mr. Farinella testified 
in his deposition that Gaylen did not have the authority to apply the proceeds of the restaurant to 
his personal account, and that he was running the restaurant as a favor to the bankruptcy court, 
that testimony can be discounted because there has never been any request by the bankruptcy 
court, Mr. Farinella, or anyone else for an accounting, even though Mr. Zebe attempted to 
foment a call for such an accounting in his email dated January 14,2009. Exhibit S. Moreover, 
Mr. Clayson's actions are not those of a mere manager who was not entitled to the fruit of his 
labors. Defendants complained about Mr. Clayson incurring about $18,000 in debt to move a 
wall in the restaurant just before turning over the operations of the restaurant to the Defendants. 
Not the work of an hireling. In any event, Mr. Farinella testified that he authorized Mr. Clayson 
to do whatever he wanted to get the Cheese Plant ready to reopen upon close of escrow, as long 
as it didn't cost Mr. Farinella or the bankruptcy court any money. Farinella deposition at 40. 
Given this record, Mr. Clayson had the right to use the money in the Star Valley Cheese account 
to pay himself or to refurbish the Cheese Plant, and any argument that he had a duty to account 
to Mr. Farinella or to the bankruptcy court for that money is irrelevant to Defendant's duty to 
reimburse him for the expenditure of that money to refurbish the Cheese Plant.2 
2 Any duty Mr. Clayson might have to account to Mr. Farinella or the Bankruptcy Court in addition to being 
irrelevant between these parties is as least as remote as Mr. Clayson's duty to pay Dairy Systems for their remaining 




The facts set out in this paragraph are undisputed. Each witness who testified on the 
issue observed the fact that Gay len Clayson was so dedicated to the reopening of the Cheese 
Plant that he lived and worked full time on site. The significance of these facts is not only in the 
facts themselves, but in the logical inferences that should be drawn from them. Mr. Zebe 
testified that it would be illogical for a person to. do all the work that Mr. Clayson was doing 
unless he had the assurance he would someday own the property. Mr. Zebe is correct in that 
observation. That observation makes illogical defendants assumption, based on no evidence, that 
Me Clayson was anxious to avoid having to close the purchase for $800,000 and that is the 
reason he assigned his rights to the defendants. The logical inference to draw is that Mr. Clayson 
was doing the work because Me Farinella, whom he had known for years, with whom he had 
done business in the past, and who had financed his associated business ventures would keep his 
promise that "the plant is yours", especially when he and his son Joe looked to profit from the 
brokering of the cheese from the plant. At it turns out that reliance was justified as was 
demonstrated when Me Farinella accepted the offer and closed on the agreement with parties 
whom he had been told were Mr. Clayson's partners. 
Paragraphs 16 through 19. 
Defendants try to downplay the significance of Gaylen Clayson's role in helping them 
obtain the right to buy the Cheese Plant, but there is little doubt in the record that Gaylen played 
a significant role in securing the right to buy the plant. Defendants try to argue that Gaylen was 
out of the picture when he and Mr. Randall went to Wyoming to make the offer on the Plant. 
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But the Court will recall that when Mr. Randall decided to make that offer he called Gaylen 
Clayson, not Don Zebe, to announce his intention because at that time the four of them were 
going to put together a deal "to buy the plant, refurbish it, and reopen it together." And while 
both he and Mr. Clayson were looking to Don and Rick to bring the money to the table to put the 
financing together, it would not be the first time that the people with the brains needed someone 
with the financial muscle to put together their dream. 
Mr. Farinella also testified to the importance of Mr. Clayson's involvement in the mix. 
He testified that there had been other offers on the plant but that they had decided to go with Mr. 
Clayson because he was a local and had the milk supply. Farinella deposition at 14-15. 
Farinella further testified that that he did not care that Don Zebe was paying the money because 
he had been introduced to Don Zebe as Gaylen's partner. Farinella Depositon at 35,57. 
Paragraphs 26 through 28. 
At first it appeared that Mr. Zebe and Mr. Lawson contradicted one another about their 
promise to pay Gaylen for his out of pocket expenses and the debts he incurred to contractors 
working on the plant. Mr. Zebe stipulated and stipulated that they would pay what was 
documented and what they could use, and, with regard to the Dairy Systems debt, represented 
that they had paid it, Exhibit I at p. 6, and specifically and repeatedly stated and indicated they 
would pay upon closing. Exhibit S, Exhibit V. 
Mr. Lawson, on the other hand, stated categorically that there was no agreement to pay 
any of Mr. Claysons bills. Mr. Zebe cleared up the confusion when he testified that the 
discussion referred to by Mr. Lawson related solely to the restaurant debts. Mr. Randall, who 
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"sang to himself' so as not to know what was going on during that discussion apparently did not 
catch that the "heated discussion" related only to the restaurant debt and not the refurbishment 
debt the Defendants had stipulated and stipulated they would pay upon the closing. 
Thus, at most, even if Defendants' version of the facts were believed, they have proven 
only a compromise between Clayson and themselves with regard to the restaurant debt. Having 
thus compromised the restaurant debt for the restaurant bills they paid, it would not be equitable 
to allow them to double dip and claim an offset against Mr. Clayson's out of pocket 
refurbishment expenses or the $50,000 he paid to Dairy Systems. 
Defendants may try to argue that any obligation they have to pay Gaylen Clayson for his 
out of pocket expenses or for the $50,000 he paid to Dairy Systems is offset by the many 
thousands of dollars they paid "on Gaylen's behalf' when they took over operations of the 
restaurant. Defendants failed to establish any right to setoff. First, there was a complete lack of 
evidence whether the restaurant bills being disputed had been incurred by Mr. Clayson during his 
three month management of the restaurant or had been incurred during the occupancy of Mr. 
Farinella's other managers. Mr. Lawson's statement that he and Mr. Zebe expected to be 
reimbursed those costs upon the closing, suggests that the bills originated with Mr. Farinella 
before Mr. Clayson's appearance on the scene. 
Another difficulty in trying to calculate any offset is the failure by Defendants to 
document the value of the inventory they received from Mr. Clayson. Mr. Lawson testified that 
when they took over the restaurant, they not only inherited the bills, but they also inherited a 
substantial inventory. When asked whether they had kept a record of the inventory or had 
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attempted to value the inventory, Mr. Lawson candidly answered "no." If they inherited 
$100,000 worth of inventory but paid only $70,000 for it, then Defendants owe Plaintiff on 
account of the restaurant in addition to what they owe for refurbishment of the Cheese Plant. 
Without putting a value on the inventory, it is not fair for Defendants to ask for credit for paying 
the bills of the restaurant. For example, $36,335.74 of the bills Defendants claim to have paid 
was for propane in a 10,000 gallon tank that was still there and full when they took over the 
restaurant. Similarly $7,797.00 was paid to Sysco Foods, the supplier of the ice cream served in 
cones at the restaurant. Defendants surely do not expect to be paid for the propane they used, or 
the ice cream they served. Without an inventory, there is no way to determine if Defendants are 
entitled to any setoff. 
Finally, Defendants testified that they paid the restaurant debts, not because of any 
agreement with Mr. Clayson, but because they needed those suppliers in order to continue to 
operate the restaurant. the law does not allow a party who, without legal obligation to do so, 
voluntarily pays a debt to seek to recover the debt from the originally debtor. It is well settled 
that a person cannot-by way of set-off, counterclaim or direct action-recover money which he or 
she has voluntarily paid with full knowledge of all the facts but with no obligation to make such 
payment. Chinchurreta v. Evergreen Management, Inc., 790 P.2d 372, 374 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1989). 
Credibility of Witnesses 
While many of the facts are not in serious dispute, and even fewer of the disputes make 
any logical sense, there are a few facts that are in dispute and for which the Court may need to 
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judge the credibility of witnesses. In that regard, when judging the credibility of the Defendants 
the Court might note that Defendants were willing to misrepresent to the banks that they had paid 
Dairy Systems for 90 percent of the electrical retrofit in the amount of $225,000. Since this is 
one of the very debts at issue in this case, a court of justice might well choose not to believe 
testimony of the Defendants tending to negate their duty to reimburse Plaintiff for that portion of 
the debt they claimed to have paid and that he actually paid. 
Jeff Randall's testimony, for the most part, corroborates the position of the Plaintiff that 
he continued to be involved with the group in their attempt to purchase, refurbish, and reopen the 
Cheese Plant even after his name was removed from the LLC documents on October 8, 2008. 
His attempts to minimize the importance of Mr. Clayson's role in purchasing the Cheese 
Plant came about because of defendant's attempts to influence his testimony. Defendants, 
particularly Mr. Zebe, with whom Mr. Randall felt some particular kinship because of their 
shared tragedies, got to Mr. Randall, told him he had "thrown them under the bus" with his 
statement that he and Clayson "sold" them the plant in November 2008, and obviously 
influenced his testimony on that issue. The reality is that Clayson and Randall did "sell" the 
plant to Defendants in November 2008. Just as the contract purchaser of a home is the owner of 
the home, Walker v. Nunnenkamp, 84 Id. 485, 373 P. 2d 559 (1962), so Clayson and Randall 
were the owners of the Cheese Plant under their contract to purchase dated October 17, 2008. 
Their November assignment of that contract to Defendants was a "sale" of the Cheese Plant. 
The purchase price was Defendants' agreement to give Mr. Randall the work shipping the milk 
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and the purchase price to Clayson was the promise to reimburse his out of pocket expenses, take 
his milk, and assume the debts he had incurred. Exhibit CC 
Dated this 24th day of November, 2010. 
A TKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
Blake S. Atkin 
Attorney for the Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
BANNOCK COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
GA YLEN CLAYSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, and LAZE, 
LLC. 
Defendants, 




GA YLEN CLA YSON, 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No: CV-2009-02212-0C 
Judge: Stephen S. Dunn 
I. The Plaintiff Gaylen Clayson has known Morris Farinella, the former owner of 
the Star Valley Cheese Plant ("Cheese Plant") for many years. 
2. Mr. Clayson supplied milk to the Cheese Plant over the years while it was being 
run by Mr. Farinella. He helped Mr. Farinella recruit other dairy farmers to supply milk to the 
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Cheese Plant and, at one point, Mr. Farinella loaned him money to purchase and operate a dairy 
in Wyoming that supplied milk to the Cheese Plant. 
3. The Cheese Plant has not been able to remain profitable over recent years in part 
because of emerging environmental concerns over the disposal of whey, a byproduct of cheese 
production. The expense of whey disposal has resulted in recent years in the bankruptcy of 
several cheese plants in the area, including the plant in Blackfoot, Idaho, and resulted in a second 
bankruptcy of the Star Valley Cheese Plant in about 2005. 
4. In 2007, Mr. Clayson was contacted by Morris Farinella who wanted him to 
reopen the Cheese Plant. Mr. Farinella knew that Mr. Clayson had the ability to supply the milk, 
Mr. Farinella and his son Joe Farinella assured Plaintiff they could market the cheese, and Mr. 
Farinella assured Mr. Clayson that he could clear up the title to the property so that Mr. Clayson 
could purchase the Cheese Plant. 
5. At the time of this contact, Mr. Clayson was in southern California on a mission 
and informed Mr. Farinella that he would not be back until the next summer. Mr. Farinella 
indicated that would give him time to work out the title problems with the Cheese Plant. 
6. Mr. Clayson was interested in reopening the Cheese Plant because he had a 
business plan to ship the whey back to the farmer who supplied the milk. The farmer could use 
the whey in feeding his cattle, and the value of the whey would offset the cost of shipping. In 
this fashion, both the environmental hazard connected with the whey and the cost of shipping 
milk to the remote location of the Cheese Plant could be offset. 
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7. In late June 2008, Mr. Clayson met Mr. Farinella at the Cheese Plant. At that 
meeting, Mr. Farinella promised Mr. Clayson that "the Cheese Plant is yours," that he should do 
whatever was necessary to get the Cheese Plant ready to reopen, and that Mr. Farinella would 
work things out so that he could buy the Cheese Plant. He even offered to finance the purchase 
of the Cheese Plant by Mr. Clayson. 
8. During that meeting, it was also agreed that Mr. Clayson would take over the 
operations of the restaurant located on the premises. Mr. Farinella told him that he had to "cash 
flow" the restaurant and that it was his operation and he should run it as his own. 
9. On July 1, 2008, Mr. Clayson physically moved into the Cheese Plant. He lived 
on site, managed the restaurant, and worked and supervised the work of others whom he hired to 
help him refurbish the Cheese Plant and make it ready for reopening. He also interfaced with 
potential lenders, notably the United States Department of Agriculture, and other people in the 
milk industry who would be instrumental in the successful operation of a cheese plant in 
Wyoming. Mr. Clayson spent 10 to 12 hours a day, 6 days a week from July 1,2008, through 
October 8, 2008, hiring and supervising workers on the Cheese Plant, working on cleaning and 
refurbishing the Cheese Plant, resurfacing the floors, plastering and painting walls, cleaning out 
unnecessary and scrap equipment, and cleaning and painting the plant, lining up contacts to 
supply milk to the Cheese Plant and to take excess milk when needed, discussing financing with 
the United States Department of Agriculture, giving tours of the Cheese Plant to interested 
parties and working toward reopening the Cheese Plant. 
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10. In mid-August 2008, Mr. Clayson hired Dairy Systems Company, Inc. ("Dairy 
Systems"), a company with whom he had dealt for over 20 years, to upgrade the electrical work 
at the Cheese Plant. 
11. Over the years, as Dairy Systems has performed work for Mr. Clayson they have 
billed him monthly. Mr. Clayson would review the bills and if he had concerns or questions he 
and Dairy Systems would discuss the bill and either he would be convinced that the charges were 
appropriate or the bill would be modified. He expected to be billed by Dairy Systems in the 
same manner for the work they performed on the Cheese Plant. 
12. In early September 2008, Mr. Clayson received a bill from Dairy Systems for the 
work they had performed in August. Mr. Clayson had been onsite watching the work being 
performed by Dairy Systems during the month of August. Upon receiving the bill, Mr. Clayson 
reviewed that bill and had no concerns and voiced no objections to the Dairy Systems billings. 
13. In early October 2008, Mr. Clayson received the bill for the work done in 
September. Again, Mr. Clayson had been on site watching the work being performed by Dairy 
Systems during the month of September. Upon a review of the bill, Mr. Clayson had no 
concerns about the September billing and voiced no objections. On September 16, 2008 he paid 
Dairy Systems $50,000 toward their bill. I 
I At about the same time Mr. Clayson delivered two additional $50,000 checks to Dairy Systems to be applied 
toward the bill and to purchase a MCC, a large ticket item that needed to be ordered several weeks in advance of 
when it would be needed. Mr. Clayson told Dairy Systems that the two additional $50,000 checks would be funded 
by Mr. Lawson and Mr. Zebe. The checks were never funded. 
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14. On October 2, 2008, Mr. Clayson, Mr. Zebe and Mr. Lawson formed a limited 
liability company, SVC, LLC, to purchase, refurbish and operate the Cheese Plant. That LLC is 
the entity that operates the Cheese Plant for Mr. Zebe and Mr. Lawson to this day. On that same 
day, Mssrs. Lawson and Zebe had their names added as members of an LLC in Idaho known as 
Milk Marketing Management, LLC. Before their joining the company, Milk Marketing 
Management, LLC, had been owned by Gaylen Clayson and Jeff Randall. After entry of Mr. 
Lawson and Mr. Zebe into the company, the parties planned to use Milk Marketing 
Management, LLC, to secure the milk supply for the Cheese Plant. 
15. Mr. Zebe does not lightly enter into business with others, and did not enter into 
this business relationship with Mr. Clayson without first thoroughly checking out the cheese 
industry and Mr. Clayson. Logically then, even though the paperwork for SVC, LLC and Milk 
Market Management, LLC, was not filed until October 2, 2008, the agreement of the parties to, 
as Mr. Randall put it, work together to purchase, refurbish and reopen the Cheese Plant, occurred 
sometime before October 2, 2008. 
16. On October 8,2008, Mr. Clayson's name was voluntarily removed from the SVC, 
LLC, records, but Mr. Clayson remained involved as is evidenced by the fact that when it came 
time to make an offer on the Cheese Plant, Mr. Randall talked first to Mr. Clayson, and only 
called Mr. Zebe on the phone as he and Mr. Clayson were on the way to Wyoming to make the 
offer. 
17. On October 17, 2008, Mr. Clayson and Jeff Randall went to Wyoming to the 
home of the broker, Val Pendleton, and made an offer to purchase the Cheese Plant for $800,000. 
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On their way to Wyoming to make that offer they called Don Zebe to tell him what they were 
doing and he agreed that it was a good move. 
18. True to the promise he had made to Gaylen Clayson in July that "the Cheese Plant 
is yours," and that he would work out the paperwork so Mr. Clayson could buy it, Mr. Farinella 
accepted the offer. 
19. On November 4, 2008, Gaylen Clayson and Jeff Randall assigned the contract to 
purchase the Cheese Plant to Don Zebe and Rick Lawson and the company of which they were 
the principles, SVC, LLC. Mr. Zebe and Mr. Lawson borrowed $2 million from Citizens 
Community Bank of Idaho, backed by the United States Department of Agriculture to purchase 
and operate the Cheese Plant. They closed the purchase on February 24, 2009, once they had 
obtained that funding. 
20. In addition to being supplied to Mr. Clayson, the Dairy Systems bills were 
delivered to Mr. Zcbe and Mr. Lawson. Neither voiced any o~jection to the bills until after they 
had obtained their financing from Citizens Community Bank on February 24, 2009. 
21. During the several months that they had the Dairy Systems bills in hand, Mr. Zebe 
and Mr. Lawson had complete control and access to the Cheese Plant. They employed experts, 
Bill Sulzer of Statco, and J.P. Electric, to examine the Dairy Systems work to determine what 
needed to be done to complete the electric retrofit. Following the review by Defendants' own 
experts, Mr. Zebe and Mr. Lawson kept the design originated by Dairy Systems and even put 
their new Motor Control Cent.er ("MCC") in the same location as designed by Dairy Systems. 
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They also kept, and are using to this day, transformers, breaker panels, and wire pulled by Dairy 
Systems. 
22. During discussions with Klark Gailey of Dairy Systems related to a threat by the 
supplier of the MCC to put a lien on the Cheese Plant, Mr. Zebe did not voice any objection to 
the Dairy Systems bills. 
23. On February 19, 2009, Mr. Zebe wrote an email to Klark Gailey telling him that 
the funding was in the bank and inviting him to confirm that fact with the broker, Val Pendleton. 
Exhibit V. Mr. Zebe admitted sending this email, but offered no explanation. Without some 
explanation, this email, which does not voice any objection to the Dairy Systems bills he had 
then had for at least four months, can only be interpreted as a communication to a creditor that 
the funding is in and he is soon to be paid. 
24. Mr. Zebe and Mr. Lawson represented to lenders from whom they were 
successful in borrowing $2 million, that they had paid $225,000 to Dairy Systems. Exhibit I at 6. 
They also told Morris Farinella that upon closing they were prepared to absorb most of the debts 
incurred by Gaylen Clayson, including specifically the $245K owed to Dairy Systems. Exhibit 
S. 
25. After the funding had been obtained and liens on the property could no longer 
interfere with financing, Mr. Zebe wrote an email to Klark Gailey in which he acknowledged 
that even from his point of view, Dairy Systems was owed more than the $50,000 that Gaylen 
Clayson had paid them. Mr. Zebe, however, insisted that he would deduct from amounts owed 
to Dairy Systems the $50,000 that Gaylen Clayson had paid. Exhibits Wand X. 
7 
714 
26. That Defendants agreed to pay at least some of Mr. Clayson's costs incurred in 
refurbishing the Cheese Plant cannot be doubted. 
27. Mr. Zebe testified that he had stipulated and stipulated that they would pay any 
expenses incurred by Mr. Clayson that were supported by cancelled checks or invoices and with 
the additional stipulation that they be for things that the Defendants could use. 
28. Defendants offered no evidence that any expenses incurred by Mr. Clayson were 
for things that Defendants could not use. What evidence is in the record indicates that most, if 
not all, of Mr. Clayson's efforts were useful to the DefendanJs. In the Business Plan that Mr. 
Zebe prepared, Exhibit I at 6, he lists for the banks, the work that had been done to that point in 
getting the Cheese Plant ready to reopen. That list included cosmetic and physical renovations, 
an electrical retrofit of the plant, resurfacing floors, plastering of walls, cleaning, removal of old 
equipment, maintenance, repairs and painting. If the work done was significant enough to merit 
a mention to the lenders, it can hardly be argued that it somehow could not be used by 
Defendants. 
29. The amount of Mr. Clayson's out of pocket expenses was difficult to ascertain 
and consumed more than its share of trial time to sort out. Mr. Clayson prepared a hand written 
summary of his expenses that was introduced at the trial as the first page of Exhibit F. That 
handwritten summary, which was delivered to defendants at the time they were discussing Mr. 
Clayson's withdrawal from the business, was prepared by Mr. Clayson at the Star Valley Cheese 
Plant offices from invoices that were kept in the ordinary course of business of the Cheese Plant 
by April McMurdo, the company's secretary. Mr. Clayson turned the office and all its contents, 
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including the file containing those invoices, over to the Defendants when he left in October 
2008. Defendants did not produce that file or any documents relating to the cost of refurbishing 
the Cheese Plant. 
30. While Mr. Clayson's legal team tried to support the amounts set out in Exhibit F's 
first page with cancelled checks and credit card receipts currently in Plaintiff's possession, it 
became clear as foundation was being laid for those documents that only some of them actually 
supported the claim. 
31. Adding all the expenses listed in the first page of Exhibit F supported by 
admissible evidence produced at trial, the total comes to $47,715.62. 
32. But the evidence also showed that the first page of Exhibit F was delivered by the 
Mr. Clayson to the Defendants during the discussions in which the Defendants agreed to pay his 
out of pocket expenses in refurbishing the Cheese Plant. That fact, coupled with the failure by 
Defendants to produce the supporting documents which they now control, supports a finding that 
all the expenses detailed in the first page of Exhibit F should be paid by Defendants to Mr. 
Clayson. The total Exhibit F charges is $74,108.00. 
33. Mr. Clayson lived and worked at the Cheese Plant from July I, 2008, through 
October 8, 2008. He worked 10 to 12 hours per day, 6 days per week. He testified that he would 
not do such work for less than $100,000 but valued his services at $15 per hour. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I. In its ruling on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court ruled that 
the express terms of the assignment of rights by Mr. Clayson to Defendants precluded him from 
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proving that he had benefitted Defendants beyond the value of the Cheese Plant reflected in that 
document, namely the $800,000 purchase price that the Defendants assumed and paid. The 
Court determined, however, that: 
Conflicting evidence in this case demonstrates that the Assignment of Rights 
Contract could have possibly been part of a larger agreement, or that there were 
other, separate agreements between the parties, thus not precluding the claims of 
an implied-in-fact andlor implied-in-Iaw contract. 
This trial was held to determine those issues. 
2. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated: 
"An implied in fact contract is defined as one where the terms and existence of 
the contract are manifested by the conduct of the parties with the request of one 
party and the performance by the other often being inferred from the 
circumstances attending the performance." Farnworth v. Femling, 125 Idaho 283, 
287,869 P.2d 1378, 1382 (1994) (citing Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 153, 
408 P.2d 810, 815 (1965)). The implied-in-fact contract is grounded in the parties' 
agreement and tacit understanding. Kennedy v. Forest, 129 Idaho 584, 587, 930 
P.2d 1026, 1029 (1997). "The general rule is that where the conduct of the parties 
allows the dual inferences that one performed at the other's request and that the 
requesting party promised payment, then the court may find a contract implied in 
fact." Homes by Bell-Hi, Inc. v. Wood, 110 Idaho 319, 321, 715 P.2d 989, 991 
(1986) (citing Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 153,408 P.2d 810, 815 (1965); 
Bastian v. Gafford, 98 Idaho 324,325,563 P.2d 48,49 (1977». 
Fox v. Mountain West BIee., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 708, 52 P.3d 848, 853 (2002) 
3. Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court has declared that: 
The doctrine of quantum meruit is a remedy for an implied-in-fact contract and 
permits a party to recover the reasonable value of services rendered or material 
provided on the basis of an implied promise to pay. See Cheung v. Pena, 143 
Idaho 30,35,137 P.3d 417, 422 (2006). 
Gray v. Tri-Way Const. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378, 387, 210 P.3d 63,72 (2009) 
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4. As to contracts implied-in-Law and unjust enrichment, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has stated: 
Unjust enrichment, or restitution, is the measure of recovery under a contract 
implied in law. Barry v. Pacific West Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103 P.3d 
440, 447 (2004). "A contract implied in law ... 'is not a contract at all, but an 
obligation imposed by law for the purpose of bringing about justice and equity 
without reference to the intent of the agreement of the parties ... .' " Id. The 
measure of recovery on an unjust enrichment claim "is not the actual amount of 
the enrichment, but the amount of enrichment which, as between two parties it 
would be unjust for one party to retain." Beco Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bannock Paving 
Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 463, 466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990). The plaintiff has the 
burden of proving that the defendant received a benefit and of proving the amount 
of the benefit which the defendants unjustly retained. Blaser v. Cameron, 121 
Idaho 10 12, 10 17, 829 P.2d 1361, 1366 (Ct.App.1992). "The value of services 
rendered can be used as evidence of the value of the benefit bestowed under the 
theory of unjust enrichment." /d. "Although damages need not be proven with 
mathematical precision, the damages, i.e., the value of any benefit unjustly 
received by the defendant in an action based upon unjust enrichment, must be 
proven to a reasonable certainty." Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, 101 Idaho 663, 
667,619 P.2d 1116, 1120 (1980). 
Gray v. Tri-Way Const. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378, 388-389,210 P.3d 63, 73 - 74 (2009) 
5. The circumstances of this case and the conduct of the Defendants and the Plaintiff 
establishes the dual inferences that Plaintiff relinquished his interest in the Plant and the business 
that would run the plant based upon the promises of the Defendants to pay the value of his 
efforts, reimbursement of his out of pocket expenses, and the $50,000 that he paid to Dairy 
Systems. 
6. Plaintiff relinquished his interest in the Cheese Plant after he had spent three 
months of his life, over $100,000.00 dollars, and his political capital with Mr. Farinella, the 
United States Department of Agriculture, Dairy Systems, a trusted supplier, and others preparing 
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the Cheese Plant to be reopened. Defendants' arguments that he agreed to do so without any 
expectation of compensation for his efforts or reimbursement for the substantial money he paid 
simply is not credible. 
7. Indeed, even Defendants themselves do not believe so absurd a proposition. Mr. 
Zebe stipulated and stipulated that they would pay Mr. Clayson his costs of refurbishment if they 
were "supported by cancelled checks or invoices" and if "they could use the work." Similarly, 
he testified that they would have paid the Dairy Systems bill if they could use the work. 
8. Defendants' supposition that the Plaintiff might have been willing to walk away 
from his investment in this project because he was afraid he could not come up with the 
$800,000 and might be liable to pay it by December 2008, had Defendants not rescued him is 
also wholly without support. 
9. There was no evidence, other than the fact that Mr. Clayson did not have the 
$800,000 in his pocket to pay the purchase price, to suggest that fear of that payment was his 
motivation to give up this opportunity. 
10. To the contrary, the evidence was that Mr. Farinella, who had in the past financed 
Mr. Clayson's businesses connected to this Cheese Plant, and who, with his son Joe, planned to 
profit from the brokering of the cheese, offered to finance the purchase for Mr. Clayson. 
Moreover, Mr. Clayson had had discussions with the United States Department of Agriculture 
who advised him that a lot of people would like to see that plant reopened and he would have no 
trouble getting help with the financing. 
12 
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1 I . Defendants did not pay the purchase price out of their own pocket. They paid the 
$800,000 purchase price with money borrowed from Citizens Community Bank of Idaho and 
guaranteed by the United States Department of Agriculture. That loan came about as a result of 
the business plan Defendants provided to the bank and the United States Department of 
Agriculture that championed the work efforts of the Plaintiff and the $225,000 that supposedly 
had been paid to his contractor Dairy Systems. Defendants simply did not prove that Gaylen 
Clayson could not have purchased this Cheese Plant on his own. 
12. Something other than the fear of the $800,000 purchase price must have 
motivated Mr. Clayson to relinquish his interest in the Cheese Plant. The evidence is that 
motivation came from the promises that Defendants made him. 
13. In its Memorandum Decision on the Motion for Summary Judgment, this court 
carved out those promises as one of the equitable claims that were allowed to go forward in this 
case: 
When Zebe stated an agreement to pay for "most of what was done while Gay\en 
was in charge ... to the tune of 245K" or to pay the Dairy Systems debt ... a 
question of fact arises as to the extent of that obligation, whether pursuant to an 
implied-in-fact contract or by way of unjust enrichment. What the nature of the 
agreement was, how much was agreed to be paid, and for what, are questions the 
jury must decide. (emphasis added). 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 21. 
14. Defendants admitted that they agreed to pay Plaintiffs out of pocket expenses to 
the extent they were documented and that they could use them. Defendants offered no evidence 
as to any improvements made by Mr. Clayson or Dairy Systems that they could not use. 
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15. Likewise, there is no question that Defendants benefited from Mr. Clayson's 
refurbishment efforts and expenses. Defendants, in their business plan that they used to obtain 
$2 million from the bank and the USDA, referenced this refurbishment work. 
The facility has and is undergoing cosmetic and physical renovations. To include 
but not limited to; an electrical retrofit of the plant, resurfacing floors, plastering 
of walls, cleaning, removal of old equipment, maintenance, repairs and painting. 
Exhibit I at 6. This is a reference to the work done and procured by the Plaintiff. Not only is this 
an acknowledgement that the Plaintiff's efforts benefited the Defendants in their continued 
operation of the Cheese Plant, but their reliance on those efforts also helped them to obtain the 
funding to purchase and operate the Cheese Plant and therefore benefitted them in that fashion. 
16. The Court concludes that the Plaintiff is entitled to recover all the amounts set 
out on the first page of Exhibit F that was delivered to the Defendants in connection with the 
agreement to remove his name from the operating documents of Defendants' LLC. While 
Plaintiff was unable to support all of those charges with receipts, cancelled checks or credit card 
receipts, this failure is due in large measure to the fact that the Plaintiff left those receipts with 
the Defendants at the time he left the Cheese Plant. Defendants made no attempt to produce 
those records or explain at the trial why they could not produc~ those records if they thought they 
would show something different from the totals shown in Exhibit F. That total is $74,108.00. 
17. As to the value of the time Mr. Clayson dedicated to the reopening of the Cheese 
Plant, the evidence is undisputed that Mr. Clayson spent at least ten hours per day, 6 days per 
week for a period of 14 weeks working on the plant, interfacing with people and entities that 
could be instrumental in the reopening of the Cheese Plant and supervising workers at the plant. 
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Mr. Clayson worked a total of at least 840 hours in those activities. Defendants did not dispute 
Plaintiffs evidence that his time was worth $15 per hour. Therefore, the value of Mr. Clayson's 
efforts is $12,600. 
18. Mr. Clayson is entitled to be repaid the $50,000 that he paid toward the Dairy 
Systems debt. There was an implied-in-fact contract between Defendants and Mr. Clayson that 
they would pay the Dairy Systems debt. 
19. On January 14, 2009, Mr. Zebe wrote an email to various recipients with the 
urgent request that it be put into the hands of Morris Farinella, the seller of the plant. In that 
email he stated "once we close we are prepared to absorb what we have paid in and most of what 
was done while Gaylen was in charge, i.e., electrical, plumbing, to the tune of 245k." 
20. Mr. Zebe testified that was a reference to the Dairy Systems debt. 
21. Defendants' conduct toward Dairy Systems after Mr. Clayson withdrew from the 
business further establishes that Defendants must have agreed with Mr. Clayson to pay the Dairy 
Systems debt. After having been given copies of the Dairy Systems invoices and having 
reviewed them, in numerous emailstoKlarkGaileyofDairySystems.Mr. Zebe discussed the 
work that had been done by Dairy Systems and plans to complete the work once funding had 
been obtained. 
22. In none of those emails did Mr. Zebe ever suggest that he would not pay the bill 
when the funding had been obtained nor even that he would be disputing the amount of the bill. 
On January 31, 2009, for instance, after asking for information about what work had been done, 
Mr. Zebe stated "I have noticed there is [sic] many parts lying around including wire on rolls, 
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conduit ets ... , I just want to be clear on what it is that has been done, and materials used. Would 
what is remaining be used for work to be completed?" Exhibit U. 
23. During a discussion with Klark Gailey of Dairy Systems about a lien that the 
manufacturer of the Motor Control Center, CEO, had threatelled to put on the Cheese Plant, Mr. 
Zebe never suggested that he would not be paying the Dairy Systems debt. 
24. In an email to Klark Gailey of Dairy Systems on February 19,2009, days before 
the funding was to be received, Mr. Zebe wrote a simple email to Klark Gailey stating that "Our 
funds are in the title companies account waiting for distribution. Once it records we will be 
funded." He then invited Mr. Gailey to verify the funds with the broker. Exhibit V. Without 
other explanation that email can only be interpreted by the creditor recipient that he is soon to be 
paid. 
25. Further evidencing their having agreed to pay the Dairy Systems debt, after the 
funding was obtained and there was no longer any threat that liens would impair the funding, Mr. 
Zebe wrote an email to Klark Gailey and for the first time stated that he would not pay the entire 
Dairy Systems debt but only that amount he could use. Mr. Zebe then stated "The amounts will 
be calculated and subtracted from the Fifty thousand that you have been paid, what is remaining 
is what will be paid." Exhibit W. He calculated that amount to be $62,333.55. Exhibit X. He 
never paid the $ 12,333.55 to Dairy Systems, and never paid the $50,000 to Mr. Clayson either. 
26. Those communications with Dairy Systems are consistent with an agreement with 
Mr. Clayson that Defendants would "absorb" the Dairy Systems debt and not with any other 
scenario. Therefore the Court finds that Defendants agreed to pay the Dairy Systems debt. 
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27. As to the amount that Defendants will be required as a part of this action to pay 
the Plaintiff toward the Dairy Systems debt, the Court is limiting the recovery to the $50,000 that 
Mr. Clayson actually paid. During the trial, the Plaintiff stipulated that there is pending in 
Wyoming an action involving Dairy Systems and the Plaintiff and Defendants in this case, and 
that in that matter, Dairy Systems has not, as yet, asserted a claim against Mr. Clayson. That 
being the case, the Court is limiting Mr. Clayson's recovery to the $50,000 he has actually paid 
since any claim beyond that amount has not yet accrued. 
28. Defendants introduced evidence of payments they made to suppliers who were 
owed money for goods and services they had supplied to the restaurant before the time when 
Defendants took over the running of the restaurant. Defendants testified that they paid those 
restaurant bills, not because of any agreement with Mr. Clayson but because those suppliers were 
important to the continued operation of the restaurant and they wanted to keep them happy. 
Defendants seek to offset those amounts against what they owe to Mr. Clayson. 
29. Such an offset cannot be allowed in this case. First, Defendants failed to show 
which of those debts were incurred when Mr. Clayson was running the restaurant versus the 
debts incurred when Mr. Farinella was running the restaurant before Mr. Clayson took over on 
July 1, 2008. Mr. Lawson's statement that he and Mr. Zebe expected to be reimbursed those 
costs upon the closing suggests that the debts may have belonged to Mr. Farinella. 
30. Additionally, Mr. Lawson testified that Defendants inherited from Mr. Clayson 
not only some debts but also some unquantified amount oLinventory. Without knowing the 
value of the inventory, the Court could not calculate whether or how much Defendants were 
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benefited or hurt by what they inherited from Mr. Clayson with regard to the restaurant. There is 
not sufficient evidence for the Court to allow any offset to the Defendants. 
3 I. Finally, the law does not allow a party who, without legal obligation to do so, 
voluntarily pays a debt to seek to recover the debt from the originally debtor. It is well settled 
that a person cannot-by way of set-off, counterclaim or direct action-recover money which he or 
she has voluntarily paid with full knowledge of all the facts, and without any fraud, duress or 
extortion, although no obligation to make such payment existed. Chinchurreta v. Evergreen 
Management, Inc., 790 P.2d 372, 374 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989). 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff has proven an implied-in-fact contract with the Defendants to pay him 
$ I 24, 108.00 in out of pocket expense reimbursement which includes the $74,108.00 shown on 
Exhibit F and the $50,000 he paid to Dairy Systems. Mr. Clayson is also entitled to recover 
$ I 2,600 for the time he spent preparing the Plant to reopen. Judgment will be entered in the 
amount of $ I 36,708.00 in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants. 
Dated this day of December, 2010. 
By the Court 
Honorable Stephen S. Dunn, District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
Register#CV -2009-2212-0C 






DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, and LAZE, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, and LAZE, LLC, ) 
) 




GA YLEN CLAYSON, ) 
) 
Counterclaim Defendant. ) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
This matter is before the Court for decision following a court trial, held on November 4, 
5, and 10, 2010. The Court has carefully considered the testimony and exhibits offered and 
admitted at trial, the deposition testimony of Morris Farinella, different portions of which were 
offered by the parties, and the parties' post-trial briefs and proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. Defendants' objection to portions of the Farinella deposition designated by 




the Plaintiff is overruled. The Court considers all of tile portions of the deposition designated by 
both parties to be relevant to the issues raised in this case. The Court notes that the Defendants' 
Counterclaim was dismissed prior to trial. The Court also notes that it had previously granted 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, in part, by order filed on September 15, 2010 
("MSJ Decision"), which is incorporated herein by reference, which order limited the issues to 
be tried. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In this case, the Court is charged both with the responsibility of deciding questions of law 
and questions of fact. Deciding the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to the 
testimony are matters exclusively within the province of the Court, as the trier of fact. Cornish v. 
Smith, 97 Idaho 89, 540 P.2d 274 (1975); Pierson v. Sewell, 97 Idaho 38, 539 P.2d 590 (1975). 
"When a case has been tried to a court, it is the province of the trial judge to weigh the 
conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of witnesses." Magic Valley 
Truck Brokers, Inc. v. Meyer, 133 Idaho 110, 114,982 P.2d 945,989 (Ct.App. 1999). 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court sets forth, in memorandum form, the facts that the Court finds most relevant to 
the legal issues to be determined. The facts stated here will constitute the Findings of Fact 
required by I.R.C.P. 52(a). For the most part, the facts are not in dispute. To the extent 
important facts are in dispute, the Court will indicate the basis for its factual determinations. 
Since 1975 the Star Valley Cheese Plant located in Thayne, Wyoming ("Plant") was 
owned by Morris Farinella ("Farinella"), apparently through a corporation. The Plant closed its 




operations in 2004 or 2005, and ultimately, Farinella's Plant corporation was in bankruptcy. 
Farinella was authorized by the bankruptcy court to receive and convey offers, or "bids" to 
purchase the Plant. Sometime in 2007, Farinella contacted the Plaintiff, Gaylen Clayson 
("Clayson"), to see if he was interested in buying the Plant. Clayson had some interest but was 
not available to do anything personally until sometime in 2008. In approximately February 
2008, Clayson made a "bid"\ to purchase the Plant for $800,000. Sometime in June 2008, 
Clayson2 had Farinella's permission to operate the restaurant which was adjacent to the Plant, 
and to clean up and make the Plant operational, as long as his efforts didn't cost Farinella or the 
bankruptcy court any money.3 Beginning July 1,2008, Clayson actually moved to and lived on 
the premises, where he operated the restaurant and began to clean up the Plant and make it 
operational. While Clayson did not yet own the Plant, he was authorized by Farinella to do what 
he was doing, the intent being that he would ultimately purchase the Plant. From that point, until 
October 8, 2008, Clayson put in considerable time and effort in running the restaurant and 
cleaning up the Plant,4 which included hiring various individuals and companies to paint, plaster 
and repair the floors, walls and exterior, and to perform plumbing and electrical services on Plant 
I The Court infers that this "bid" was not a fonnal offer to purchase, but was part of a process by which interest to 
purchase for certain amounts could be shown and "accepted" by the bankruptcy court, thus allowing the person 
making the accepted bid to do some authorized activities related to the Plant. 
2 Clayson has been a dairy fanner for 38 years in Firth, Idaho, and, at one point, sold milk to the Plant when it was 
operational. 
3 Farinella Depo., p. 40. This is also confirmed in part by Farinella's letter dated August 28,2008, included in the 
record as Farinella Deposition Ex. 5A. There is a conflict in the testimony as to whether Clayson had the authority 
to keep and use any funds from the restaurant business in excess of those needed for restaurant operations, including 
food, wages, employment taxes, workers compensation payments, etc. Farinella testified that Clayson had no 
authority to keep any funds personally, and Clayson testified he could keep any excess funds, and he created a bank 
account for that purpose. The Court need not resolve this conflict because it is not relevant to the issues to be 
decided here. 




equipment. 5 It is agreed that Defendants never personally requested or authorized any of the 
refurbishment work Clayson did or had done. One of the companies hired by Clayson was Dairy 
Systems Company, Inc. ("Dairy Systems"), a company who had provided various plumbing, 
electrical and maintenance services for Clayson at his dairy for many years. Dairy Systems 
provided certain services at the Plant and billed Clayson monthly. Clayson personally paid 
Dairy Systems $50,000.6 
Clayson testified to substantial additional refurbishment expenses. Plaintiffs Ex. F is a 
handwritten list of his claims, but was admitted only for the purpose of showing what Clayson 
claimed and not as proof of what was actually paid. Subparts A through V of Plaintiffs Ex. F 
are the supporting documents for Clayson's payments. Certain ofthose exhibits were stricken as 
lacking foundation of personal knowledge. The Court finds that Clayson made the following 
payments: Subpart A - $1872.00; Subpart B - $10,772.41; Subpart C - $0; Subpart D - $643.99; 
Subpart E - $0; Subpart F - $10,621.00; Subpart G - $379.14; Subpart H - $0; Subpart I -
$3887.02; Subpart J - $5100.06; Subpart K - $3532.00; Subpart L - $0; Subpart M - $0; Subpart 
N - $0; Subpart 0 - $0; Subpart P - $1738.00; Subpart Q - $0; Subpart R - $0; Subpart S - $0; 
Subpart T - $9100.00; Subpart U - $50,000.00, plus $308.61 (True Value charges). These 
payments total $97,954.23, including the $50,000 payment Clayson made to Dairy Systems. 
4 Clayson's undisputed testimony is that he worked 6 days a week, 10-12 hours per day, from July I to October 8. 
He testified that his opinion of the value of his personal labor is $15 per hour. 
5 All the work done or authorized by Clayson shall hereafter be referred to as the "refurbishment work." 
6 The testimony is that Clayson also gave Dairy Systems two unfunded checks, each for $50,000, telling Dairy 
Systems that Defendants would fund those checks at a later time. He also asserts that Defendants reviewed and 
agreed to fund those checks and to pay the entire Dairy Systems debt, totaling something in excess of $250,000 for 
services rendered prior to January 1, 2009 (plaintiffs Ex. G). However, per Court rulings prior to and during trial, 




At some point in late July, August and Septemper, 2008, Defendants, Don Zebe and Rick 
Lawson, 7 were introduced to Clayson by the mutual friend of all the parties, Jeff Randall 
("Randall"). It is undisputed that at the beginning Zebe, who was a real estate developer, was 
going to help Clayson prepare a business plan to assist in obtaining financing for the purchase of 
the Plant. Lawson, a certified public accountant, was initially involved in the accounting aspects 
of the business plan. At some point, but no later than late September by their own testimony, 
Defendants became interested in participating in the ownership of the Plant. 8 
On October 2, 2008, Clayson, Zebe and Lawson became members of a Wyoming limited 
liability company, SVC, LLC ("SVC"),9 with the expectation that they would jointly own and 
operate the Plant. However, by October 8, 2008, Clayson did not have any more money to put 
into the restaurant or the Plant, and could not pay the restaurant payroll due at that time. A 
conversation occurred between Clayson and Lawson. There is a minor conflict in the testimony, 
with Lawson testifying that Clayson called him and said he had no more money, that Defendants 
should take over the restaurant and Plant, and that Clayson "was through." Clayson's testimony 
is that he wanted Defendants to start paying the expenses of the facilities, including the payroll, 
the sole issue on the Dairy Systems debt is whether Defendants are required to reimburse Clayson the $50,000 he 
paid to Dairy Systems. Therefore, no further discussion is needed about the entire Dairy Systems debt. 
7 Collectively referred to as Defendants and individually referred to as "Zebe" and "Lawson". 
8 There is a significant dispute in the testimony as to when the Defendants' interest in the project became more 
involved. Clayson testified that it was almost immediately, or in mid-August, and Defendants testified that they did 
not become interested in ownership participation until late September. The Court need not resolve this conflict 
because it is not relevant. The question is whether Defendants ever agreed to reimburse Clayson's refurbishment 
expenses or whether it would be unjust to allow them to retain the benefits of those expenses. When they became 
interested in participating in the ownership of the plant is not pertinent to those questions. 
9 Plaintiff's Ex. J. At or about the same time these same parties, plus Randall, became involved in another limited 
liability company, Milk Management, LLC. However, that company was-not involved in the dispute over the 
refurbishment expenses. 




but that Lawson told him if Defendants were to do that Clayson was out of the business. 
Clayson admitted that he "relinquished" his continued participation in the business at that time. 
It is clear that from October 8 forward Clayson left the premises, had no further involvement in 
SVC, and did not do any further work on the Plant. The SVC articles were amended to delete 
Clayson as a member. Defendants took over the operation of the restaurant and physical 
possessIOn of the Plant, under essentially the same arrangement with Farinella that Clayson 
Shortly thereafter, on or about October 10, 2008, Clayson testified that Defendants 
agreed to reimburse him all his refurbishment expenses, which he estimated at somewhere 
between $100,000 and $150,000. Clayson asserts that he was told "when we get our funding we 
will reimburse for you're out of pocket expenses." Defendants adamantly deny that any such 
conversation took place. The Court will resolve this dispute below. 
On October 17, 2008, Clayson and Randall signed a formal offer to purchase the Plant 
from Star Valley Cheese, Inc., for $800,000. The conversations between the parties on that day 
10 Over the course of several weeks in October and November, 2008, Defendants paid some expenses related to 
restaurant operations which they testified had been incurred, but unpaid by Clayson, totaling $25,986.01. 
Defendants' Ex. IIA. Defendants also assert that they paid substantial additional expenses in the ensuing months, 
both related to restaurant operations and renovations, as well as Plant refurbishment. The total combined payments 
testified to by Defendants was $78,237.79. Defendants' Ex. II. Defendants testified to these payments to 
demonstrate that they had dealt with Clayson fairly, but they do not make any claim for reimbursement of these 
expenses and dismissed the Counterclaim that may have asserted such a claim. In addition, in an e-mail from Zebe 
to Pendleton and others dated January 14,2009, Zebe stated: "From October 8th we (Rick & I) have paid every 
invoice and bill that has been incurred with no regret. We have also paid over 35k ofbiIls Gaylen incurred. I know 
this is my issue and I accept that, my fault and my mistake ... Once we close we are prepared to absorb what we have 
paid in .... " Lawson also testified that it was advantageous enough to keep the restaurant open, that they decided to 
pay these bills, and that some of the bills were for inventory that was on the premises when they took it over. Thus, 
there would be no legal or factual basis for Defendants to seek reimbursement of these expenses. 




are significantly in dispute. After careful consideration, including evaluation of credibility and 
reconciliation of the testimony, the Court finds the following facts. 
At the urging of Randall, Defendants determined to make a formal offer to purchase the 
Plant for $800,000. On October 17, 2008, Randall was going to meet with Defendants to 
facilitate the offer. He picked up Clayson and the four of them met at the Plant. While Clayson 
may have had the intent to participate in the purchase, Defendants were surprised to see him. 
Zebe then had a telephone conversation with Val Pendleton, the realtor handling the sale, and 
they got into an argument over the sales commission. Zebe hung up and it appeared that no offer 
would be made. However, Randall encouraged Defendants to allow him to go to Pendleton to 
make an offer himself. Defendants agreed to that procedure if the agreement Randall signed 
included the language "and assigns" so the contract could be transferred to Defendants. 
Defendants also provided the $10,000 earnest money for the contract. Randall believed 
that he was going to be the only person to purchase the Plant that day but when he and Clayson 
arrived at Pendleton's the prepared contract had both Randall and Clayson listed as purchasers. 
Randall believed that this was because Clayson had prior conversations with Pendleton 
expressing an interest in purchasing. When Randall and Clayson returned with the signed 
contract, Zebe was upset because Clayson's name was on the contract and it did not contain the 
"assigns" language. I I Randall did not consider that a concern because he had signed the 
agreement with the intent to assign it to Defendants. Although Defendants did not intend to have 
Clayson be one of the purchasers of the Plant on October 17, the fact is that a contract for the 
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sale of the Plant occurred on that date with Clayson as one of the buyers. In fact, Zebe testified 
that he was upset enough when the contract was returned to him that he said if Clayson and 
Randall wanted to buy it they could. 
On November 4, 2008 another meeting took place between the parties, and including 
Randall, at Lawson's office in Pocatello, Idaho. It is uncontested that Clayson produced a list of 
expenses that he wanted to be reimbursed for l2 and stated that he was unwilling to sign an 
assignment of the sales contract to Defendants without that reimbursement. It is also agreed by 
all that Defendants refused to make those reimbursements, asserting that they had already paid 
many of Clayson's unpaid billsY Clayson ultimately signed an assignment of the sales contract 
without any agreement on that day that he would be reimbursed. 14 
The Court also finds the following material facts. At some point in October, Defendants 
had a conversation with Clayson where he requested reimbursement of his refurbishment 
expenses, among other things, and Zebe stated he would not pay any of those expenses without 
invoices or canceled checks and that they would pay for "the work that was done in the design" 
only if they could use that work in their design. IS 
II Plaintiffs Ex. D. 
12 It may have been Plaintiffs Ex. F, or some form thereof. 
13 Referring to Defendants' Ex. IIA. 
14 The assignment is Plaintiffs Ex. N. 
15 Zebe Depo., pp. 112-13. 




On January 14, 2009, in an e-mail to Pendleton (copied to Lawson), Zebe stated that 
"[ 0 ]nce we close we are prepared to absorb what we have paid in and most of what was done 
while Gaylen was in charge, i.e., electrical, plumbing, to the tune of $245k.,,16 
In the Business Plan submitted by Defendants to support a bank loan they received, 
Defendants stated: "The facility has and is undergoing cosmetic and physical renovations. To 
include but not limited to: an electrical retrofit of the plant, resurfacing floors, plastering of 
walls, cleaning, removal of old equipment, maintenance, repairs and painting. Ninety percent of 
the electrical retrofit has been completed at a cost of $225,000 which has been paid by the 
principles of SVC, LLC ... The current restaurant business has been profitable to date, however, 
the facility is old and out dated. The structure is sound. However, an exterior and interior 
upgrade would benefit the overall appearance and value of the facility."l? 
In an e-mail from Zebe to Dairy Systems dated February 19, 2009 (copied to Lawson), 
Zebe stated: "Our funds are in the title companies [sic] account waiting for distribution. Once it 
records we will be funded.,,18 The Court infers from this that Defendants were stating an intent 
to pay Dairy Systems at least some amount. 
In an e-mail from Zebe to Dairy Systems dated February 25, 2009 (copied to Lawson), 
Zebe stated: "The long and short of it is this, we will pay for work that is accepted. We will pay 
16 Plaintiff's Ex. s. 
17 Plaintiff's Ex. I, p. 5. Zebe acknowledged that this business plan was submitted to the bank after Clayson was no 
longer a member of SVC. Thus, the statements contained herein are those ofthe Defendants. Zebe admitted that the 
statement relating to having made the payments already was a misrepresentation to the bank. 
IS Plaintiff's Ex. V. 




for material used only ... amounts will be calculated and subtracted from the Fifty thousand 
that you have been paid, what is remaining is what will be paid.,,19 
In an e-mail from Zebe to Dairy Systems dated March 7, 2009 (copied to Lawson), where 
Zebe identified Defendants' assessment of the Dairy Systems work they found acceptable, Zebe 
stated: "I have attached my calculations for materials used, hours worked, expenses. This is all 1 
can justify and this is what will be paid. You received $50,000.00 from Gaylen and our amount 
total is $62,333.55. We will have a check for you Monday in the amount of $12,335.55 for that 
final and absolute payment.,,20 Dairy Systems rejected this compromise and no additional 
payment was made. 
On February 24,2009, Defendants formally closed on the purchase of the Plant and have 
d ·· h . 21 owne It smce t at tIme. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The legal issues to be resolved in this case are whether the facts support the conclusion 
that Clayson is entitled to reimbursement of the refurbishment expenses from Defendants, based 
on an implied contract in fact (quantum meruit) and/or an implied contract at law (unjust 
enrichment).22 The Idaho Court of Appeals has stated: 
There are essentially three types of contractual arrangements: express contracts, implied-
in-fact contracts and contracts implied-in-Iaw. Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. 
Chandler Supply Co., 95 Idaho 739, 743, 518 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1974); Podolan v. Idaho 
Legal Aid Services, Inc., 123 Idaho 937, 942, 854 P.2d 280, 285 (Ct.App.l993). Express 
contracts exist where the parties expressly agree regarding a transaction. Id. Contracts 
19 Plaintiff's Ex. W. 
20 Plaintiff's Ex. X. 
21 Zebe testified that Laze, LLC owns the Plant and SVC, LLC is the operating entity. 
22 See MSJ Decision. 




implied-in-fact are those where there is no express agreement but the conduct of the 
parties implies an agreement from which the contractual obligation arises. Id. To find 
such a contract, the facts must be such that the intent to make a contract may be fairly 
inferred. Podolan, supra. 
Baker v. Boren, 129 Idaho 885, 890-91, 934 P.2d 951, 956-57 (Ct.App.1997). 
As to an implied-in-fact contract, the Idaho Supreme Court has also stated: 
'An implied in fact contract is defined as one where the terms and existence of the 
contract are manifested by the conduct of the parties with the request of one party and the 
performance by the other often being inferred from the circumstances attending the 
performance.' Farnworth v. Femling, 125 Idaho 283, 287, 869 P.2d 1378, 1382 (1994) 
(citing Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 153,408 P.2d 810, 815 (1965)). The implied-
in-fact contract is grounded in the parties' agreement and tacit understanding. Kennedy v. 
Forest, 129 Idaho 584, 587, 930 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1997). 'The general rule is that where 
the conduct of the parties allows the dual inferences that one performed at the other's 
request and that the requesting party promised payment, then the court may find a 
contract implied in fact.' Homes by Bell-Hi, Inc. v. Wood, 110 Idaho 319, 321, 715 P.2d 
989, 991 (1986) (citing Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 153, 408 P.2d 810, 815 
(1965); Bastian v. Gafford, 98 Idaho 324, 325, 563 P.2d 48, 49 (1977)). 
Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 708, 52 P.3d 848, 853 (2002). As to the 
remedy for an implied-in-fact contract, the Idaho Supreme Court has declared: 
The doctrine of quantum meruit is a remedy for an implied-in-fact contract and permits a 
party to recover the reasonable value of services rendered or material provided on the 
basis of an implied promise to pay. See Cheung v. Pena, 143 Idaho 30, 35,137 P.3d 417, 
422 (2006). 
Gray v. Tri-Way Const. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378, 387, 210 P.3d 63, 72 (2009). Defendants 
focus on this additional statement from Gray: "The general rule is that where the conduct of the 
parties allows the dual inferences that one performed at the other's request and that the 
requesting party promised payment, then the court may find a contract implied in fact." Id. 
Defendants contend that because Clayson stipulated to and the evidence showed that Defendants 




did not, at any time prior to October 8, 2008, agree to, authorize, or direct Clayson to perform 
any refurbishment services, they cannot be held responsible to reimburse him for them. They 
assert that any implied promise to pay must be made "in advance" of the services rendered. 
While this is a true statement in the right context, it misses the mark in terms of the 
evidence in this case. The Court is not finding a contract implied in fact based on Defendants' 
promise to pay Clayson for refurbishment expenses before they were incurred. The Court finds 
that an implied-in-fact contract exists because Defendants conduct and statements create an 
implied agreement to pay Clayson's refurbishment expenses when he transferred operation of the 
Plant and restaurant to Defendants on October 8, 2008. Zebe's own statement, in response to a 
question about whether he had agreed to reimburse Clayson's debts and out-of-pocket expenses, 
arising out of a conversation with Clayson at or shortly afterOctober 8, 2008, was: "And again, 
I answered that question by saying we wanted invoices to prove that the work had been done. 
Okay ... And without invoices, without canceled checks, we were not going to reimburse him a 
dime. And the other stipulation was, again, is that if we would use the work that was done in the 
design that we were going to design, we would pay for those expenses.,,23 
Although Defendants refused to confirm this agreement at the meeting on November 4, 
2008, Zebe did confirm this implied agreement, including the agreement to pay that part of the 
Dairy Systems bill Defendants felt they could use, with his statements on multiple other 
occasions.24 While Defendants denied Clayson's testimony that they agreed to reimburse him in 
23 Zebe Depo., pp. 112-13. 
24 See facts stated on pp. 8-10, irifra. 




a conversation on October 10, 2008, the Court finds Zebe's deposition testimony more credible, 
particularly in light of admissions made in later statements. 
As to an implied-in-Iaw contract, claiming unjust enrichment, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has stated: 
Unjust enrichment, or restitution, is the measure of recovery under a contract implied in 
law. Barry v. Pacific West Canst., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004). 
"A contract implied in law ... 'is not a contract at all, but an obligation imposed by law 
for the purpose of bringing about justice and equity without reference to the intent of the 
agreement of the parties ... .' " Id The measure of recovery on an unjust enrichment claim 
"is not the actual amount of the enrichment, but the amount of enrichment which, as 
between two parties it would be unjust for one party to retain." Beco Constr. Co., Inc. v. 
Bannock Paving Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 463, 466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990). The plaintiff 
has the burden of proving that the defendant received.~ benefit and of proving the amount 
of the benefit which the defendants unjustly retained. Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho 
1012,1017,829 P.2d 1361, 1366 (Ct.App.l992). "The value of services rendered can be 
used as evidence of the value of the benefit bestowed under the theory of unjust 
enrichment." Id "Although damages need not be proven with mathematical precision, the 
damages, i.e., the value of any benefit unjustly received by the defendant in an action 
based upon unjust enrichment, must be proven to a reasonable certainty." Gillette v. 
Storm Circle Ranch, 101 Idaho 663, 667, 619 P .2d 1116, 1120 (1980). 
Gray v. Tri-Way Canst. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378, 388-89, 210 P.3d 63,73-74 (2009). 
Applying this legal standard to the facts found above, the Court concludes that the 
Defendants benefited from Clayson's refurbishment efforts and expenses. When they took over 
the Plant and restaurant on October 8, 2008, they received a Plant and restaurant that was better 
than it had been before Clayson's efforts and expenses. Defendants admitted that these efforts 
improved the Plant and restaurant in their business plan. They clearly accepted those benefits. 
Even as to the Dairy Systems bill, which Defendants claim did not benefit them to the full extent 




of the bill, they admit that the value they received exceeds the $50,000.00 Clayson paid?5 
Defendants are free to assert, in other litigation, that they did not agree to payor receive a benefit 
in excess of $62,333.55. But as between Clayson and Defendants they have agreed that they 
received at least a $50,000.00 benefit, for which they must reimburse Clayson. Based on 
Defendants statements and the benefits Defendants received, the Court finds that an implied-in-
law contract exists. Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court renders the following 
Conclusions of Law. 
1. The conduct of the parties creates a contract-in-fact whereby Defendants agreed to 
reimburse Plaintiff for the expenses shown to have been incurred in refurbishing the Plant. 
2. The conduct of the parties also creates an implied-in-Iaw contract whereby Defendants 
are obligated to reimburse Plaintiff for benefits they received in his refurbishment efforts. 
3. Defendants are obligated to reimburse Plaintiff for the $50,000.00 he paid to Dairy 
Systems for work done on the Plant. Defendants both impliedly agreed to reimburse that amount 
to Clayson and admitted that they received a benefit of that work in excess of the $50,000.00. 
4. As to additional refurbishment expenses, claimed in Subparts A through V of 
Plaintiffs Exhibit F, the Court concludes that Clayson's expenses to attend the Idaho Milk 
Producers conference (Subpart D) are not legitimate refurbishment expenses and are not allowed. 
All other refurbishment expenses supported by documentation, listed by the Court above, are 
legitimate, reflect the benefit Defendants received, and Defendants are obligated to reimburse 
Plaintiff for those amounts, totaling $47,310.24. 
25 Plaintiffs Ex. X. 






5. While the Court accepts the fact that Clayson did work many hours at the restaurant 
and Plant from July 1 through October 8, 2008, the evidence is insufficient to establish how 
many hours Clayson worked in operating the restaurant as opposed to working on refurbishment 
of the Plant. In the Court's view, only the latter hours would be compensable, but there is no 
evidence from which the Court can infer that number. To the extent Clayson spent time 
operating the restaurant, he was receiving the benefit of any net income of that operation and 
those hours did not go to improving or refurbishing the restaurant or the Plant. The Court can 
infer from Clayson's testimony that much of the refurbishment efforts were undertaken by 
employees and contractors, who were supervised by Clayson. While his supervision time would 
have been compensable if proven, unless also duplicated by hours he spent running the 
restaurant, the evidence is insufficient to determine how much time was spent supervising Plant 
refurbishment. The burden of proof on this issue is Plaintiffs,z6 His compensable time must be 
shown with reasonable certainty. That has not occurred, and damages based on conjecture or 
speculation are not allowed. Therefore, based on a lack of sufficient evidence, the Court declines 
to award any amounts for time spent. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds in favor of Plaintiff and awards damages totaling 
$97,310.94. A Judgment is entered contemporaneously herewith. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
26 Horner v. Sani-Top, Inc., J43 Idaho 230, 237, J41 P.3d 1099. 1107 (2006). 
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CASE NO. CV-2009-0002212-0C 
DEFENSE MEMORANDUM ON 
DAMAGE CLAIM 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this Memorandum is to provide briefing and evaluation of the equitable basis, 
if any, for a claim by Plaintiff asserting damages for the entire Dairy Systems' bilI beyond the 
$50,000 payment he made on September 16, 2008. To the extent that this Memorandum cites to or 
discusses equitable theories beyond the implied-in-fact and implied-in-Iaw/unjust enrichment claims 
which are at issue in this litigation, this Memorandum should not be considered express or implied 
consent or acquiescence by the Defendants for Plaintiff to expand his theories of recovery. 
DISCUSSION OF RELEVANT LAW 
A. PERl1NENT FACTS 
Mr. Clayson stipulated that there is no legal claim by Dairy Systems against Clayson to 
recover itts daim for work performed and materials provided at the Star Valley Cheese Plant in 2008 
- -
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and 2009. Dairy Systems did not bill Clayson, it billed "Star Valley Cheese." Dairy Systems is 
pursuing the Defendants to recover its claim, not Clayson, in the lawsuit it filed in Wyoming. 
B. PLAINTIFF CAN ONLY RECOVER TO THE EXTENT HE HAS PAID THE DAIRY 
SYSTEMS DEBT 
Even under equitable theories, Clayson can only recover from Defendants what he paid. In 
a scenario somewhat analogous to this case, where one pays the debt of another, that party may seek 
recovery from the party that benefitted under the equitable theory of subrogation. The Idaho 
Supreme Court explained the equitable remedy of subrogation I in Williams v. Johnston, 92 Idaho 
292, 298 (Idaho 1968): 
" Its principle is often extended to those who, because of their interest in 
the property on which debts of others are a charge, are entitled to pay such debts and 
be substituted to the place of the original creditor. Generally speflking it is only in 
cases where one advances money to JIIlY the debt of another to protect his own 
rigIILs that a court of equity substitutes him in place of the creditor as a matter of 
course, without any express agreement to that effect. The doctrine of subrogation is 
not administered as a legal right but the principle is applied to subserve the ends of 
justice and to do equity." [quoting Houghtelin v. Diehl, 47 Idaho 636, 277 P. 699 
(1929)] (emphasis supplied) 
The equitable remedy of subrogation is not available to a party2 who has not paid the debt 
of the party against whom it seeks recovery for the payment. In fact, subrogation is not available 
to a party who has not discharged the entire debt. Restat 1st of Restitution, § 162 provides: 
1975) 
c. Where obligation not fully discharged. Where property of one person is used in 
partially discharging an obligation owed by another, and the balance of the 
ISee also May Trucking Co. v. International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 319,321 (Idaho 
2Subrogation is also not available to a party who had no obligation to payor had no 
interest to. protect by paying. A person who was only a volunteer cannot invoke the aid of 
subrogation. 
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obligation has not been discharged, the former is not entitled to be subrogated to the 
position of the obligee. Until the obligation is fully discharged, the obligee is himself 
entitled to enforce the balance of his claim, and the person whose property has been 
used in discharging only a part of the claim is not entitled to occupy his position. If 
the balance of the claim is subsequently discharged by the obligor, however, the 
person whose property was used in discharging a part of the obligation is entitled 
then to be subrogated to the claim to the extent that his property was used in 
discharging the claim. 
See also Labella Winnetka, Inc. v. General Cas. Ins. Co., 259 F.R.D. 143, 147 (N.D. Ill. 2009) 
(Equitable subrogation implicates a body of equitable principles, which include a requirement 
that "the claim or debt under which the subrogee asserts his rights [be] paid in full.") 
There is no equitable remedy which would allow Clayson to recover for a liability he has 
not paid. His only payment to Dairy Systems was a $50,000 payment on September 16, 2008 
from his personal account and he is limited to attempting to recover the $50,000 from the 
Defendants. 
C UNJUST ENRICHMENT IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR HYPOTHETICAL FUTURE 
LIABILITIES 
The equitable remedy of unjust enrichment does not protect against hypothetical future 
liabilities: 
The elements for unjust enrichment are that the defendant was enriched, 
that such enrichment was at the plaintiffs expense and that the circumstances 
were such that in equity and good conscience the defendant should return the 
money or property to the plaintiff Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 
830 F. Supp. 204, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)~ see also Bank of America, N.A. v. 
Moyer, 18 V.I. 220,224 (Terr. Ct. 1982). Hyatt has not alleged that Skopbank has 
been enriched at Hyatt's expense. Hyatt simply alleges that ifit should be awarded 
judgment against 35 Acres, then Skopbank and GGF will be unjustly enriched 
"when the shell entity 35 Acres is left insolvent and unable to satisfY a judgment 
rendered in favor of Hyatt. " However, no claim of unjust enrichment lies for 
"hypothetical future liabilities." Axel Johnson, 830 F. Supp. at 211-12. 
Gov'tGuar. Fund of Fin. v. Hyatt Corp., 955 F. Supp. 441, 460 (D.V.I. 1997) 
To salvage the claim, Andersen articulates an entirely different version of 
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the claim in its memoranda oflaw, basing the allegation on the "possibility" of 
Johnson obtaining a judgment against Andersen in the future, rather than on the 
past occurrence of Johnson's purchase ofITI stock. Andersen's present argument 
is that if it were to be forced to pay damages to Johnson, then the third party 
defendants -- who are the real wrongdoers and accordingly should be the ones 
paying damages -- would be unjustly enriched. 
As a preliminary matter, such a claim, even if valid, is not alleged in the 
complaint. However, even if this version had been properly pleaded, no cause of 
action for unjust enrichment lies for hypothetical future liabilities. 
Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 830 F. Supp. 204,211-212 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 
Dairy Systems has not attempted to hold Clayson liable to date for a debt incurred by Star 
Valley Cheese in 2008. Dairy Systems has sued the Defendants for that debt. Clayson's liability 
is, at best, a ~'hypothetical future liability" for which no action for unjust enrichment lies. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no equitable remedy for an obligation which the Plaintiffhas not paid. There is, 
therefore, no basis for Clayson to assert damages for the entire Dairy Systems bill. The 
Defendants respectfully request that this Court deny Clayson's claim for any amount related to 
the Dairy Systems debt which exceeds the $50,000 payment he actually made on September 16, 
2008. 
DATED this 6th day of November, 2010. 
COOPER & LARSEN 
/s/ Gary L. Cooper 
GARY L. COOPER 
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PLANTIFF'S TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
REGARDING THE ADMISSmllJTY OF 
EVIDENCE TBA T DEFENDANTS 
ASSUMED OR RATIFIED CLAYSON'S 
ENTIRE BILL TO DAIRY SYSTEMS 
COMPANY 
Case No: CV-2009-02212-0C 
Judge: Stephen S. Dunn 
Historically there were two courts. Courts of law and courts of equity. Rules were 
developed in the law courts to prevent the skullduggery that unfortunately is often the nature and 
disposition of people in their dealings with one another. These concerns give rise to such legal 
principles as the statute of frauds that precludes legal enforcement of certain classes of contracts 
unless the contract is in writing. But when the facts of the case demonstrate that such legal 
principles are being used unscrupulously in order to promote injustice, another court, a court of 
equity, would step in and provide a remedy so that justice might be done against the clever use of 
legal principles. Thus, familiar equitable maxims such as "the Statute of Frauds cannot be used 
to perpetrate a fraud." 
Today, in Idaho, as in most jurisdictions, the courts of law and the courts of equity have 
been joined in a single court, but equity still has the power to prevent skullduggery and clever 
use of the law to injure others. The equitable jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked in this 
case because this is one of those instances where, if the equitable jurisdiction of the Court is not 
brought to bear, the Defendants' clever use of legal principles will result in great injustice to 
Plaintiff Gaylen Clayson and to people with whom he dealt who still believe that a man's word is 
his bond, and that a handshake should still be honored. 
Mr. Zebe testified that in his view, promises don't mean anything in real estate unless 
they are in writing and if Gaylen Clayson does not know that he is stupid. If equity cannot be 
relied upon in this case to enforce these Defendants' oral agreement to reimburse Plaintiff for his 
out of pocket expenses in refurbishing the Cheese Plant and to pay the workmen who, based on 
20 years of trust, went to work for him to get theplant~going as quickly as possible so he would 
2 
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have a home for his milk, knowing that he was an honest man who would see that they were 
paid, then equity has lost its ability to serve the purpose for which it was born. 
Under the facts of this case, a court of equity cannot allow these Defendants to not pay 
the Dairy Systems debt they promised Clayson they would pay. Not only do the facts in 
evidence, and the facts proffered by the Plaintiff, clearly establish the dual inferences required in 
a court of equity to enforce a contract implied in fact, i.e., the existence and terms of a contract to 
pay Dairy Systems, Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 52 P. 3d 848, 853 (2002), 
these Defendants misrepresented to a Federally insured Idaho Bank and to the United States 
Department of Agriculture that they had paid Dairy Systems for 90% of the electrical retrofit in 
the amount of $225,000. Exhibit I, page 6. Defendants now admit that was an outright 
misrepresentation to the banks, and the evidence is clear that neither Mr. Zebe nor Mr. Lawson 
has paid a nickel to Dairy Systems. That Mr. Clayson's $50,000 check of September 16, 2008, 
was the only money that had been paid to Dairy Systems and Defendants are now trying to deny 
authorizing the other two $50,000 checks that were delivered to Dairy Systems on their behalf. 
But having made that representation and having benefited greatly by having induced Citizens 
Community Bank of Idaho and the United States Department of Agriculture to loan them $2 
Million on the basis of this fraudulent representation, Defendants cannot be allowed in a court of 
equity to walk away from the obligation underlying this fraud, i.e., the payment of Dairy 
Systems. 
Defendants conduct with regard to their agreement to pay the Dairy Systems debt has 
been "dishonest, [and] fraudulent and deceitful as to the controversy in issue." See, Ada County 
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Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 370, 179 P.3d 323, 
333 (2008), and a court of equity is not without power to now enforce the agreement they made 
that is consistent with their fraudulent conduct. l The Defendants are willing to lie regarding this 
obligation at the expense of Gaylen Clayson, Dairy Systems, Citizens Community Bank of Idaho 
and the United States Department of Agriculture. Defendants cannot be allowed to profit from a 
misrepresentation that they have paid the debt and now avoid the obligation. 
I. WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS ASSUMED OR RATIFIED CLAYSON'S 
OBLIGATION TO DAIRY SYSTEMS COMPANY BAS ALWAYS BEEN AN 
ISSUE IN THIS CASE. 
The Complaint in this case alleged that Defendants had assumed Clayson's obligation to 
Dairy Systems. 
12. Defendants later offered to buyout Plaintiff's partnership interest for 
reimbursement of his out of pocket expenses, assumption of the debt he incurred 
in refurbishing The Plant, including the debt to Dairy Systems and payment of 
$500,000.00 in cash. As part of this agreement, Defendants also agreed to take all 
of Plaintiffs milk supply at class 3 prices, FOB the dairy. 
13. Because Plaintiff s real interests lie in the dairy industry, Plaintiff agreed 
to this buyout arrangement. Pursuant to the agreement, Plaintiff transferred to 
Defendants his interest in the contract with Farinella and facilitated the purchase 
of Morris Farinella's interest by the Defendants. 
14. Defendants have failed and refused to reimburse Plaintiff s out of pocket 
expenses, have failed and refused to assume the debt to Dairy Systems, and have 
been unable or unwilling to take Plaintiff s production of milk as promised. 
See, Amended Complaint on file with the Court, paragraphs 12-14. 
In its memorandum decision, this court carved out this obligation as one of the 
equitable claims that were allowed to go forward in this case: 
1 While the Ada County case involved the equitable doctrine of clean hands that is typically used as a shield, it 
nonetheless illustrates the concept that a court in equity should not bend over backwards to help a party avoid 
liability for a debt they fraudulently represented to the bank they had paid! 
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the trier- of fact could reasonably infer that Zebe, on behalf of SVC, LLC, had 
agreed to assume some of the debts owed by Clayson, and it is reasonably 
possible that Clayson assigned his rights over to the Defendants to purchase the 
Plant in reliance of these payments or assumptions of debt, or that a separate 
implied-in-fact agreement had been entered into where SVC, LLC agreed to make 
such payments. When Zebe stated an agreement to pay for "most of what was 
done while Gaylen was in charge ... to the tune of 245K" or to pay the Dairy 
Systems debt . . . a question of fact arises as to the extent of that obligation, 
whether pursuant to an implied-in-fact contract or by way of unjust enrichment. 
What the nature of the agreement was, how much was agreed to be paid, and for 
what, are questions the jury must decide. (emphasis added). 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 21. 
II. GA YLEN CLAYSON HAS THE LEGAL OBLIGATION TO CAUSE DAIRY 
SYSTEMS TO BE PAID. 
Under the facts in this case, Gaylen Clayson clearly has a contractual obligation to pay 
Dairy Systems for the work they performed at the Star Valley Cheese Plant. He had a long term 
relationship with Dairy Systems under which he would call upon them for service, they would 
provide services to him and bill him monthly for the services performed, and he would pay. If he 
questioned any of their charges he would bring it up, they would discuss it and it would be either 
adjusted or not and he would pay. 
In this case, Mr. Clayson called upon Dairy Systems to perform work at the plant. They 
performed that work. As was their usual and customary practice, they billed him for the work on 
a monthly basis. Mr. Clayson received the bills, and even discussed them with Dairy Systems 
and raised no objections. Those facts support not only a contract, but an account stated. When a 
statement shows on its face that it is intended to be a final settlement up to date, assent to that 
account rendered is implied from a failure to object to the billing within a reasonable period of 
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time. This conduct transforms the account into an account stated. Argonaut Insurance 
Companies v. Tri-west Construction company, 107 Idaho 643, 691 P. 2d 1258 (Idaho 1984). 
Mr. Clayson not only has the obligation to pay, but at this late date, having had the bills, 
having watched the work be performed, having been in control of the premises and able to have 
the work inspected as he saw fit, and with all this knowledge having not raised any question to 
the bills, the bills are an account stated and he is obligated to pay them as they stand. Id. 
Moreover, Mr. Clayson will be under that legal obligation until Dairy Systems is paid or 
the statute of limitations has run. The pendency of an action in Wyoming in which Dairy 
Systems is attempting to get paid by Defendants does not change this analysis. The Wyoming 
case at this point is completely irrelevant. The fact that Dairy Systems has not asserted a claim 
against him yet is irrelevant. The statute of limitations on this account stated is six years. If 
Dairy Systems should get thrown out of court in Wyoming, or if Dairy Systems should obtain a 
judgment in Wyoming and Defendants file bankruptcy or otherwise fail to pay, Dairy Systems 
will still have a claim it can pursue against Mr. Clayson. There is no evidence that Dairy 
Systems has made any agreement not to pursue Mr. Clayson if Defendants do not pay. In fact, 
Mr. Clayson testified that he was anxious to have Defendants pay Dairy Systems because 
otherwise he is "on the hook." When two courts have concurrent jurisdiction over an issue, the 
pendency of proceedings in one court can be no affect on the other court until one court reaches a 
final judgment. Erwin v. State, Dept. of Family Services, 237 P.3d 409, 412 (Wyo. 2010) 
(Emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). Res judicata bars the relitigation of previously 
litigated claims or causes of action. Erwin, 237 P.3d at 412 (Emphasis added) (internal citation 
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omitted). Here, there has been no adjudication of any issues in the Wyoming court, and there is 
no final judgment in that court. 
There is no quasi-estoppel or judicial estoppel applicable to the facts of this case . 
... doctrine of quasi-estoppel applies when: (1) the offending party took a different 
position than his or her original position, and (2) either (a) the offending party 
gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other 
party was induced to change positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to 
permit the offending party to maintain an inconsistent position from one he or she 
has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in. 
Terrazas v. Blaine County, 147 Idaho 193,200 (Idaho 2009). 
In this case, Clayson has not taken a position different in this case than the position he 
has taken in Wyoming. In both cases, Clayson takes the position that he contracted with Dairy 
Systems to perform the refurbishment work on the Cheese Plant and that Defendants agreed with 
him that in exchange for relinquishing his interest in the plant and the limited liability company 
that was set up by the parties to refurbish and run the plant, that the Defendants would, among 
other thin~~ assume that Dairy Systems obligation. Nor is there any evidence that Defendants 
were disadvantaged, were induced to change positions, or that it would be unconscionable for 
Clayson to continue to pursue Defendants for their failure to pay Dairy Systems. 
Judicial estoppel is even more remote. Before judicial estoppel is applicable, a party 
must, in a prior proceeding "obtain a judgment, advantage, or consideration from one party ... " 
Indian Springs, LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv .• LLC, 147 Idaho 737, 748 (2009). Defendants' 
third party complaint in the Wyoming case was filed after this action and has not come to 
judgment. Moreover, even after judgment in the prior proceeding, judicial estoppel only 
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prevents a party from taking a position contrary to the position taken in the prior proceeding in 
"sworn statements." In this case, Clayson is taking the same position in this case as he took in 
the "subsequently" filed third party complaint in Wyoming-namely that he contracted with 
Dairy Systems to confer a benefit on himself and his partners Don Zebe and Rick Lawson which 
they agreed to satisfy when he agreed to relinquish his interest in the plant and the limited 
liability company set up by the parties to refurbish and run the plant. There simply is no 
rationale by which this Court can or should defer to proceedings that are merely pending in 
Wyoming. 
ill. GAYLEN CLAYSON'S MORAL OBLIGATION TO PAY DAIRY SYSTEMS IS 
SUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION TO SUPPORT DEFENDANTS' AGREEMENT 
TO PAY DAIRY SYSTEMS ON HIS BEHALF. 
A moral obligation, even though legally unenforceable, is sufficient consideration to 
support creation of a binding contract. Homefinders v. Lawrence, 80 Idaho 543, 549, 335 P.2d 
893, 897 (1959); Woods v. Locke, 49 Id. 486, 289 P. 610, 612 (1930). Gaylen Clayson, 
promised Dairy Systems that they would be paid if they would drop everything, go to a remote 
location in Wyoming, and, in rapid fire, bring a cheese plant that had been in moth balls for two 
and a half years back online. It seems obvious that those facts created a legally binding 
contract-especially where neither party to the contract are disputing its existence. If that did 
not create a legal obligation on Mr. Clayson's part to Dairy Systems, it at least created a moral 
obligation to see that they were paid for their work. 
In determining whether there is a contract implied in law, the court needs to examine 
whether the terms and existence of the contract are manifested by the conduct of the parties. Fox 
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V. Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 708, 52 P.3d 848, 853. The facts and 
circumstances in this case clearly support the inference that the Defendants agreed to assume or 
ratify all of Clayson's debt to Dairy Systems and not just the $50,000 check that Clayson funded. 
Clayson testified that he was "on the hook" to Dairy Systems and Defendants agreed to 
pay that and the other debts he had incurred in the refurbishment of the plant. Defendants, in 
their Business Plan, represented to banks and the United States Department of Agriculture that 
they had paid Dairy Systems for 90 percent of electrical retrofit in the amount of $225,000. 
Exhibit I at p. 6. They further represented to third parties that, upon closing, they would absorb 
Dairy System's debt of$245K. Exhibit S. 
Contrary to his testimony on cross-examination that he informed contractors hired by 
Clayson that be did not know how they would be paid, Mr. Zebe told Dairy Systems that they 
would be paid upon closing as suggested by Plaintiff's Exhibit V, which clearly appears to be 
assurance to a legitimate creditor, that the money is in and is about to be paid. These facts raise 
an inference that there was a contract by Defendants to pay Dairy Systems, and upon closing 
they would pay Dairy Systems in full, thus fulfilling Gaylen Clayson's legal and/or moral 
obligations to Dairy Systems. 
IV. IF THE COURT RULES THAT GAYLEN CLAYSON HAS A RIGHT TO 
ENFORCE DEFENDANTS' AGREEMENT TO PAY DAIRY SYSTEMS 
THERE IS STILL NO NEED FOR FURTHER EVIDENCE ON THE AMOUNT 
OWING TO DAIRY SYSTEMS BEYOND THE EVIDENCE CONTAINED IN 
PLAINTIFF'S EXnmIT L. 
In his emails to Klark Gailey, ExhibitsW and X, Mr. Zebe clearly ratifies the contract 
between Dairy Systems and Gaylen Clayson. He makes reference to the $50,000 Clayson paid 
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Dairy Systems and states that Dairy Systems must deduct that amount from the amount they are 
owed, a clear reference to the Clayson contract and a clear adoption of a benefit from that 
contract. The only problem is, Defendants want to ratify the contract as to the parts they like, but 
not as to the parts they don't. Similarly, Mr. Zebe admitted that when they decided not to pay 
Dairy Systems, they did not rip out the wires Dairy Systems had installed. They kept the 
components they liked and those components installed by Dairy Systems are still working in 
their plant to this day. 
Thus Defendant have ratified the Dairy Systems contract, but are attempting to have that 
ratification apply only to the extent of "work we can use." A court of equity should reject the 
notion that Defendants were free to pick and choose what parts of the Dairy Systems contract 
they would not reimburse. A party cannot ratify only a part of an agreement. Honesty and fair 
dealing require him to stand by the contract "in toto." Henry Gold Mining Co v. Henry, 25 
Idaho 333, 137 P. 523 (Id. 1913). 
Dairy Systems provided Mr. Clayson and the Defendants with monthly statements setting 
out the amount of their bill, Mr. Clayson never objected to the bills, and six months went by, 
with ongoing discussions about Dairy Systems finishing the work and Defendants manifesting 
their intent to make payment once their funding was available. During that entire time, 
Defendants did not make any objection to the Dairy Systems bills. In fact, $150,000 in payments 
was made during that period, although only $50,000 of the payment cleared the bank. A party 
. 
can ratify a contract by remaining silent about the matter for several months after full knowledge 
of all the facts. Henry Gold Mining Co v. Henry, 25 Idaho 333, 137 P. 523 (Id. 1913). Here, 
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defendants had the bills from Dairy Systems for several months during which time they had 
complete control of the premises and could and did inspect the work Dairy Systems had done. 
Mr. Zebe testified that he hired William Sulzer and lP Electric, two of Defendants' designated 
experts, to examine the plant to determine what it would take to finish the work started by Dairy 
Systems. That work was done prior to the January 14,2009 email to Morris Farinella, Exhibit S, 
in which Defendants stated their intention to absorb the Dairy Systems bill upon closing, and 
before Mr. Zebe's assurance email to Klark Gailey that funding was imminent on February 19, 
2009. Exhibit V. Yet Mr. Zebe testified that to that point he had not objected to the Dairy 
Systems bills, but had only asked for information about the work that had been done because "I 
just want to be clear on what it is that has been done ... " Exhibit U. An objection to an 
account rendered must be "more than a mental operation on the part of the person receiving the 
account, and must be made to the party rendering the account." Argonaut Insurance Companies 
v. Tri-West Construction Company, 107 Idaho 643,646,691 P. 2d 1258, 1261 (1984). 
Because it would not be equitable for the Court to allow Defendants under the 
circumstances of this case to pay only for the parts of the contract that "they can use," and 
because Defendants went months without raising any question about the bills, repeatedly 
reaffirmed the fact that they would pay once they obtained their funding, all the while having the 
ability to examine Dairy Systems' work, they should not now be allowed to question the amount 
of the Dairy System bills, therefore the evidence that Defendants would put on relating to what 
they deem the value of Dairy Systems work to be is not relevant to any issue in this case. 
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There is an additional reason Defendants should not be allowed to dispute the amount of 
the Dairy Systems debt. There is a time honored equitable principle called "estoppel" that 
prevents a party from disputing certain facts when a person has previously asserted those facts to 
his advantage. In this case, Defendants represented to a federally insured bank in the State of 
Idaho and to the United States Department of Agriculture that they had paid $225,000.00 to 
Dairy Systems for 90 percent of electrical retrofit on the project. On the basis of that 
representation, Defendants obtained $2 million from Citizens Community Bank of Idaho that 
was guaranteed 80 percent by the United States Department of Agriculture. While Mr. Zebe has 
admitted during his testimony that this was an outright misrepresentation to the banks, 
Defendants, because of that conduct, should be estopped from now asserting they are not 
responsible to pay in full what they represented that they had paid. 
Dated this day of November, 2010. 
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.e. 
Blake S. Atkin 
Attorney for the Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant 
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BJake S. Atkin (ISB# 6903) 
7579 North Westside Highway 
Clifton, fdaho 83228 
TeJephone: (208) 747-3414 
ATKIN LAW OFFICES. P.C. 
837 South 500 West, SuIte 200 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 533-0300 
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380 
Attorney fot Plaintiff/Counterclaim Dt4fendant 
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l_ ! 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
BANNOCKCOUNTY STATEOFIDABO 
GA YLEN CLAYSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON ZEBE, ruCK LA WSON~ and LAZB~ LLC, 
Defendants, 
DON ZEBE, RICK LA WSON, and LAZE, LLC, 
Counterclaim Plaintiffs, 
v. 
GA YLEN CLAYSON, 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER DAMAGE ASPECTS 
or DECISION DATED 
SEP1ME)(8Eltt5,2010 
Case No: CV-2009-022J2·0C 
Judge: Stephen S. DUllU 
Plaintift: by and through undersigned counsel, hereby subtnits this Reply Memorandum 
in Support of its Motion to Reconsider Damage Aspects of .Decision Dated September 15, 2010. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF HAS ADMlSSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE VALUE or mE 
CBEES1i! PLANT AT THE nME IT WAS CONVEYED TO THE 
DEFENDANTS. 
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Shortly after joining Gaylen Clayson i.n the SVC. LLC venture to refurbish and bring the : 
Cheese plant on line, Defendants prepared a business plan for the purpose of soliciting money to 
purch~e the cheese plant and to bring it on line. Zebe Deposition transcript at pp. 6-11,21-22. 
As Par: of that ef'fol1, Defendants commissioned two appraisals on the property. One was an 
appraisal of the plant equipment by William Sulzer, and the other was an appraisal of the rea] 
I 
estate :by the broker Val Pendleton. Mr. Sulzer appraised the equipment at $2,760,100.00 and 
Mr. Pendlcton appraised the plant, restaurant, and acreage at $2,100,000.00. These appraisals 
were appended to the busilless plan and referred to in the business pJan under the title of 
"funding." The busincss plan also included financial statements of SVC, LLC whioh represented 
the value of the equipment at $1,150,000. Defendants then. uaed the business plan with its 
financials and appraisals to obtain loans from the bank of at least $1.6 mOtion. See. Deposition 
transcript of Don Zebe, p. 38. The business plan with its opinions of value and the loan 
documentc; is not hearsay and even if it were the p1an would be admissible as exceptions to the 
hearsay rule. 
The fact that tbe bank loaned substantial amounts on the plant and equipment on the basis 
of the ~usiness plan with its representations as to the value of the property is admissible evidence 
of the value of the property. See, U.S. v. Licavoli, 604 F. 2d 613 (9th Cir. 1979) em denied. 446 
U.S. 935 (1980)(fact that insw-er relied on appraisal before any litigation made appraisaJ 
l·eliable). 
A. The values of the plaDt and ill eqbipmeat are admiss.ble under Idaho 
Rule of EvideDQ 801(d)(2)(B) as beinl adopted by the Delead .. t 




Don Zebe wrote the business p]an, Zebe deposition transcript at p. 5. On the page of the 
business plan entitled "Funding," Mr. Zebe specifically states that '<the appraisal of this 
equipment was done by Bill Sulzer of Stateo in the amount of $2,760,100.00." lobe deposition 
! 
transcript at p. 39. 
i By definition, this statement by Mr. Zebe, a party opponent, is not hearsay. Rule 
, , 
801 (d)( 1 )(2) (A) provides that "A statement is not hearsay if. . . The statement is offered against 
a party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or representative capacity, .. i 
The statements as to value in the business plan are not hea.i'say and are thus admissible as 
evidence of the value of the property. 
Even though the broker's opinion of the value of the real estate is 110t specifically 
mentioned in the body of the business plan, it i.s appended thereto as a "supporting document." 
TIlUS, evidencing Mr. Zebe's adoption of that appraisal and making it not hearsay under rule 
80 1 (d)(2)(B). That rule provides that "A statement i.s not hearsay if .•.. The statement is 
offered against a party and is a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption .... " 
. When Do~ Zebe relied on the apPl'aisai values of the Cbeese Plant and its equipment 
given to him by William Sulzer and Val Pendelton by including them in his business plan, his 
actions manifested an ado,ption of those 1lumbers. As a result. those appraisal numbers are not 
hearsay and are admissible as all. adn1ission of a party opponent under Idaho Rule of Eviden.¢e 
80 1 (d)(2)(B). White Industries, Inc. v. CeS§l!a Aircraft Company, 611 F.Supp 1049 (W.O. Mo. 
1985), discusses wh,en a party's use of a document supplied by another in fact represents that 
party's intended assertion of the truth of the information contained in that document and 
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therefore an adoptive admission can be found. While the ~ case relied on the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, Rule 801 (d)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules is the same as the correspondin.g federal rule. 
I 
! Don Zebe, who prepared the business plan which was submitted to the bank for the 
, , 
purpose of obtaining financing,. included in that business plan appraisals by both William Sulzel' . , I 
and Val Pendelton as to the value of the plant, restaurant, equipment and the acreage on. whiclt . 
the cheese plant i$ located. As a result of the business pJan, Defendahts ultimately received loans : 
from Citizens Community Bank totaling at least $1.6 million. Se~ Zebe deposition transcript at 
p.38. 
According to White. in order to find an "adoptive" admission 
the mere fact that the party bas acted (or fajled to act, in the case of an admission 
by silence) in some wa.y in reference to the statement or information (as by 
! repeating it or retaining it) is not sufficient, stImding alone, to justifY a finding that 
I there has been an adoption. Instead, the surrounding cliCumstances. incJuding the 
. circumstances and nature of the underlying statement itself, must be examined to 
: determine whether an intent to adopt the statement is fairly reflected by the act or 
failure to act which is in question. 
Whi~,' 611 F.Supp. at 1062 (Internal citations omitted). Zebe's inclusion of the Sulzet· and 
Pendelton numbers in his business plan evidences an intent to adopt! those numbers. The ~ 
court goes on to state tbat while it may be difficult to find adoption when c'the document (or 
, 
infonnation fTom it) is merely used in some internal fashion by the party", Id. at 1063, "there is 
no doubt that where a party's use of a document supplied by another in fact represents the party's 
intended assertion of the truthlhood in. the information therein, an adoptive admission. ean be 
found." M!: at 1063. 
Don Zebe prepared the business plan. Zebe deposition transcrIpt at p. 5. As part of the 
business plan, in 'the seotion entitled "Funding," Mr. Zebe states that, with regard. to the loan 
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being sought, it would "be secured by all fixtures, ftuniture~ equipmellt, treatment pJan~ water 
treatlnent facility. excluding the restaurant equipment. The appraisal of this equipment was done 
by Bill Sulzor of Stat co in the amount of $2,760,100." Zebe deposipon transcript at p. 39. ntat 
appraisal was done by Mr. Sulzer at the request of Mr. Zebe. Zebe deposition transcript at pp. . 
3940~ Mr. Zebe also hlcluded in the business plan an estimated opinion of value based on 
nonnBI market conditions of the Star Valley Cheese Plant, Restaurant, and Acreage, in the 
amount of $2,100,000.00. lebe deposition transcript, Exhibit 1. One of the purposes of writing 
a business plan is to convince lending institutions to lend you money. Zebe deposition transcript 
at p. 21. Mr. Zebe provided the business plan to the lending _institutions tbat Defendants were 
seeking to borrow the money from, including Citizens Community Bank. Zebe deposition 
trans~ipt at p. 11·12. Defendants ultimately borrowed at least $1.6 million fTOm Citizens 
Community Bank as a result of the business plan submitted previously. Zebe deposition 
transcript at p. 38 . 
. By using tbe appraisal values of Sulzer and Pende1ton in the business plan and submitting I 
that business plan to the bank for the purpose of obtaining t'irumeing. which they did obtain. in the 
amount of at least $1.6 million, Zebe deposition transcript at p. 38, Defendants can not now 
I 
claim that these numbers are hearsay and eannot be admitted. This information is admissible as 
. an exception to the hearsay rule under Idaho Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(2)(B) . 
. B. EVEN IF HEARSAY, THE APPRAISALS ATTACHED TO THE 
BUSINESS PLAN ARE EXCEPTIONS TO TIlE HEARSAY RULE 
Even W01'ethe appraisals still considered hearsay despite Mr. Zebe's adoption of them, 
it is not true that appraisals and the like must be excluded as hearsay. The business plan with its 
attached financials and appraisals are business records and thus ex~ons to the hearsay rule. 
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TIllS business plan and the appraisals were prepared in the course ofSVC's attempts to obtain the 
'fillancing necessaty to purchase the cheese plant and was in fact used for that purpose. Zebe; 
deposition transcript at pp. 11-12,21,39-46. The copy of the apPPlisal we have today was kept 
by Syc, LLC and is the only coPY of the business plan that was ever created. Zebe deposition 
tran~ipt at pp.l 0-] 1. The business plan was assembled using information provided to Mr. ! 
Zebe by Gaylen ~layson, Val Pendleton. and William Sul7..er, with the best information they had ; 
at the time. zebe deposition transcript at pp. 24, 39-46. It was prepared by the Defendants at a 
tim.e When they were still working with the Plaintiff, [plaintiff relinquished his interest in SVC. 
LLC on October 2, 2008 and entered into the contract to purchase the Cheese Plant and 
Restaurant on October 17, 2008 and assigned that contract to Defendants on November 4,2008] 
and not for the purpose of litigation, was submitted to banks. financial institutions, and 
governm.ent agencies who guarantee loans, and loans were a.ctually obtained from those 
institutioac; to purcbase the Plant and restaurant. Zebe deposition transeript at pp. 8-9, 1.1-14, 37. 
Appraisals, even when standing alone and not as part of a business record and even when offered 
without the presence of the appraiser, arc often admitted under the busin.ess records exception to 
the hearsay rule, Rule 803(6), or the general exception, Rule 803(24). hI fact, rule 803(6) , 
specifically allows admission of "opinions" if found within a business record, such as 
Defen~ants business pJan. Both exceptions apply in this case. U.S. V. Licaygli, 604 F. 2d 613, 
(9th cir. 1979) eert. denied 446 U.S. 935 (1980); Selig v. U~, 740 F. 2d 572 (61i1 cir. 1984); Aero 
Union Com. v. U.S. 1981 WL 30814 (ct. c1. 1981). As the analysis of these cases show, the 
, 
locus is on the circumstances surrounding the creation and use of the documents that indicate , 
trustworthiness. ~~ Cl1ri$nsen v . .Rice, l14 Id. 929, 763 P. 2d 302 (Ct. App. 1988)(Certain ~ 
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types of hearsay evidence are admissibJe because the circumstan.ces behind their creation impHes 
a high degree of veracity). The fact that an appraisal was not created for purposes of litigation i.s 
I 
one such compelling fact that supports admissibility of the document. ~,Mo Union Coll'. v .. , , 
, 
I U.S" :1981 WL 30814 (Ct. 01. 1981). SimilarJy, the fact that persons other than the proponent of· , 
, , 
the document reJied on the appraisal before the litigation began is strong support for its reliability 
and tberefore its admissibility. U.s. v. Licavoli, 604 F. 2d 613, (9th cir. 1979). In this case~ 
Defendants relied on the app1-aisals in the business plan that they submitted to the bank that I 
provided their purchase money fOl'the cheese plant. 
, In addition to the business record exception, the business ptan with its fmancials and 
appraisals fit cleanly in the "other exceptio11s" of Rule 803(24). A document is admissible under 
this rule if (A) it is offered as evidence of a material f~ (B) the statement is m.ore probative on 
the point for which it Is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure 
through reasonable' efforts; and (C) the general purpose of the rules of evidence and the interests 
of justice will best be served by admission of the statement. 
: The values of the business that Gaylen Clayson relinquished and conveyed to Defendants 
is a materi.al que$tion in this case and the busin.ess plan, its financials and its appraisals offer 
cogent' and reliable evidence of that material fact. The values that Defendants assigned to the 
0pp0rf:1:mity they obtained from Gaylcn Clayson before the litigation was commen.ced is more 
probative of those values than any hired gun expert could poovide, and because this document 
was created before the litigation, indeed before the falling out between the parties, was relied 
upon by the Defendants in attemptillg to procure fmancing, and was relied upon by the lenders in 
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loaning at least $1,600~OOO.OO to the Defendants, the business plan and its values serve the. 
purpdse of the rules of evidence and the interests of justice. 
CONCLUSION 
I Since Defendants' opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider and anow Plaintiff to 
show'the tinder of fact the true value of the business opportunity Plaintiff relinquished to the 
Defe"dants is limited to argument that Plaintiff cannot prove that value, and because, as shown i 
I '
above~ admissible non hearsay admissions of the Defendants establish that value at over $4 : 
, "I
million, the Court should grant Plaintiff's motion and allow the Plaintiff to show the value of the 
business through the business plan Don Zebe wrote . 
. DATED THIS 21 s1 day of October, 2010. 
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
~~ •. 
Blak.e S. Atkin 
Attorney for the Piaintiff/Cmlnterciaim Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT dfrlIE" ;). 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
Register#CV -2009-2212-0C 






DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, and LAZE, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, and LAZE, LLC, ) 
) 




GA YLEN CLAYSON, ) 
) 
Counterclaim Defendant. ) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
ON MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS 
This matter is before the Court on Motions by both parties for costs and attorney fees. The 
Court has considered all written submissions of both parties, as well as the arguments of counsel, 
\. together with applicable rules and legal authority, and now renders this Memorandum Decision. i' i 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This matter involved a dispute over a claim for reimbursement of expenses incurred by 
the Plaintiff in partial refurbishment the Star Valley Cheese Plant in 2008, prior to the time the 




Defendants obtain control over and ultimately purcI:l.ased the cheese plant. I In summary, the 
Decision, filed December 6, 2010, awarded some, but not all of the damages sought by Plaintiff, 
in the total amount of $97,310.94. The MSJ, filed September 15,2010, found that no contract 
existed between the parties, determined that several other claims should be dismissed, but 
allowed the case to go forward on equitable theories of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment 
for certain damages. At trial the Plaintiff s damage claims were further limited, with Plaintiff 
being allowed to seek reimbursement of amounts paid to Dairy Systems directly, but not any 
additional amounts sought by Dairy Systems. 
80th parties now file requests for costs and fees, asserting that they were the prevailing 
party. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In any determination of an award of costs and fees, the threshold question is which party 
prevailed. LR.C.P. 54(e)(l) states: "In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney 
fees, which at the discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or 
parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(8), when provided for by any statute or contract." [Emphasis 
added]. LRC.P. 54(d)(l)(8) governs the prevailing party issue: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial 
court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in 
relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court in its sound 
discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in 
part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair 
I The Court's Trial Decision ("Decision"), filed December 6, 2010, sets forth the facts found by the Court in this 
case, and are incorporated herein by reference. Also incorporated herein is the Court's Memorandum Decision 
("MSJ"), filed September 15,2010, which granted summary judgment to Defendants on several issues raised by 
Plaintiff in this case. 




and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action 
and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained. 
The determination of who is the prevailing party is committed to the sound discretion of the trial 
court. Rockefeller v.Grabow, 139 Idaho 538, 82 P.3d 450 (2003). 
The legal basis for an award of costs is LR.C.P. 54(d)(l). Some costs are awarded to a 
prevailing party as a matter of right and some costs can be awarded in the discretion of the Court. 
Discretionary costs are allowed "upon a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional 
costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse 
party." When objections to discretionary costs are made the Court "shall make express findings 
as to why such specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed." Such costs 
may also be disallowed without objection, in the discretion of the Court and upon express 
findings. The determination of whether a cost is "exceptional" involves an evaluation both of the 
cost itself, i.e., whether it is the kind of cost commonly incurred in the type of litigation at issue, 
and whether the case itself is exceptional. City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 130 P.3d 
1118 (2006); Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 109 P.3d 161 (2005); 
Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 960 P.2d 175 (1998). 
The award of attorney fees is governed by LR.C.P. 54(e)(1), which provides that such an 
award is discretionary, to the prevailing party, "when provided for by any statute or contract." 
Whether to award fees and the amount of the fees awarded are matters of discretion, unless it 
involves a specific determination of a statute which allows for attorney fees. Grover v. 




Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60, 205 P.3d 1196 (2009); Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705,201 P.3d 1282 
(2009); Contreras v. Rubley, 142 Idaho 573, 130 P.3d 1111 (2006). 
If fees are awarded, the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, must consider the 
factors set forth in LR.C.P. 54(e)(3). Sanders v. Lankford, 135 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d 823 
(Ct.App.2000); Boe! v. Stewart Title Co., 137 Idaho 9, 16,43 P.3d 768, 775 (2002); Brinkman v. 
Aids Insurance Co., 115 Idaho 346, 351, 766 P.2d 1227, 1232 (1988). The district court must, at 
a minimum, provide a record which establishes that the court considered these factors. Building 
Concepts, Ltd. v. Pickering, 114 Idaho 640, 645, 759 P.2d 931, 936 (Ct.App.1988). A trial court 
need not specifically address all of the factors contained in LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) in writing, so long 
as the record clearly indicates that the court considered them all. Brinkman, 115 Idaho at 351, 
766 P.2d at 1232. In addition, a court need not blindly accept those attorney fees requested by a 
party, and may disallow those fees that were incurred unnecessarily or unreasonably. Craft Wall 
of Idaho, Inc. v. Stonebraker, 108 Idaho 704, 706, 701 P.2d 324,326 (Ct.App.1985). 
Plaintiff seeks recovery of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3), claiming that this 
matter involves a commercial transaction. Defendants do not identify any particular basis for 
their claim for attorney fees. Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides: 
In any civil action to recoyer on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except 
transactions for personal or household purposes. 




"A court is not required to award reasonable attorney fees every time a commercial 
transaction is connected with a case. The critical test is whether the commercial transaction 
comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit; the commercial transaction must be integral to the claim 
and constitute a basis on which the party is attempting to recover." Bingham v. Montane 
Resources Assoc., 133 Idaho 420, 426, 987 P.2d 1035, 1041 (1999). The award of attorney fees 
is warranted when the commercial transaction comprises the crux of the lawsuit. Broods v. 
Gigray Ranches, Inc., 910 P.2d 744,750 (1996). There is a two-part test in determining whether 
attorney fees are appropriate in a commercial transaction. "First, the commercial transaction 
must be integral to the claim, and second, the commercial transaction must provide the actual 
basis for recovery." Iron Eagle Development, LLC v. Qualify Design Systems, Inc., 65 P.3d 509, 
515 (2003). If the complaint asserts a claim under a contract that qualifies as a commercial 
transaction under I.C. § 12-120(3), this statute must be applied even if no liability under the 
contract is established. Lexington Heights Develop. LLC v.Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 287, 92 
P.3d 526, 537 (2004); Peterson v. Shore, 146 Idaho 476, 197 P.3d 789 (Ct.App.2008). Even 
when allowed under this statute, the amount of the award is within the discretion of the court. 
Johanneson v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423,196 P.3d 341 (2008); Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 
425, 111 P.3d 110 (2005). 
ANALYSIS AND DECISION 
The Court's first determination is whether there is a prevailing party. Both parties claim 
that they are the prevailing party. In determining the prevailing party, the Court is required to 
consider the issues and claims involved and the resulting judgment. Each party offers its own 




analysis of why they believe they prevailed. Rather than focus on what the parties have stated, 
the Court makes its own analysis of that issue. 
There were several important issues raised in this case. First, Plaintiff asserted that a 
contract existed between the parties which provided, among other things, that he would sell milk 
to the Defendants over three years and receive $500,000 for those sales, and that Defendants 
would assume all debts Plaintiff incurred in refurbishing the cheese plant, including the entire 
debt owed to Dairy Systems, arguably something in the neighborhood of $250,000. In the MSJ 
the Court found that no contract existed and that Plaintiff could not recover damages in either of 
these instances, except for the amounts paid directly by Plaintiff to Diary Systems, totaling 
$50,000.2 
Secondly, Plaintiffs complaint sought damages for extortion, duress, slander and 
defamation, but those claims were also dismissed in the MSJ, this Court concluding that no 
factual basis for these claims existed. 
Thirdly, Plaintiff was allowed to seek, on equitable theories, reimbursement of expenses 
he incurred in refurbishing the cheese plant. He also sought payment for his personal labor in 
that effort. His claims totaled $136,708, including $12,600 for his labor. In the Decision the 
Court found that there was insufficient evidence to support all of Plaintiff s claims but did award 
$97,310.94 in damages. Defendants claimed that they owed nothing to Plaintiff but, as found in 
the Decision, there was substantial evidence to support their reimbursement obligation on an 
equitable basis. 




At best, the Court concludes that the results of this case are mixed, with either side 
prevailing in part. The Idaho appellate courts have held that mixed results, including recovery 
of less than the amount sought, can support an award of attorney fees. 3 However, the Court, in 
its discretionary consideration of "the final jUdgment or result of the action in relation to the 
relief sought by the respective parties," determines that both parties "prevailed in part and did not 
prevail in part," and further determines that careful consideration of the outcomes in this case 
leads to the conclusion that no fees or costs should be awarded to either party. 
Secondarily, the Court also concludes that even if a determination had been made that the 
Plaintiff prevailed, no fees would be awarded because this case, in the final analysis, did not 
invo lve a commercial transaction. Recovery under I. C. § 12-120(3) requires a contractual 
foundation of some kind. In this case the Court found that there is no contract and that any 
recovery was on an equitable basis. This is insufficient to find a commercial transaction.4 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court denies both Motions for Attorney Fees and Costs. The 
Judgment will not be amended. 
2 At trial Plaintiff continued to claim that he could be reimbursed for the total Dairy Systems bill, but that claim was 
not allowed. 
3 Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 203 P.3d 702 (2009) (attorney fee award upheld even though prevailing party 
recovered substantially less than the relief sought); Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 
141 Idaho 716, 117 P.3d 130 (2005) (award offees upheld although recovery on counterclaim was less than ten 
percent of amount sought); Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 191 P.3d 1107 (Ct.App.2008); Chadderdon v. King, 104 
Idaho 406,659 P.2d 160 (Ct.App.1983). Based on these cases, the question of whether Plaintiff has prevailed is a 
close one. 
4 See Hausam v. Schnable, 126 Idaho 569, 887 P.2d 1076 (Ct.App.1994). The Court notes that the successful 
defense against a contract can, in certain circumstances, be held to support a claim for fees. See Lawrence v. Jones, 
124 Idaho 748, 864 P.2d 194 (Ct.App.l993). However, in this case, Defendants successful defense of the contract 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
GA YLEN CLAYSON, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) CASE NO. CV-2009-0002212-0C 
) 
vs. ) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, AND ) 
LAZE, LLC., ) 




DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, AND ) 
LAZE, LLC., ) 
) 




GA YLEN CLAYSON, ) 
) 
Counterclaim Defendants, ) 
) 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, GA YLEN CLAYSON, AND HIS ATTORNEY, 
BLAKE S. ATKIN, 7579 NORTH WESTSIDE HWY, CLIFTON, ID 83228; AND THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - PAGE 1 
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NOTICE OF HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellants, Don Zebe, Rick Lawson and Laze, LLC, appeal against 
the above named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision, Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated December 6, 2010, and Judgment dated December 6, 2010, 
which rulings were entered in the above entitled action on the dates stated above by the Honorable 
Stephen S. Dunn, District Judge, presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments 
or orders described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)( 1) 
and/or II(a)(7), I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants then intend to 
assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the Appellants from 
asserting other issues on appeal, including the following: 
A. The Court improperly applied the law governing implied-in-fact contracts and 
quantum merit. 
B. The Court improperly concluded that Defendants were unjustly enriched 
despite Defendants having purchased the plant and equipment for its fair 
market value. 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? NO. 
5. (a) 
(b) 
Is a reporter's transcript requested? YES. 
The Appellants request the preparation of the fo llowing portions of the 
reporter's transcript: 
NOVEMBER 4, 5 and 10,2010 COURT TRIAL 
NonCE OF APPEAL - PAGE 2 
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6. The Appellants request the following documents to be included in the Clerk's record 

































NOTICE OF APPEAL - PAGE 3 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and/or 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and/or 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Plaintiffs First 
Amended Complaint to Assert a Claim for Punitive Damages; 
Motion to Continue Pursuant to IRCP 56f; 
Minute Entry and Order on Motion to Dismiss; 
Defendants Lawson and Zebe Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to DismisslMotion for Summary Judgment; 
Affidavit of Blake S. Atkin in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment; 
Affidavit of Blake S. Atkin in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment; 
Hearing result for Motion for S~ummary Judgment held 08-09-2010 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
Motion to Reconsider Damage Aspects of Decision dated 9-15-10; 
Memorandum in Support of Defense Motion in Limine; 
Second Affidavit of Gary L. Cooper; 
Defense Motion in Limine; 
Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim; 
Joint Pre-Trial Stipulation; 
Motion to Reconsider Damage Aspects of Decision dated 9-15-10; 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff s Motion for Reconsideration 
Re Damage Aspects of Decision Dated September 15,2010; 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defense Motion in Limine; 
Hearing result for Motion held on 10-25-2010; 
Trial Brief; 
Designation of Testimony from the Deposition of Morris A. Farinella 
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 11/08/2010); 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 1111012010); 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 01111/2011; 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 11/04/2010; 
Court hearing held Court Reporter; 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 1111012010; 
Hearing result for Status Conference held on 11/08/2010; 
Minute Entry and Order; Court Trial held; 




















Defense Objection to Plaintiff's Designation of Deposition Excerpts 
from the Deposition of Morris Farinella; 
Defense Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Argument; 
Plaintiff's Post Trial Brief; 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; 
Defense Memorandum on Damage Claim; 
Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum Regarding the Admissibility of Bill to 
Dairy Systems Company; 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider Damage 
Aspects of Decision Dated September 15,2010; 
Memorandum Decision on Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out 
below: 
Sheila Fish, Court Reporter 
clo District Court Clerk 
624 E Center, Room 218 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
(b)( 1) That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation ofthe reporter's transcript. 
(c)(l) That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been paid. 
(d)(1) That the Appellants filing fee has been paid. 
(e) 
II 
That service has been made upon all p(lrties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
DATED this _11-..:.-_ day of January, 20~;r.,\ 
OOfER & LARSEN 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- PAGE 4 
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Blake S. Atkin 
7579 North Westside Hwy 
Clifton, ID 83228 
Atkins Law Offices 
837 South 500 West, Ste 200 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
John D. Bowers 
Bowers Law F irrn 
PO Box 1550 
Afton, WY 83110 
Honorable Stephen S. Dunn 
District Judge 
624 E Center, Room 220 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
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Appealed from: Sixth JudiCial District, Bannock County 
Honorable Judge Stephen S. Dunn presiding 
Bannock County Case No: CV-2009-2212-OC 
Order of Judgment Appealed from: Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law filed the 6th day of December, 2010 and Judgment filed the 
7th day of December, 2010. 
Attorney for Appellant: Gary L. Cooper, COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED, 
Pocatello, Idaho. 
Attorney for Respondent: Blake S. Atkin, ATKIN LAW OFFICES, Clifton, Idaho. 
Appealed by: Don Zebe, Rick Lawson, and Laze, LLC., 
Appealed against: Gaylen Clayson 
Notice of Appeal filed: January 14, 2011 
Notice of Cross-Appeal filed: No 
Appellate fee paid: Yes 
Request for additional records filed: No 
785 
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FEB - 12011 
Supreme Court_Colirt af./Geals_ 
tille, <,d on ATS b ,I.l£,.l.. 
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No 
Name of Reporter: Sheila Fish 
Was District Court Reporter's transcript requested? Yes 
Estimated Number of Pages: More than 500 
Dated~~O L\,2D\1 
DALE HATCH, .. 
Clerk of the District Court 
786 
IN THE DISTRICT OF THE .s,IXTH JUllJtlC'lAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE' COUNTY OF BANNOCK 




DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, AND LAZE, LLC., 
SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 38471-2011 
DISTRICT COURT CASE NO. 2009-2212 
The transcript in the above entit led matte r 
consisting of 516 pages was lodged with the District 
Court Clerk at the Bannock County Courthouse in 
Pocate llo , Idaho, on the 29th day of March, 2011. 
The following hearings were lodged: 
November 4 , 2011, Court Trial; November 5, 2011, Court 
Trial; November 10, 2011, Court Trial. 
DATED this 29th day of March, 2011. 
Via: 
(XX) Hand-Delivery 
( ) U.S. Mail 
(XX) Electronic Copy to ISC/COA; BCCO; AG; SAPO 
Cc: 
(Signature of Reporter) 
SHEILA T. FISH, RPR, CSR 
(Typed name of Reporter) 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
GAYLEN CLAYSON, ) 
) 








Supreme Court No. 38471-2011 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, DALE HATCH, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that the 
above and foregoing record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound 
under my direction as, and is a true, full, and correct record of the pleadings and 
documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho appellate 
Rules. 
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-
entitled cause, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along 
with the court reporteris transcript and the clerk's record as required by Rule 31 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
788 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of said Court at Pocatello, Idaho, this _-'--_ day 2011. 
(Seal) 
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DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, LAZE, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant, ) 
Supreme Court No. 38471-2011 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, DALE HATCH, the duly elected, qualified and acting Clerk of the District 
Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Bannock, do hereby certify that the following are the original exhibits marked for 
identification and introduced in evidence at trial of the above and foregoing 
cause, to wit: 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS 
1. Exhibit SA Ferinella Desposition. 
2. Exhibit 11 IRE 1006, Summary of Clayson Invoices paid by SVc. 
3. Exhibit 11-A Bills paid through Nov. 25, 2008. 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS 
1. Exhibit D Contract to Buy Real Estate. 
2. Exhibit G Pages 1-4 of Invoices and Statements of Dairy Systems. 
790 
3. Exhibit I Star Valley Cheese business plan. 
4. Exhibit J Article of Organization. 
5. Exhibit K Annual Report from Milk Market Management. 
6. Exhibit N Addendum A1 Assignment. 
7. Exhibit Q Financial from 12/31/08 to 6/30/09, pages 7 and 8, and 
last two pages. 
8. Exhibit S Email from Don Zebe date 2/25/09. 
9. Exhibit U Email from Don Zebe dated 1/31/09. 
10. Exhibit V Email from Don Zebe dated 2/19/09. 
11. Exhibit W Email from Don Zebe dated 2/25/09. 
12. Exhibit X Email form Don Zebe dated 3/7/09. 
13. Exhibit CC Affidavit of Jeff Randall. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that the above exhibits are attached to, and made a 
part of, the original transcript on appeal in said cause. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of said Court, this the __ day of ~~t=--:~~--, 2011. 
(Seal) 
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DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, LAZE, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendant-Counterclai mant-Appellant. ) 
--------------------------) 
Supreme Court No. 38471-2011 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, DALE HATCH, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that I 
have personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT and CLERK'S RECORD to each of the Attorneys of 
Record in this cause as follows: 
Gary L. Cooper 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
Post Office Box 4229 
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4229 
Blake S. Atkin 
ATKIN LAW OFFICES 
7579 North Westside Hwy 
Clifton, Idaho 83228 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
r 
of said Court at Pocatello, Idaho, this ----"""--- day ofC2~,~2011. 
'1 
(Seal) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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